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II. KANT AND THE NEW WAY OF WORDS*

1. In his new book Wilfrid Sellars attempts to present a systematic over-all picture of his philosophical views, thereby giving an explicit account of the philosophical system whose outlines were previously to be grasped only through a multitude of separate papers.¹ Sellars hopes that the book will, 'in addition to standing on its own feet as a piece of sustained argument . . . provide a framework within which the above mentioned papers will gain in intelligibility' (p. vii). There is certainly a need for such a framework, for understanding Sellars is notoriously hard. The difficulties are in part due to external factors — matters of style, way of reference, etc. — but it is essential to note — as R. J. Bernstein, in his heroic review of *Science, Perception and Reality*², has also emphasized — that the main difficulty in grasping Sellars is due to an element of his philosophy which is, in fact, also its most valuable feature, namely, its synthesizing tendency, its bringing together traditionally incompatible conceptions, its combining traditionally distant arguments.

Science and Metaphysics is, thus, primarily not an account of new results, but rather an attempt to make formerly won insights intelligible. This is the reason for the quasi-historical guise of the book.

Philosophy without the history of philosophy if not empty or blind, is at least dumb. Thus, if I build my discussion of contemporary issues on a foundation of Kant exegesis and commentary it is because, as I see it, there are enough close parallels between the problems confronting him and the steps he took to solve them, on the one hand, and the current situation and its demands, on the other, for it to be helpful to use him as a means of communication, though not, of course, as a means only (p. 1).

In translating his own position into Kantian terminology, Sellars at the same time, obviously, gives a modern formulation to the original Kantian problems. He has always believed — rightly, I think — that such a re-

* Wilfrid Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics. Variations on Kantian Themes*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1968, x+ 246 pp. Page references in parentheses refer to this work unless otherwise specified.

formulation is extremely helpful, for 'while the new questions may be clearer, they will none the less be in essence the same' as the old ones.³ The questions asked in *Science and Metaphysics* are expressed in a 'new way of words', but they have not lost their Kantian flavour.

2. The argument of the book rests on two basic ideas, one quite un-Kantian, the other deeply Kantian. The former concerns the role of analogy in philosophy. In contrast to Kant, Sellars maintains that the concept of analogy can be put to positive use in the clarification of questions confronting theoretical philosophy. The kind of analogies Sellars has in mind are those applied in scientific concept-formation, those leading to the so-called *theoretical constructs* of science. 'As I see it', writes Sellars, 'the use of analogy in theoretical science, unlike that in theology, generates new determinate concepts. It does not merely indirectly specify certain unknown attributes . . . ' (p. 49). Sellars stresses the fact that several negative features of Kant's philosophy — in particular, its *agnosticism* — can be eliminated from the system of critical philosophy, if the concept of analogy is put to proper use. According to Sellars, the idea that the noumenal world is in essential respects *analogous in structure* to the spatio-temporal world can be reconciled with the main insights of Kant. It is important to note, however, that *within* the system of Kant's philosophy this analogy can be postulated only transcendently, i.e. we do not know and cannot know just *what* the analogy consists in. Now on Sellars's view it is not the unknowable *Ding an sich* which lies behind the phenomenal world, but the world of *scientific entities*, and these can be approached with the help of *scientific analogies*. Incidentally, nowhere in Sellars's earlier writings does the concept of analogy play such an explicit role. I see two reasons for its becoming so prominent here. The first has been indicated already: because the question of analogy is a point on which the philosophies of Kant and Sellars differ in important respects, stress has to be laid on it in this book where the author approaches his own philosophy through that of Kant. The other reason is that here Sellars has to explain a great many things in the course of a relatively short argument. He thus has to make explicit reference to the heuristic principles which, in his more detailed arguments, are used rather than mentioned.

The concept of analogy is of particular importance to the clarification of the relation of *language and thought*. This subject is treated in the third chapter. Sellars draws attention to an analogy that is widely if only implicitly recognized, between *linguistic acts* and *mental acts*. His suggestion is that we should construe the relation between *conceptual representings* and their content, the *conceptual representeds*, as analogical to that between linguistic expressions and their meanings. This implies, further, that those properties of conceptual representings by virtue of which they represent their content should be construed on the analogy of those properties by virtue of which linguistic expressions stand for their meaning.

Sellars emphasizes that this is not a *discovered* analogy. That is, we did not reflect first upon the nature of thought and then upon the nature of language (or vice versa), finally coming to the conclusion that there are significant

likenesses between them. Conceptual acts as such are, rather, *postulated* by the application of these very analogies, in order to arrive at theoretical constructs with the help of which the explanation of certain phenomena becomes possible. More precisely, the postulation of conceptual acts is a phenomenon occurring already at the common-sense level, and the task of the philosopher is to *reconstruct* this process of postulation. The philosopher, by working out some sort of historical fiction, must show that it is possible to describe a community which *does not have* the concept of mental acts, i.e. one for which every conceptual representing involves explicitly *linguistic* acts. Now as far as mere *description* goes, argues Sellars, linguistic behaviour can be characterized perfectly in the vocabulary of this community, i.e. in this respect it is not necessary to refer to publicly unobservable, inner mental occurrences. We can imagine, however, some members of the community discovering that by postulating a publicly non-observable, 'underlying' level, a better *explanation* of certain concrete properties of linguistic behaviour is made possible. The concept of 'thinking' has been hitherto unknown to this community; only the concept of 'thinking-out-loud' is employed, and this latter concept does not suggest to them, as it does to us, that 'in thinking-out-loud covert conceptual episodes are, so to speak, coming to the surface and finding their appropriate expression in speech' (p. 75). It is clear that even on this view the occurrence of each thinking-out-loud, with the exception of direct reactions evoked by the constantly changing environment, can only be interpreted as the manifestation of some prior disposition, for on any alternative interpretation it would seem that the members of this community quite irrationally think-out-loud now this, now that. On the other hand, these dispositions are themselves constantly changing, and as any change at the level of potentialities necessarily points to a change at the level of actualities, the members of our fictitious community come to postulate certain inner episodes which are in every relevant respect analogous to thinkings-out-loud, without being, however, publicly observable. These inner episodes, called 'mental acts', are then used to explain the fact that, in the absence of thinkings-out-loud, certain changes take place as the result of which, at any given moment, the propensities to think-out-loud are the same as if, during the interval, the speaker had been noticing-out-loud every change in his environment, and used these noticings-out-loud as premisses in reasonings-out-loud and decidings-out-loud. It is in this way that 'mental acts' can be construed as theoretical constructs which enable those who use them to give a better explanation of linguistic, and even non-linguistic, behaviour.

3. The argument of the book is, as indicated above, borne by two major leitmotives, of which the application of analogies is the first. The other is less easily located. In fact it does not become adequately characterizable as long as we remain at the level of theoretical philosophy, i.e. epistemology and ontology. Only on transcending this domain and on taking up the problems of 'practical philosophy' can we recognize it — and only then can we see how close the connection between Kant and Sellars really is. Too many things have happened in the sciences and in logic since the days of

Kant to make the parallels in theoretical philosophy *prima facie* obvious. It is only when the question 'What is man?' is raised that we come to see the essence of the relationship between Kant and Sellars — and only then do we begin to understand at all the latter's philosophy. 'In their most general aspects', writes Sellars in connection with Kant, 'both his problems and our perplexities spring from the attempt to take both man and science seriously' (p. 1). *Man follows norms* — thus could we sum up in one sentence the common assertion, and the fundamental problem, of the two philosophies. What does it mean, and how is it possible, to follow norms in a world where norms and rules *do not really exist*, where there are only natural laws and uniformities? The question, naturally, first arises in ethics, but Sellars — in harmony with Kant — asserts that the questions of theoretical philosophy cannot be answered in isolation from this problem either, and emphasizes that

unless and until the 'scientific realist' can give an adequate explication of concepts pertaining to the recognition of norms and standards by rational beings his philosophy of mind must remain radically unfinished business (p. x).

Let us, then, begin the survey of the main argument with an attempt to outline Sellars's ethical theory. It is the last, seventh, chapter which deals with the 'metaphysics of practice'. In interpreting it, an earlier paper by Sellars, 'Imperatives, Intentions and the Logic of "Ought"' (henceforth 'Imperatives') will be of great help.⁴

Understanding the role of ethical norms, as Kantianism pointed out with great clarity, is made difficult by the fact that in the light of analysis the concept of 'ethical imperative' seems to become self-contradictory. The mode of behaviour prescribed by the 'categorical imperative' is, on the one hand, binding on every human being (not everyone follows moral norms, but everyone ought to follow them); yet, on the other hand, it seems impossible to explain why a norm, which according to ethical intuition, does not express a *natural* necessity, should be necessarily binding. If, for example, some moral imperative prescribes that everyone should strive towards maximal individual happiness, then, argued Kant and the neo-Kantians, this norm is universally valid either because everyone, with natural necessity, strives exclusively towards individual happiness, and in this case the specifically moral character of the imperative is not accounted for — ethics becomes an inventory of useful hints for finding the *cleverest* way to achieve an independently given aim — or else the validity is due to some other, higher imperative, but then again the question arises: *why* do we have to follow this higher imperative? 'How', asks Sellars, 'can we combine the conception of moral action on principle, with the idea that the principles in question are *reasonable* principles?' ('Imperatives', p. 206).

Sellars's method, here as always, is to analyse the contrasting arguments into their logical elements, to evaluate them separately, and then — by extracting from them whatever truth they seem to contain — to develop his own position as a sort of Hegelian synthesis. In the present case Sellars considers it absolutely necessary to preserve the idea that ethical norms are in *some* sense binding, i.e. that their connection with the relevant action is

not merely contingent. Ethics absolutely has to reconstruct the fact that 'the connection between moral thinking and doing [is] analytic' ('Imperatives', p. 162). The fact that this connection must be direct, indeed, conceptual, leads Sellars to attempt a logical analysis of the moral 'ought' in terms of the concept of 'intention', for intentions — and, even more directly, volitions — conceptually involve the doing of the relevant action. Volitions are 'mental acts' that can be construed on the analogy of statements of the form 'Now I shall do *A*', and the essence of the Sellarsian conception could be summarized by saying that the above-mentioned mental acts are just those which — *ceteris paribus*, i.e. in the absence of unfavourable conditions — are manifested, due to their conceptual construction, in the doing of *A*. 'Volitions' are theoretical constructs introduced for the very purpose of explaining the occurrence of *doings* — i.e. those practical acts which cannot be construed as direct responses to the environment — and so the connection between volitions and the appropriate doings really is analytic. As to intentions, they can be construed as delayed volitions. The relation of intentions and volitions is characterizable chronologically. The statement, 'I shall raise my hand in ten minutes', expresses an intention. It could not do this, however, were it not part of a conceptual structure which systematically reflects the *constant change of time*: this statement, if we suppose that nothing leads the subject to consider an alternative course of action, undergoes continuous modifications, thereby signalling that the time of action is nearing. Finally, *ceteris paribus*, the original statement becomes the statement 'I shall raise my hand now', which already expresses a volition, and is manifested, *ceteris paribus*, in a raising of the hand.

But although 'shall' statements expressing intentions are conceptually connected to the doing of the appropriate action, and thus satisfy one of the demands that 'ought' statements have to satisfy, they fail to do justice to the specific features of 'ought' statements in other important respects. The former are fundamentally subjective — one could say egocentric — whereas the latter have an essentially intersubjective status. This finds expression in the fact that 'shall' statements — in contrast to 'ought' statements — have no proper negation. If Smith says, 'I shall raise my hand', and Jones answers, 'You shall not raise your hand', these statements are not logically contradictory, even if it is clear that the two intentions *conflict*. 'Ought' statements, however, can be meaningfully contradicted. The statements, 'Smith ought to raise his hand' and 'Smith ought not to raise his hand', are *logically incompatible*. But to see this difficulty is already to take the first step towards the solution. Sellars draws attention to the fact that although intentions *as such* are not intersubjective, there still *are* intersubjective intentions. This becomes apparent the moment we think of the persons with conflicting intentions as constituting not just a multitude, but a *community*. As Sellars says:

I wish to emphasize that when the concept of a group is 'internalized' as the concept of *us*, it becomes a form of consciousness and, in particular, a form of *intending*. . . it is clear that a person who shares none of the intentions of the group could scarcely be said to be one of *us* ('Imperatives', p. 203).

The intentions of the members of a community can differ from each other in innumerable ways. But there are necessarily some intentions in common, and those that are relevant from a moral point of view are exactly of this kind: in some ways they *constitute* the community.

We seem to be on the right track, then, if we construe 'ought' statements as a special case of those 'shall' statements which express common intentions — these latter are called 'shall we' statements by Sellars. But what special case? This question concerns the essence of morality, and, as Sellars emphasizes, it was Kant who came nearest to answering it.

The central theme of Kant's ethical theory is, in our terminology, the *reasonableness* of intentions. In what sense or senses, if any, can *intentions* be said to be reasonable, i.e. have a *claim* on the assent of a rational being? Kant clearly construes this task as parallel to the task of defining in what sense or senses, if any, *beliefs* can be said to be reasonable, i.e. have a *claim* on the assent of a rational being. As in his epistemology, Kant sides with the rationalists against both the empiricist and the sceptic — but gives rationalism that twist which makes all the difference. In both areas his insights were so revolutionary that they are even now just beginning to be absorbed (p. 208).

The primary distinction Kant draws is between 'hypothetical' (or, as Sellars prefers, 'relative') and 'categorical' reasonableness. The reasonableness of Kant's hypothetical imperatives is relative. The hypothetical imperative, as the conclusion of some inference, is reasonable if the intention serving as a premiss is reasonable. Sellars draws attention to the fact that in the domain of theoretical reasoning it is customary to distinguish between the *validity* and the *goodness* of arguments. An argument is valid, if its conclusion is reasonable relative to its premiss. To say that it is good is to add that the premiss is reasonable. (This way of putting the matter suggests that truth is a special case of reasonableness. We will see that this is what Sellars actually maintains.) The situation is similar in the domain of practical reason, only here the reasonableness of the premiss does not involve the concept of truth. But what *does* it involve then?

Kant is clearly looking for a property of intentions which corresponds to *truth*. In short, he is attempting to discover what might make practical arguments *good* as opposed to merely valid (p. 210).

An intention is 'categorically' valid, if it can be justified by a *good* practical argument. Sellars stresses that among the premisses of a statement expressing some categorically reasonable intention there might well be intentions having a conditional form, and these latter are themselves categorically reasonable. We still do not have an answer to the question as to *what* makes an intention categorically reasonable, but one very important point is already clearly emerging here: the concept of 'ought' statements can be explicated on the basis of the concept of categorically reasonable intention. For if we construe 'We ought to do *A*, if in *C*' as the object-language counterpart of 'The statement "we shall do *A*, if in *C*" is categorically reasonable', then, it seems, we have given a satisfactory explication of what it means to follow moral norms.

Now it is clear that what makes an intention categorically reasonable cannot be its form. Somehow the content of that intention must be responsible for bringing its categorical reasonableness about. But how can we proceed along these lines without making the reasonableness in question relative again?

Traditional materialistic ethics, says Sellars, considers the maximum general welfare of mankind as being the highest moral good. The critical argument outlined above seems to suggest, however, that even this value cannot be accepted as an absolute one. After all, we can still ask: why is it ethical to maximize general welfare? As Sellars stresses:

The point of view of benevolence is not the moral point of view, though, as Kant saw, it is easily confused with it. Even generalized and embracing benevolence is, so to speak, an external point of view (pp. 207-8).

But, according to Sellars, it is this traditional conception which will help us to bring the argument to a successful end all the same, for 'the hypothetical imperative which comes closest to capturing the moral point of view is that of impartial benevolence' (p. 212). One is tempted to say — Sellars goes on to argue — that the actions prescribed by the point of view of benevolence coincide with the prescriptions of morality. The difference between the hypothetical imperatives of impartial benevolence and the categorical imperatives of morality is thus one of conceptual form rather than content, and this means that in a different logical setting the traditional view might well turn out to be the correct one. In fact, the above analysis has already provided this new setting. In order to realize this it is enough to see that for the members of a *community* it can not be questionable whether it is reasonable to maximize the welfare of that community. By saying 'we shall do everything to maximize our general welfare', we, in some sense, announced a conceptually and thus categorically reasonable intention. The conceptual reasonableness of this intention is due to its being a kind of 'implicit definition'. This definition, naturally, differs in fundamental respects from those of the theoretical domain: it defines who belongs to 'us', i.e. who belongs to the relevant community. He for whom the above intention is not binding, he who recognizes its inherent beauty without following the appropriate practical implications, at least *ceteris paribus*, is not a member, in the moral sense, of the given community.

Roughly, to value from a moral point of view is to value *as a member of the relevant community*, which as far as the present argument is concerned, I shall assume to be mankind generally (p. 220).

To approach this same idea from another direction: it is logically impossible that between members of the same community there should be an *in principle* insolvable difference of opinion concerning moral principles.

... to discuss with another person what ought to be done *presupposes* (shall I say dialectically?) that you and he are members of one community (p. 220).

Especially this latter approach makes it quite obvious that, besides Sellars's Kantian commitments, there is a deep relation between his ethics and the

philosophy of the later Wittgenstein: *every explanation must come to an end* — and the last instance is nothing but *the common form of life*.

As to his position with respect to Kant, Sellars explicitly maintains that 'these considerations pertaining to the conceptual structure of the moral point of view amount to a thoroughly Kantian metaphysic of morals' (p. 222). It is not obvious that this claim is justified; indeed the last moves in Sellars's argument might easily give the impression that the author in fact returns to a pre-critical standpoint, one already refuted by his own previous arguments. I believe, however, that his conclusions are actually correct and that, contrary to appearances, they are truly Kantian in spirit. Naturally, everything depends upon what one considers to be the Kantian spirit in ethics. In my opinion the practical philosophy of Kant involves a kind of 'Copernican revolution' very similar to that outlined in the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. To judge that a given action is morally right is not to observe that this action stands in a certain relation to prior values existing in themselves. Moral judgements, rather, *constitute* these values; it is in this way that generally valid ethical norms are possible at all. The judgement that it is unconditionally good to maximize general welfare is really a very general restatement of what 'good' means for the relevant community — and, by implication, a partial restatement of what it means to *belong* to that community. There will be those who say that in the above reconstruction of the categorical imperative its essentially formal character is lost. It ought to be realized, however, that 'formal' here does not and cannot mean a complete absence of 'content': if the categorical imperative is to do the job which Kant wanted it to do, it necessarily has to have, besides generic logical powers, certain specific logical powers too. Incidentally, outside the context of specifically ethical arguments, it was the establishment of a '*vollkommen gerechte bürgerliche Verfassung*' that Kant considered as '*die höchste Aufgabe der Natur für die Menschengattung*'. ('*Ideen zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*.' Fünfter Satz.)

4. On Sellars's view moral action always involves *reflection* upon the moral norms one is obeying: the unreflective following of rules does not raise the specific questions of ethics, for under these circumstances the problems pertaining to the acceptance of norms cannot occur. The non-reflective following of rules is, according to Sellars, not even an activity or doing in the strict sense. Rule-obeying behaviour is, however, really a doing. A rule is always a rule for doing something: it prescribes what — under given circumstances — one ought to do or might do. The thesis that man follows norms is, in the philosophy of Sellars, equal on the one hand to the thesis that man is a rational being and on the other to the thesis that man is an active being.

To stress that in the absence of doing proper the concept of following a rule has no application is no less important in the domain of theoretical philosophy than it was in the metaphysics of practice. Mere natural uniformities do not involve rules. Lightning is invariably followed by thunder, but this uniformity does not imply the existence of rules. As

Sellars indicates, many fundamental errors of traditional philosophy — in particular, of empiricist epistemology — can be traced back to the confusing of subject-object uniformities in *verum natura* with rules involving the reflective activity of the subject. That view, for example, according to which in order to check the truth of a statement we have to *compare* this statement with reality, typically rests on the mistake of construing observation as a doing. To say that a statement is true is not to say that upon comparing this statement with reality we will find a *correspondence* between the actual states of affairs and this statement — such a comparing 'could only be comparing a judging with another judging of the same specific kind'.⁵ For a statement to be true means, rather, that one is authorized by the semantical rules of the language to *assert* it. If we know, for example, that some statement *p* follows logically from a set of observational statements and that the observational statements in question have been made in standard circumstances, then to assert *p* is justified, i.e. *p* is *true*. Conceptual thinking, to which reflection upon true statements *as* true statements belongs, thus explicitly involves the obeying of rules. To say that a statement is true is to say that it is epistemically reasonable; and to say that a statement is epistemically reasonable is to observe that it conforms to norms followed by rational beings *as* rational beings.

The above explication of the concept of truth is presented in the fourth chapter of the book. The details of the explication are given in the framework of a special theory of meaning (outlined in the third and fourth chapters). In Sellars's treatment, for two expressions to have the same sense or meaning is for them to have the same *linguistic role*. This conception of synonymy has a great significance in Sellars's philosophy of language, as according to him the meaning of an expression is constituted by its linguistic role; *naming* is only one aspect of this complex role. To symbolize the concept of linguistic role Sellars introduces special quotation marks. 'Not', for example, is the common name of all those words which, in the language to which they belong, play a role similar to that of 'not' in English. Thus 'not' is a 'not', but 'nein' and 'non' are also 'not'-s. According to this conception, to say what the meaning of an expression is means to *classify* it. Incidentally, if there is a point at all in qualifying a theory of meaning as Kantian — as indeed I think there is — then this one is such. On the basis of this theory it becomes possible to give a linguistic formulation of Kant's teachings about the *a priori* forms of knowledge. In so far as the linguistic role of an expression is determined to a great extent by intra-linguistic rules, there is a sense in which we can say that the descriptive, *empirical* content of a term is, in important respects, given *by the language*, thus *before* individual experience. Making use of this 'new way of words', we can construe synthetic necessary connections as those constituted by the 'implicit definitions' establishing the intra-linguistic status of descriptive predicates. Such an 'intensional' theory of meaning also enables one to give an interpretation of the Kantian conception of *categories* which goes beyond regarding them merely as the most general sortal concepts.

The conception of the categories as the most general classifications of the logical powers that a conceptual system must have in order to generate empirical knowledge is the heart of the Kantian revolution.⁶

True statements — i.e. semantically assertable ones — belong to various types, according to the semantical rules upon which their assertability rests. The statement 'Two and two make four' — and every statement having the same sense, thus, for example, 'Deux et deux font quatre' — is semantically assertable, its truth does not, however, presuppose semantical uniformities of the kind presupposed by, e.g., 'the sky above me is blue', in that it does not, unlike the latter, involve extra-linguistic aspects: it does not belong to the class of *factual* truths. The specific characteristics of factual truth are examined in the fifth chapter. The Tractarian thesis that language is the 'logical mirror' of the world, serves as a point of departure. Sellars regards it as quite evident that the sentences expressing factual truth are, *as complex objects in rerum natura*, somehow isomorphic with the facts they describe or rather *picture*. The descriptive terms of such sentences stand in determinate relations to extra-linguistic objects. These relations are, however, not sufficient but merely necessary to constitute the conceptual role played by the terms in question.

The correlation between objects and their linguistic pictures must not be confused with the pseudo-relations *standing for* and *denoting*. Thus, that 'triangular' stands for triangularity essentially involves the intra-linguistic consequence uniformities governed by the consequence rules (axiomatizations) of geometrical predicates. The crudest form of the contrary position consists in taking the language entry role of a perceptual predicate, the fact that statements involving the predicate are correct responses to objects which exemplify the perceptual character for which it stands, to *constitute* the fact that it stands for this character (p. 128).

Picturing is not a *semantical* relation.

A statement to the effect that a linguistic item pictures a non-linguistic item by virtue of the semantical uniformities characteristic of a certain conceptual structure is, in an important sense, an object language statement, for even though it mentions linguistic objects, it treats them as items in the order of causes and effects, i.e. *in rerum natura*, and speaks directly of their functioning in this order in a way which is to be sharply contrasted with the metalinguistic statements of logical semantics. . . (p. 137).

The semantical statements concerning truth and meaning are not describing some linguistic-extralinguistic *relation*. They *classify* — from a special point of view — the statements and other expressions of language.

The concept of truth is closely related to that of existence, most directly in those existentially quantified statements where the quantified variable takes names of objects as its substituends.⁷ Sellars recognizes the consequences of this fact and, following Kant, actually eliminates the distinction between epistemic and ontological categories.

The core of Kant's 'epistemological turn' is the claim that the distinction between epistemic and ontological categories is an illusion. All so-called ontological categories are in fact epistemic.⁸

Existence thus becomes an essentially semantic — in the light of previous considerations we could say social — category. What there is in the world depends upon what existential statements of the necessary logical form are classified as true, i.e. as semantically assertable in that conceptual structure which rational beings find reasonable to accept. And as it is the conceptual structure of *science* which it is, ultimately, reasonable to accept, we come to the conclusion, says Sellars, that it is the entities postulated by science, and not metaphysical *Dinge an sich*, which stand behind the phenomenal world of everyday experience.

5. *Science and Metaphysics* is, as already indicated, an attempt to present systematically the philosophical views of its author. A reviewer cannot very well conclude without giving his judgement as to the success of the exposition itself. I think that on the whole this book makes many complicated issues in Sellars's philosophy easier to understand. On the other hand, naturally, Sellars could not quite free himself from the consequences which, in philosophical works, invariably make themselves felt whenever systematic requirements interfere with the absolutely independent development of the problems to be solved. On several points, therefore, the reader will turn back to formulations given in Sellars's earlier papers — while looking forward, of course, to coming ones.

J. C. Nyíri

NOTES

1. The number of these papers is now well over fifty. An excellent selection of them was published under the title *Science, Perception and Reality*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1963. Another volume, *Philosophical Perspectives*, was published in 1967 by Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Ill.
2. *Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 20 (1966), No. 1, pp. 113–14.
3. 'Realism and the New Way of Words', in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 8 (1948). Reprinted with minor alterations in H. Feigl and W. Sellars (Eds.), *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York 1949. The above quotation is from the latter version, p. 426.
4. *Methodos*, Vol. 8 (1956). A revised version was published in G. Nakhnikian and H. N. Castañeda (Eds.), *Morality and the Language of Conduct*, Wayne State University Press, Detroit 1963. References are to the latter version.
5. 'Some Remarks on Kant's Theory of Experience', *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LXIV (1967), No. 20, p. 640.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 641.
7. See *Science, Perception and Reality*: 'The Language of Theories', esp. p. 116. Sellars here separates his own position from that of Quine, according to whom every formally existential statement carries ontological commitments. The Sellarsian conception is in fact essentially a generalized explication of scientific intuition uncorrupted by instrumentalism.
8. 'Some Remarks on Kant's Theory of Experience', *op. cit.*, p. 634.