

Image and Metaphor in the New Century

Perspectives on Visual Learning

Edited by András Benedek and Kristóf Nyíri

Volume 3

Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Budapest University of Technology and Economics

András Benedek / Kristóf Nyíri (eds.)

Image and Metaphor in the New Century

Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Budapest University of Technology and Economics

András Benedek / Kristóf Nyíri (eds.)
Image and Metaphor in the New Century
Budapest:
Hungarian Academy of Sciences /
Budapest University of Technology and Economics
2019

© MTA–BME Open Content Development
Research Group, 2019
© The authors, 2019

The papers here collected have been accepted after a strict
double-blind peer-review process.

Cover design: István Ocztos

ISBN 978-963-313-307-1



Contents

András Benedek

Closing Note to the Series

Perspectives on Visual Learning ix

Kristóf Nyíri

Prologue xiii

BEYOND METAPHOR

Zoltán Kövecses

New Extensions of Conceptual Metaphor Theory:

How They Apply to Visual Metaphors 3

Réka Benczes

Visual Metonymy and Framing in Political Communication 17

Orsolya Putz

Image-Schema-based Folk Models of the MIND 29

Veronika Szelid

On the Multimodality of Folklore 41

METAPHOR AND VISUALITY

Xu Wen – Jin Liu

Understanding Visual Metaphors:

A Cognitive Linguistic Perspective 55

Alessandro Cavazzana

Imagining: The Role of Mental Imagery

in the Interpretation of Visual Metaphors 71

<i>Annamaria Contini – Lorenzo Manera</i> Visual Metaphors and Pedagogical Practices in the New Century	83
<i>Gerard Martin C. Suarez</i> Metaphors Made Live: Multimodal Metaphor Analysis in Animation	93
<i>Charles Forceville</i> Reflections on the Creative Use of Traffic Signs’ “Micro-language”	103
THE POWER OF THE IMAGE	
<i>Anna Botalova</i> The Visual Perception of Jacques Derrida’s Haunting Philosophy	117
<i>Trischa Goodnow</i> Omission as Silence: Extending a Theory of Invisuality	125
<i>James J. Kimble</i> Vectors, Left-Right Directionality, and Time: An Exploratory Analysis	135
<i>Izabella Grexa</i> Photography and Autobiography	149
<i>Erik P. Bucy</i> The Vulnerability of Images to Diverse Interpretation: Issue Attitudes, Visual Framing, and Individualized Readings	161
<i>Daniel Conway</i> Visualizing the Alien Other: Science Fiction and Genocide Studies	177

PHILOSOPHY IN THE NEW CENTURY

Zsuzsanna Kondor


Perceiving and Organizing the World 187


Tibor Bárány

Pictorial (Conversational) Implicatures 197

Kristóf Nyíri

Epilogue 209

Notes on Contributors 

Index 

András Benedek

Closing Note to the Series ***Perspectives on Visual Learning***

It was almost exactly one decade ago, in October 2009, that the philosophical discussions I had with Prof. Kristóf Nyíri on the role played by time and images in human activities led the expert group around me dealing with the development of education to the idea to establish – building on our researches investigating the more and more complex impact of mobile communication tools on learning – a Learning Lab within the Budapest University of Technology and Economics. Although both topics – Mobile communication on the one hand, isual learning on the other – are equally important both from the theoretical and practical aspects of education, we finally chose the issue of *visuality* and started to examine it from an interdisciplinary approach. The success of our first meeting – a brief talk given by Prof. Dr. Kurt Röttgers (FernUniversität in Hagen, Institut für Philosophie), visiting professor at the Department of Technical Education, and a brief talk given by Prof. Alan Knox (University of Wisconsin–Madison, Department of Educational Leadership & Policy) – and the interest we experienced gave us the impetus we needed to go on.

The widest possible interpretation of *visuality* awakened the interest of the representatives of several disciplines. Linguists, psychologists, sociologists and experts of technical sciences joined the more and more exciting program of our professional platform that was initiated by a philosopher and an education researcher. The evolution of international dialogue was strengthened by the Visual Learning Conferences organized each year between 2010 and 2016; in spite of its initial workshop conference nature – 30-40 scientific lectures – with the talks of European and even overseas researchers, it slowly outgrew the modest university frameworks. Of course, electronic publicity was available, as well, through the abstracts, pre-

sentations and our web page (www.vll.bme.hu), and at the same time, we launched a book series, too. The seven books in this series included the studies that were written by the speakers of the outstanding lectures held at the conferences and were strictly edited; the series was published by The Peter Lang Publishing Group (Berlin, Bern, Brussels, Oxford, and New York)¹.

Looking back at the results of the former years, at the turn of 2017 and 2018 we made a new decision. Stepping out of the routine of organizing our conference each year, we prepared a more significant event, and we won the Hungarian Academy of Sciences over to support the organization of the *8th Budapest Visual Learning Conference*. We faced some relevant questions: *What professional responses would we meet? How intense and what quality interest could be awakened by lectures that were relevant in their field (Communication – Culture – Consciousness) and were connected to the broad and complex interdisciplinary topic of Visual Learning? How would we be able to create a synthesis summing up the given topics and to provide a summative evaluation of an exciting period of co-thinking?* These questions were partly responded by the interest in the conference (150 participants and 93 lecturers), and the results of the international event can also be judged by the reader. We made some changes in the method and genre of publishing our findings. Considering the topic timely and worth further researches, we decided to compile a new series of three books to be published by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Budapest University of Technology and Economics. The slightly altered title of the new series, *Perspectives on Visual Learning*, refers to this new phase. However, the titles of the volumes show that arriving at the end of a develop-

¹ The volume was edited in cooperation with Kristóf Nyíri, published in 2011 and was titled *Images in Language: Metaphors and Metamorphoses*. The titles of the later volumes: *The Iconic Turn in Education* (2012), *How to Do Things with Pictures: Skill, Practice, Performance* (2013), *The Power of the Image – Emotion, Expression, Explanation* (2014), *Beyond Words: Pictures, Parables, Paradoxes* (2015), and the latest two edited in cooperation with Ágnes Veszelszki: *In the Beginning was the Image: The Omnipresence of Pictures: Time, Truth, Tradition* (2016) and *Virtual Reality – Real Visuality: Virtual, Visual, Veridical* (2017).

Closing Note to the Series Perspectives on Visual Learning

ment stage; we undertook something more: a comprehensive reevaluation. This is why the first volume, comprising 21 chapters, was titled: *Vision Fulfilled: The Victory of the Pictorial Turn*. It took only a little more than half a year to make this book available: the electronic form has been accessible since December 2018 and the print form since the spring of 2019. The second book was titled: *Learning and Technology in Historical Perspective*, and it contains 14 chapters. The studies were connected to a wider thematic of education and teaching, the authors, again, were teachers, sociologists, philosophers, media researchers and technical experts. In addition to their theoretical approaches, the chapters introduced the practical experiences of the relevant researches, as well.

The present volume is the final one of this series. Its title, *Image and Metaphor in the New Century*, makes it clear that we have arrived at an essential phase of our story; however, the volume is not the closure of something but deals with new exciting issues that are topical from a scientific point of view. Placing the notion of metaphor into a broad context, the authors deal with new phenomena of visuality indicating the wider environment of education as part of a system of organic interrelations. They show us what challenge the complexity of our world means for the disciplines in terms of the subject and the applied methods. This is why we consider it essential that we have had the opportunity to adopt a multidisciplinary approach in these volumes and their more than fifty chapters, demonstrating the fascinating issues engaging many researchers; publishing the results of their thinking may attract further professionals to these developments. I am very grateful to Kristóf Nyíri who rendered us enormous help in the professional preparation of the volumes, in creating their final form, and without whose ideas, constructive proposals and generous editing work this exciting new series could not have been born.

May 12, 2019

Kristóf Nyíri

Prologue

The chapters in this volume emerged, after an extended process of peer-reviewed selection and rigid editing, from the talks given at the 8th Budapest Visual Learning Conference (VLC8), held on April 26–28, 2018. The volume is the third one in a series of three. The title of the first volume, published in March 2019, is *Vision Fulfilled: The Victory of the Pictorial Turn*, while that of the second, published in May 2019: *Learning and Technology in Historical Perspective*.

As explained in the Preface to the first volume, VLC8 was preceded by seven earlier conferences, which in their turn were based on the activities of the Budapest Visual Learning Lab (VLL – www.facebook.com/BudapestVisualLearningLab), established at the Department of Technical Education, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, in October 2009, by Professor András Benedek and myself. In his introductory chapter to the first volume Benedek has provided a detailed history of the Budapest Visual Learning Lab, as well as a summary of the fundamental transformations education in the Western world has undergone in the past few centuries, and of the challenges educational theory and practice now face.

The present volume's first part, BEYOND METAPHOR, begins with the chapter "New Extensions of Conceptual Metaphor Theory: How They Apply to Visual Metaphors", by Zoltán Kövecses. The author has been since many years one of the leading scholars in the field; his present paper amounts to a radically new approach within – or beyond – what is known as the Lakoff–Johnson paradigm. Kövecses starts from the contention that "if conceptual metaphors are indeed conceptual in nature (not simply linguistic), then any expression of our conceptual system can be metaphorical. Consequently, the *visual* expression of our conceptual system can be metaphorical." He then presents a breathtakingly novel analysis of a painting by contemporary American artist Mark Tansey, arriving at the general con-

clusion that “the interpretation of works of art share a great deal with how the human conceptual system operates in interpreting everyday experiences. By studying visual art, we can find out not only about what happens in the course of understanding a particular work of art but also how we (everyday people) utilize our metaphorical conceptual system.” The second chapter, “Visual Metonymy and Framing in Political Communication”, by Réka Benczes, again emphasizes that if metaphor is primarily conceptual, then it can indeed be “expected to occur outside the verbal mode as well. Based on this assumption”, Benczes points out, “conceptual metaphor has been successfully identified outside of spoken language as well, in music, gesture and images.” She then sets the stage for her central argument by noting that metaphor “is yet only one of the cognitive devices that fundamentally govern and structure our conceptualization; its less appreciated – but even more ubiquitous – sister is conceptual metonymy”. The specific aim of her paper is, as she puts it, to expand the research in visual metonymy into the realm of political discourse. The particular case she studies is the “multiple and interlocking uses of visual (and multimodal) metonymy exploited in an anti-EU television advertisement created by the Hungarian government in 2017”. The following chapter, “Image-Schema-based Folk Models of the MIND”, by Orsolya Putz, builds on the notion which was the first vague indication by Lakoff and Johnson that their theory might be about more than just verbal thought: the notion of “image-schemas”. Orsolya Putz discusses the epistemologically central concept of the *mind*, focussing on how this concept is embedded in folk psychology, everyday thinking confirming the idea of there being “a recurring, dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that gives coherence to our experience”, the definition of image-schema given by Mark Johnson. Summing up her analysis, the author writes: “I propose that experts whose work is related to the mind to any extent should be aware of the way lay people think about their own mind. Researchers of the mind (e.g. philosophers, cognitive scientists, AI researchers) should be familiar with the folk model of the mind that might be evoked even by scientific jargon related to the mind. Therapists may help their patients struggling with mental illnesses change their meta-

Prologue

phors about their mind reflected in their language use. Teachers should treat their students' mind carefully, as even an inappropriate metaphor can ruin the students' view of their own mental ability." With the last chapter in this part of the volume, we remain in the domain of folk thinking. Veronika Szelid's "On the Multimodality of Folklore" is a moving analysis of a minstrel song from Transdanubium, applying the methods of conceptual metaphor theory. The position Szelid argues for is that there is a type of multimodality that is prevalent in Hungarian folklore, a type she designates as *multimodal source domain representation*. The source domains she specifically considers derive from "spoken language, written language, visuals, music, sound, gestures, smell, taste, and touch", but her analysis extends, also, to a possible source domain commonly not taken into account: the *time of performance*, which she sees as providing "an extra dimension and power to the metaphor that is intended to be construed". The intriguing connections between time, visualization, and metaphor certainly deserve being called attention to; I will come back to the issue of metaphor, image, and time in my Epilogue to the present volume.

For the next five chapters, constituting the second part of the present volume, it was precisely the heading METAPHOR AND VISUALITY that felicitously offered itself. The first chapter here, "Understanding Visual Metaphors: A Cognitive Linguistic Perspective", by Xu Wen and Jin Liu, is on the one hand a masterly summary of the array of topics image, metaphor, conceptual metaphor theory, Forceville's studies of pictorial or visual metaphor, visual communication and visual metaphors; on the other hand it as it were continues, and enlarges on, the theme initiated in the chapter by Réka Benczes, that of visual political propaganda. Wen and Liu present a number of classic political cartoons, interpreting them as visual metaphors. And let me quote the concluding passage of their chapter: "Visual metaphors are inherent in our thought, and thus enable us to translate invisible and abstract ideas into a realm of familiar actualities that we can see. They are artistic devices or cognitive strategies used to help us understand the invisible things by relating them to something familiar and visible. ... visual metaphors are, in essence, the realizations of conceptual metaphors in pictures or images, and their tenors are some-

thing invisible. Just like conceptual metaphors, visual metaphors are everywhere in our daily life.” The following chapter, the sixth chapter in the present volume, is Alessandro Cavazzana’s “Imagining: The Role of Mental Imagery in the Interpretation of Visual Metaphors”. It begins by recalling Noël Carroll’s 1994 position, according to which “visual metaphors are ‘visual images that function in the same way that verbal metaphors do’”. There follows a reference to Arthur C. Danto’s view, dating back to 1981, suggesting that verbal metaphors work in the same way “elliptic syllogisms” do. Against these two approaches as a background, and adding the notion of mental imagery, Cavazzana introduces his basic idea: “when interpreting visual metaphors, *mental imagery* plays the role that the inference plays in comprehending verbal metaphors”. At a later point in his argument he provides a detailed analysis of the notion of mental visual imagery, citing, among others, Ganis and Schendan, quoting from their 2011 paper: mental imagery “refers to ‘our ability to reactivate and manipulate visual representations in the absence of the corresponding visual stimuli’”. I take Cavazzana’s chapter to be making an absolutely essential point. I believe human cognition cannot be properly understood if the claim for the fundamental role of thinking in images is not accepted. This is the position I sided with in my Postscript to the first volume of the present series, a position I am defending again in my Epilogue.

We are coming to the next chapter in this volume, “Visual Metaphors and Pedagogical Practices in the New Century”, by Annamaria Contini and Lorenzo Manera. The chapter’s introductory passage: “A particular kind of early active engagement with metaphors happens when children enact them through their actions, in a process where the relevant substitution occurs primarily through gestures.” The authors refer to Lakoff and Johnson’s idea – note that this is an idea not there in the original Lakoff–Johnson paradigm – that “metaphor can be instantiated through nonlinguistic modalities such as gestures and images, if we consider metaphors to be primarily not a figure of speech, but a way of thought”. It is in the light of this idea that the authors reinterpret “one of the earliest informal learning contexts experienced by children: pretend play”. The reinterpretation relies heav-

Prologue

ily on the fact that “access to digital technologies for the purpose of creating narrative structures including visual components” very much facilitates designing new types of learning activities, and enhances for preschoolers “the possibility to augment their metaphorical imageries by exploring non-structured materials”. The following chapter, similarly, deals with a phenomenon / scholarly issue that would not be there were it not for new digital technologies. This is the chapter “Metaphors Made Live: Multimodal Metaphor Analysis in Animation” by Gerard Martin C. Suarez. The question Suarez formulates: “how pervasive is a conceptual metaphor when studied as part of an ongoing discourse?” – the background of the question being that while, for instance, “[a] finished movie or a printed political cartoon ... does not change once it reaches the eyes of the intended viewer”, authors of serialized works such as, say, episodic television are in a position “in between the production of each segment, to hear the perceptions and feedback of their audience which can potentially change subsequent content”. Suarez on the one hand analyzes what role conceptual metaphors play in the medium of serialized animation, on the other hand investigates what impact the “established conventions” and “the serialized nature” of animation have on “the structuring and consistency” of the particular conceptual metaphor the chapter discusses. His conclusion: “The representation of the conceptual metaphor remained consistent throughout years of varying situations and representations, adding further support to the claim of the persistence of metaphor.” Our next chapter is written by a world-renowned pioneering expert on visual metaphors, Charles Forceville, who is recurrently quoted in the present volume, too. The chapter’s title: “Reflections on the Creative Use of Traffic Signs’ ‘Micro-Language’”. Forceville begins by making the in my opinion entirely laudable point that it is generally speaking misleading to speak of “visual languages” or “visual grammar”, and specifically refers to Kress and Van Leeuwen as “over-stretching ... the notion of a ‘grammar of visual design’ ”. However, Forceville suggests, there still are “certain *genres*, or certain visual phenomena within genres ... that one might nonetheless want to call a rudimentary ‘language’. ... We could use the term ‘micro-languages’ for closed sets with only a few items (a ‘micro-

vocabulary’) and just a few rules specifying the relations among these items and their relation with other elements (a ‘micro-grammar’).” In this chapter Forceville describes the micro-language of traffic signs, and analyzes “the way in which traffic signs function as (verbo)visual ‘speech acts’”. The analysis is accompanied by a number of delightful pictorial illustrations. And the specific, very convincing, conclusion he arrives at is that “the genre of quasi-traffic signs enables the creation of persuasive messages, even without the use of language”.

We have reached this volume’s third part: THE POWER OF THE IMAGE. It begins with the chapter by Anna Botalova, “The Visual Perception of Jacques Derrida’s Haunting Philosophy”. My impression is that Botalova has achieved the rare feat of making Derrida’s philosophy fathomable even to those who would otherwise shrug off the same. She analyzes the 2002 film *Derrida: The Documentary*, and let me quote her introductory passage at some length: “We are accustomed to the fact that a text is a traditional way for philosophy to exist. We read a book, we learn philosophical concepts through it, and that is how philosophy had been perceived during the centuries.” However, with cinema, a new way of perceiving has emerged. “The perceptual richness proper to the cinema enables it to reflect on a wide variety of things. So, what philosophical powers do images have? What powers do films have as they operate images in motion? ... it is possible to live through a concept cinematically as it happened to me and the film *Derrida*. But ... why should we prefer a film over a book? ... film-philosophy, this alternative way of concept’s existence, can be extremely vivid, comprehensive, important and, simply, different. During the analysis of the documentary film *Derrida*, we will see how major concepts of Derrida’s philosophy, such as deconstruction, difference, metaphysics of presence, trace, hauntology may be transmitted through the film’s structure and montage.” The next chapter, the eleventh chapter in the present volume, “Omission as Silence: Extending a Theory of Invisuality”, by Trischa Goodnow, continues to pursue a topic that was introduced in a paper given by James J. Kimble in May 2016 at the Budapest Visual Learning Lab, based on research by Kimble and Goodnow. The term “invisuality” refers to the absence of some central element in a visual object –

Prologue

a visual omission. In the present chapter Goodnow argues that “omission plays a vital role as a rhetorical strategy of invisuality”, examining the Berlin Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe “as an exemplar of omission invisuality”. She focusses on the much-discussed fact that this memorial, also known as the Holocaust Memorial, lacks any listing of the victims’ names: “While traditional memorials reveal elements of those who were lost (absent), the Berlin Holocaust Memorial fails to call to mind the tragedy of those absent.” Goodnow, exploiting a perspective worked out by Walter Benjamin in the 1930s, offers a complex philosophical explanation for this vagueness; but she also sees a much simpler one. As she puts it: “Perhaps ... the ambiguity in possible interpretations of the memorial reflects Germany’s own struggle to adequately memorialize that which they themselves wrought.” The following chapter is by James J. Kimble. This chapter, “Vectors, Left-Right Directionality, and Time”, begins with a reference to Kress and Van Leeuwen’s notion of *image vectors*, applying it to a famous WWII photograph depicting United States Marines as they raise a U.S. flag during the Battle of Iwo Jima. The next reference is to Joost Schilperoord’s observation that “a vital aspect of the photograph’s potency lies in the ‘left-right orientation’ of its flagpole-as-vector. From the viewer’s perspective, the action transpires from left to right, signifying a narrative shift ‘from past to future’”. Schilperoord also observed that if that photograph’s left–right orientation is reversed, “‘a lot of its pictorial impact gets lost’”. The explanation put forward by Kimble for this phenomenon: “horizontal directionality is inevitably fused with the viewer’s conceptualization of time... Numerous fields of inquiry indicate that time, at least in most Western cultures, tends to be understood as flowing into the future from left to right. ... even italic fonts, by leaning to the viewer’s right, convey a sense of forward motion.” Kimble here adds a note: “Many scholars connect this left-right phenomenon to the process of reading. Some cultures, of course, read in a right-left direction. In such cultures, appropriately, horizontal directionality appears to depict time as flowing to the left.” Let me here interject that the primordial – preliterate – notion of time is of course cyclic rather than linear, I will refer to this topic in my Epilogue to this volume. Coming back to Kimble: by

way of conclusion, he offers several examples – presenting highly telling images and commenting on them – from his own area of research: “the imagery of the U.S. home front in WWII”. His summary, analyzing a collection of 108 posters presented online: depictions of American soldiers in combat situations “routinely feature rightward vectors”, with the actors “looking, leaning, or rushing toward” an “often offstage” goal “in an immediate future”.

We have arrived at the next three chapters in this part of our volume. The chapter “Photography and Autobiography”, by Izabella Grexa, is a discussion of the diary, letters and some two hundred private photographs representing the life of a Hungarian marginalized labour woman, Erzsébet Király, living during the Communist and post-Communist era. “As an orphan, without any family ties, moving from flat to flat, changing her workplaces”, writes Grexa, “photographs played important roles in Király’s life, confirming her identity and status in her social group.” The theoretical background of the chapter is sketched by the introductory passage: “Pictures, photos and visuals play an ever larger role. Social sciences look at these objects as valuable sources and not only as illustrations. Applying visual sources for talking of links between society, individuals and pictures has been a practice in the field of ethnography and anthropology for decades. Beside specific themes that pictures portray, one may learn more about family and relationships, value systems and strategy of life. The social network that represents the importance of relationships is a distinguished target in the investigation of photographs. In an analysis of the way of life, photographs are important because they represent the environment of ordinary people, farmers and workers.” As Grexa then by way of conclusion writes: keeping alive, or recreating, her past over and over again, through keeping a diary, letters, and preserving photos, meant a great deal to Erzsébet Király. She must have felt that, as Grexa puts it, she had unconsciously left traces of her life for posterity. On the other hand, she was clearly very much conscious of her own vulnerability, and of the vulnerability of the photographs she so much cherished. “The Vulnerability of Images to Diverse Interpretation: Issue Attitudes, Visual Framing, and Individualized Readings” is the title of the fol-

Prologue

lowing chapter, by Erik P. Bucy. To quote from his introductory passage: “To a large extent, public understanding of and attitudes toward important policy issues hinge on the media messaging about them – and, centrally, the imaging used in that messaging. Issue understanding depends not just on the volume of available information”, but also on “how important developments are *framed in media*. Given the cultural ubiquity and psychological accessibility of images, how issues are visually framed in public communication should occupy a central place in our thinking about persuasion.” Bucy’s analysis is based on two case studies surveying the controversial issues, first, of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) in the U.S., and secondly, Syrian refugees in Europe. His central explanatory scheme: When “individuals derive meaning from images, they engage in an interactive process” driven, on the one hand, “by the stimulus properties of the visual”, and, on the other, by “their prior knowledge, political and moral commitments, and situatedness”. There is no “fixed relationship between an image and a monolithic interpretation; rather, viewers bring their unique perspectives shaped by their attitudinal priors and individual histories to bear on the image interpretation process”. And a passage from the chapter’s concluding section: “visual portrayals alone do not dictate how individuals construct meaning from images but rather interact with standing attitudes and, depending on the issue, the ideological orientation of the viewer”. The theme “refugees in need of humanitarian relief” reemerges in next chapter, “Visualizing the Alien Other: Science Fiction and Genocide Studies”, by Daniel Conway. Let me quote the opening passages of the chapter: “Teachers and scholars working in the field of genocide studies face the daunting challenge of communicating to their respective audiences the scope of genocide and the motivation(s) of its perpetrators. This is a challenge ... because those who do not already acknowledge genocide as a viable political or military option find its appeal to be virtually incomprehensible. Most civilized audiences, including those that are inclined to accept the possibility of just warfare, dismiss the practice of genocide as primitive, barbaric, inhumane, *and*, as a result, unthinkable. ... At the same time, however, genocide remains a persistent feature of the contemporary geopolitical land-

scape. Moreover, recent history and current events confirm that recourse to genocide is not the exclusive province of barbaric, anti-modern nations and peoples.” Conway proposes that we should “acknowledge the impetus toward genocide as native to the human condition itself”, and he proceeds to throw light on this impetus by exploiting the “visual and philosophical resources available within the underexplored cinematic genre of science fiction”. Pointing to some representative films in the genre, he shows “how unfamiliar *others* – e.g., aliens, avatars, and androids – are subjected to escalating degrees of suspicion, fear, disgust, intolerance, emotional/psychological trauma, abjection, and hatred. As such, these unfamiliar others may be understood to represent the vulnerable minority populations and communities that currently face the gathering threats posed by statelessness, xenophobia, out-group shaming, misogyny, religious persecution, homo- and transphobia, ethnic cleansing, and genocide itself.”

We now come to the last part of our volume: PHILOSOPHY IN THE NEW CENTURY. The first chapter here, the sixteenth chapter in this volume, is Zsuzsanna Kondor’s “Perceiving and Organizing the World”. The chapter in effect fulfills the role of connecting the first and last parts of the volume, mainly since it repeatedly refers to conceptual metaphor theory, but also because it treats a subject with which the chapter by Orsolya Putz was, albeit from a radically different perspective, occupied: namely the concept of mind. Kondor examines the concepts mind/intellect/consciousness, with the central focus on consciousness. As she by way of introduction puts it, she is attempting “to illuminate the intertwined relation between culture and consciousness”, the relation being based on “hard-wired aspects” of human evolution. “I will suggest”, writes Kondor, “despite the fact that the human intellect is traditionally described in terms of visual metaphors, that our conceptual skills are based on a kind of crosstalk between different sense modalities and motor-control, i.e., visual perception and processing alone can not provide sufficient grounds for abstraction, and hence, concept-formation.” A major philosopher on whose ideas Kondor builds is Maurice Merleau-Ponty. It is with reference to Merleau-Ponty she claims: “Consciousness is necessary

Prologue

for intentional activity and the capability of forming the world beyond the limits of reciprocal adjustments between the organism and its environment.” Merleau-Ponty saw the human *body* as playing an essential epistemological role. Again with reference to Merleau-Ponty does Kondor write: the body “gains special importance. It provides perspective, ties the perceiving self to ‘a system of things’, accommodates multimodal synthesis, yields perceptual fields and field of practice, and ‘as an active body capable of gestures, of expression, and finally of language, it turns back on the world to signify it’.” Another author whose work Kondor builds upon is Nicholas Humphrey, “a neuropsychologist known for his research of blindsight and work on the evolution of human consciousness, made an attempt to illuminate how the brain and the mind can be the ‘aspects of a simple state – a single state, in fact, of the material world’”. Altogether this is how Kondor sums up her chapter: “As humans are living organisms and have a direct relation with the physical world, they are socially embedded as well, capable of reorganizing their milieu. This creative power relies heavily on the capacity for abstraction, and later on abstract reasoning, and is rooted in a wide range of sensual experiences and motor skills.” The following chapter, “Pictorial (Conversational) Implicatures”, by Tibor B  r  ny, discusses a rather technical philosophical issue, but his way of introducing the subject is intelligible even to non-philosophers: “there seems to be a deep asymmetry between the communicative use of words and of pictures. While it is reasonable to talk about *syntactic rules* operating on linguistic items (by which the syntactic structure of the sentence will be generated) and posit *compositional semantic content* or *conventional meaning* of sentences derived from conventionally encoded lexical word- (or morpheme-) meaning and conventional semantic rules for composition (which correspond compositionally to conventional syntactic rules), pictures appear to lack any kind of syntactic structure or encoded meaning-constituents.” This is possibly not a universally uncontestable position, just recall Forceville’s argument earlier in the present volume – I will return to the subject in my Epilogue. Be that as may be, B  r  ny takes his point of departure from the established notion of what working out the conversational

implicatures of a syntactically complete verbal utterance – a sentence – means: “the *derivation of additional propositions* (supposedly meant by the speaker) from the proposition expressed by the utterance, which is triggered by particular features of the conversational context and the speaker’s communicative behaviour (or on hypotheses thereof formed by the audience)”. He then goes on allowing that the “fact” (I add: the supposed fact) “that pictures do not have syntax and in interpreting pictures the audience normally does not decode visual items does not make the concept of *what is shown* (as analogous to what is said) theoretically useless or unintelligible. We can reasonably speak of ‘meaning (implicating) one thing by showing (a picture of) something else’”. From here Bárány proceeds to put forward his own design, the first step being to endorse “some version of the resemblance theory of depiction, and assume that in normal cases visual features of the picture determine what it depicts. Resemblance theorists contend that the fact that pictures have a certain content (i.e. they represent, or are used by some people to represent objects, persons, events, actions, etc. from a particular perspective) should be explained by appeal to the visual resemblance relation between the picture and its object”, rather than, Bárány writes, by appeal to the fact that pictures belong to some conventional representational system, as most notably Nelson Goodman suggested. I applaud Bárány’s taking stand against the sadly mainstream position initiated by Goodman, but will not here follow in detail his extended and highly interesting argument; instead, I quote his concluding sentence: “conventionally encoded meaning need not serve as a departure point for conversational implicatures – and this holds for language and pictures alike”.

In the series *Perspectives on Visual Learning* we do not follow the today dominant convention of indicating, for internet references, the date when authors last accessed the site they quote. Rather, each internet reference has been checked by the editor in charge; all internet references contained in this volume were valid at the date the material was uploaded to the internet.

June 10, 2019

BEYOND METAPHOR

Zoltán Kövecses

New Extensions of Conceptual Metaphor Theory: How They Apply to Visual Metaphors

1. Introduction

Beginning with the 1990s, a lot of work has been done in conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) on visual metaphors. Much of this work was pioneered by Charles Forceville,¹ and was continued by a large number of researchers all the way to the present time.² This large body of work covers much of the domain of visibility, including advertisements, cartoons, comic books, films, theater, opera, drawings, gestures, traffic signs, and several other areas of visual experience.

Researchers on visual metaphor emphasize especially two points. One is that if conceptual metaphors are indeed conceptual in nature (not simply linguistic), then any expression of our conceptual system can be metaphorical. Consequently, the *visual* expression of our conceptual system can be metaphorical. Another point that is stressed by researchers is that although the visual metaphors may be manifestations of modality-neutral conceptual metaphors, they may have their modality-specific characteristics, not possessed by the modality-neutral ones and not shared by other modality-specific metaphors. I am assuming these two principles in the present paper, but I base my comments on the former principle, leaving the latter in the background.

¹ See e.g. Forceville, *Pictorial Metaphor in Advertising*, London: Routledge, 1996; and Forceville, “Metaphor in Pictures and Multimodal Representations”, in Raymond Gibbs (ed.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 462–482.

² For a summary, see Forceville, “Metaphor in Pictures and Multimodal Representations”; and Charles Forceville – Eduardo Urios-Aparisi (eds.), *Multimodal Metaphor*, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2009.

My aim in the paper is to introduce two recent extensions of CMT and see how they apply to the study of visual metaphors, more precisely, to the study of a single visual metaphor – a painting by Mark Tansey, a contemporary American artist (see Figure 1). The extensions of CMT I focus on are what I call the contextual and multi-level view of conceptual metaphor (extended CMT, for short).



Figure 1: Picasso and Braque. A painting by Mark Tansey.

2. Two Extensions of CMT

In recent years I have proposed two extensions of conceptual metaphor theory. In brief, the first one, the contextual view of metaphor, is based on the idea that conceptualizers produce conceptual and linguistic metaphors that are prompted by context as broadly defined.³ Four different types of context are distinguished: situational, discourse, conceptual-cognitive, and bodily contexts. Each of these is

³ Zoltán Kövecses, *Where Metaphors Come From: Reconsidering Context in Metaphor*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

constituted by a variety of different contextual factors (such as the physical, social, and cultural environment, which function as contextual factors within the situational context).

The multi-level view of metaphor⁴ maintains that conceptual metaphors come in vertically organized hierarchical systems. Lakoff and Johnson⁵ thought of conceptual metaphors as primarily couplings of conceptual domains. However, in later work, both Lakoff and Johnson and other scholars proposed further conceptual organizations of experience as making up conceptual metaphors, including frames, schemas, mental models, mental spaces, scenarios, cultural models, idealized cognitive models, and so on. In my “Levels of Metaphor” I attempted to unify and make coherent with each other these observations in what I call a schematicity hierarchy.⁶

In the present paper, I will rely on both of these developments in CMT, but will make use of the latter, the multi-level view of metaphor, more extensively. The specific question I will be concerned with is this: How do these extensions apply to visual metaphors in paintings, such as the one by Mark Tansey above?

3. Analysis I

First, I present a metaphor analysis of the painting that makes use of “standard” or “traditional” conceptual metaphor theory. In the next section (Analysis II), I approach the painting with the conceptual tools of the extended view of CMT.

We can begin by noting that the painting is about cubism, as the title of the painting indicates: *Picasso and Braque*. It can be suggested, furthermore, that the concept of cubism is a complex abstract system, on a par with many others, such as society, mind, and lan-

⁴ Zoltán Kövecses, “Levels of Metaphor”, *Cognitive Linguistics*, vol. 28, no. 2 (2017), pp. 321–347.

⁵ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980.

⁶ On this, see also Barbara Dancygier and Eve Sweetser, *Figurative Language*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

guage.⁷ The idea of complex abstract systems is an addition and modification to the Great Chain of Being.⁸ The levels of the Great Chain may serve as source and target domains in conceptual metaphors. The modified Great Chain of Being can be given as follows:

- God
 - Complex abstract systems (SOCIETY, MIND, LANGUAGE, CUBISM, ...)
 - Humans
 - Animals
 - Plants
 - Complex physical objects (COMPUTER, CAR, MACHINE, AIRPLANE, ...)
- etc.

Given this hierarchy of concepts, the metaphorical representation of cubism in the Tansey painting could be characterized with the help of two conceptual metaphors – a very general and a more specific one:

A COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEM IS A COMPLEX PHYSICAL OBJECT

CUBISM IS AN AIRPLANE

In addition, we could also suggest that the conceptualization of the painting involves two metonymies – again, a more general and a more specific one:⁹

AN EXAMPLE OF A CATEGORY FOR THE WHOLE CATEGORY

⁷ See Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction* (2002), 2nd ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

⁸ George Lakoff and Mark Turner, *More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989, ch. 4.

⁹ See Kövecses, *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction*; and Zoltán Kövecses – Günter Radden, “Metonymy: Developing a Cognitive Linguistic View”, *Cognitive Linguistics*, vol. 9, no. 1 (1998), pp. 37–77.

THE PAINTING “VIOLIN” BY PICASSO FOR CUBISM AS A WHOLE

As the painting by Picasso (entitled “Violin”) below shows (see Figure 2), the airplane in the painting by Tansey is partially made up by the Violin. This explains why we might rely on the metonymies as well when we try to make sense of the Tansey painting.




Figure 2

There may be some other figurative devices that we could employ in conceptualizing the painting by Tansey. But, on the whole, it seems to me that the two conceptual metaphors and metonymies would be needed by anyone who is confronted by the painting and wanted to make sense of it by utilizing the machinery of standard CMT.

4. Analysis II

How does this rough-and-ready analysis change if we put to use extended CMT? To begin, in the multilevel view we can work with con-

ceptual structures (image schema, domain, frame, mental space) that occupy different levels of schematicity:¹⁰

- | | |
|--------------------|----------------|
| ■ Most schematic: | ■ image schema |
| | ■ domain |
| | ■ frame |
| ■ Least schematic: | ■ mental space |

By setting up such a schematicity hierarchy of conceptual structures, we can observe that a particular area of experience (such as cubism) is commonly characterized by conceptual metaphors that involve these conceptual structures on four levels of schematicity; that is, where the source and target concepts occupy different schematic levels. I propose that two aspects of cubism lend themselves to analyses along these lines; namely, first, that cubism can be regarded as an abstract complex system and, second, as an abstract movement. I turn to the metaphor analyses of these two aspects below.

4.1. Abstract Complex System

In this subsection, I briefly look at cubism as an abstract complex system on the image schema, domain, frame, and mental space levels.

As already noted above, the notion of cubism, more generally, art, as represented in the painting by Tansey can be interpreted as a Complex Abstract System. Complex Abstract Systems are routinely conceptualized metaphorically as complex physical objects of various kinds. This yields the following highly schematic conceptual metaphor for the cubism hierarchy: A COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEM IS A COMPLEX PHYSICAL OBJECT. But at the *level of image schemas*, the complex physical object should be represented image-schematically

¹⁰ For the distinctions between these structures, see e.g. Alan Cienki, “Frames, Idealized Cognitive Models, and Domains”, in Dirk Geeraerts and Hubert Cuyckens (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook Of Cognitive Linguistics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007; Karen Sullivan, *Frames and Constructions in Metaphorical Language*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2013; Dancygier and Sweetser, *op. cit.*; Kövecses, “Levels of Metaphor”.

(not propositionally, as the meaning of the phrase “complex physical object”):

COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEM



COMPLEX PHYSICAL OBJECT

In the diagram above, complex physical objects are represented schematically as a blue square. This is the source “domain” of the high-level conceptual metaphor. Complex physical objects are characterized by a variety of image schemas, such as CONTAINER, LINK, PART-WHOLE, VERTICAL-HORIZONTAL EXTENSION, (FORCE), (MOTION), and so on. These schemas account for the “complexity” of the physical object. (This complexity is not represented in the image schema.)

At the *domain level*, according to the painting cubism is metaphorically viewed as a vehicle, which gives us the conceptual metaphor: CUBISM IS A VEHICLE. The source domain of vehicle is conceptually connected to a number of concepts, such as the following:

CREATION, SHAPE, SIZE, TYPE, STRUCTURE, CONSTITUENT
MATERIALS, FUNCTION, OPERATION, FORCE, MOTION

Vehicles are created, they have shapes (but not a uniform shape), they have size and type, they are structured, they are made of some materials, they have function, they have particular modes of operation, they work with various degrees of force, and they can move. In short, the concept of vehicle comes with an extensive domain matrix in Langacker’s sense.¹¹

¹¹ Ronald Langacker, *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987.

At the *frame level*, we have cubist painting as target. The source concept here emerges as an airplane – a special case of the concept of vehicle. The aspects of the source as defined by the domain matrix attaching to the concept of vehicle become more specific here. For instance, airplanes are made in certain ways, they have a characteristic shape, they are typically large, their parts are assembled to form a unique structure, they are made of special materials, and they can fly. These features apply to cubist painting and, together, they result in the frame-level metaphor CUBIST PAINTING IS AN AIRPLANE.

What we know about these aspects individually and taken together greatly contributes to the metaphorical understanding of cubism and cubist painting. For example, our knowledge about the type, structure, and constituent materials of airplanes figures importantly in how we interpret the success of cubist painting. In other words, to do so, we will employ a submetaphor of the CUBIST PAINTING IS AN AIRPLANE metaphor, which is THE SUCCESS OF CUBIST PAINTING DEPENDS ON THE TYPE, STRUCTURE, AND MATERIALS OF THE AIRPLANE.

This takes us the *level of mental spaces*. What we find here is that the potential frame-level knowledge is actually utilized in the painting. First, the type of the airplane: what we can see is that the frame-level airplane is a very light airplane. Second, the structure of the airplane: the airplane in the painting looks like an early one from the experimental stages of airplane building, and it looks like one which is quite “loosely” put together. Third, the materials: it is made of cubist paintings (the Violin).

These features are conceptually blended in the painting. Together they portray an airplane that is hazardous for purposes of travel. The blend at the mental spaces level seems to be coherent with Picasso’s and Braque’s initial fears concerning their project. That is to say, at the level of mental spaces we are dealing with a very specific conceptual metaphor that can be put thus:

THE FRAGILITY AND UNCERTAIN FATE OF CUBISM AT THE TIME OF
ITS EMERGENCE IS THE FRAGILITY AND UNCERTAINTY THAT COMES

FROM THE LIGHTNESS AND CONSTITUENT MATERIALS OF THE AIRPLANE THAT IS ABOUT TO TAKE OFF.

The mental space level of the painting involves more. It also tries to answer the question of who the leading figure of cubist painting is. It does so by making use of the “operation” aspect of airplanes. We have the frame level knowledge that the controller of the plane is the pilot. This maps onto the leading figure of cubist painting, as represented in the Tansey painting: the pilot corresponds to the leading figure. Thus we get a further mental space level metaphor: THE LEADING FIGURE OF CUBISM IS THE PILOT OF THE PLANE.

Finally at the mental space level, the airplane frame is elaborated at this level: There is a second person on the ground who is actively involved in the operation of the plane (running along excitedly on the ground, thus possibly playing a less important role in the operation of the plane). This reaffirms the person of the leading figure: Picasso is the pilot and leading figure, while Braque is on the ground, figuring less importantly.

4.2. Abstract Movement

But cubism is not only a complex abstract system, it is also an abstract movement. Consider the following quote on the relevant sense of “movement” from a dictionary:

b: a series of organized activities working toward an objective;
also: an organized effort to promote or attain an end – the civil rights movement – a movement to increase the minimum wage¹²

At the *image schema level* the abstract complex system moves and moves toward a goal. This gives us two image schemas in light of which we interpret abstract complex systems, such as cubism, as moving: the MOVEMENT (ACTIVITY) and SOURCE-PATH-GOAL (OBJEC-

¹² From *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/movement>.

TIVE / PURPOSE) schemas, which can be represented as follows (Figure 3):



Figure 3: a. The *MOVEMENT* image schema

b. The *SOURCE-PATH-GOAL* image schema

More specifically, we find the following partial characterization of the *domain* of Cubism in Wikipedia:

Cubism is an early-20th-century art movement which brought European painting and sculpture historically forward toward 20th century Modern art. Cubism in its various forms inspired related movements in literature and architecture. Cubism has been considered to be among the most influential art movements of the 20th century. The term is broadly used in association with a wide variety of art produced in Paris (Montmartre, Montparnasse and Puteaux) during the 1910s and throughout the 1920s. (from Wikipedia, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cubism>)

Given the metaphor ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION from the Event Structure metaphor,¹³ we get two additional conceptual metaphors that apply to art movements in general and cubism in particular:

A SET OF PURPOSEFUL ARTISTIC ACTIVITIES (BY A GROUP OF ARTISTS) IS TRAVEL (BY A GROUP OF TRAVELERS)

THE CUBIST MOVEMENT IS A JOURNEY

¹³ George Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor”, in A. Ortony (ed.), *Metaphor and Thought*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

At the *frame level*, the movement of cubist painting is an air journey, resulting in the conceptual metaphor THE CUBIST MOVEMENT IS AN AIR JOURNEY / A FLIGHT. Given this frame level metaphor, the mappings can be laid out as follows:

- the air journey / flight → the movement of cubist painting
- flying → working / activities within the framework of cubism
- the traveler in the air journey → the painter in cubist painting
- the destination of the air journey → the goal of cubist movement
- the beginning of the air journey → the beginning of the cubist movement
- the end of the air journey → the end of the cubist movement

These are fairly conventional mappings that are involved in any application of the air journey source “domain” (more precisely, frame), not just cubism. However, at this point we can ask why this mode of travel was (unconsciously) chosen by the artist from among other modes of travel (such as car, train or sea journey).

There are several answers to this question at the *level of mental spaces*. One reason is that the success, viability – the functionality – of the movement was not clear at the time of its inception. Success and functionality is metaphorically viewed as upward oriented; hence the metaphor FUNCTIONAL IS UP, as indicated by the idiomatic phrases *up and running*, *get off the ground*, *take off*. Now, since ACTION IS MOTION, we can combine it with FUNCTIONAL IS UP to yield FUNCTIONAL / SUCCESSFUL ACTION IS UPWARD MOTION, as in the case of an air journey. Second, we can surmise that the choice is also facilitated because the initial part of the journey is crucial in air travel (see, e.g., the many metaphorical expressions concerned with the initial part of air travel: *get off the ground*, *take off*, *would not fly*, *launch*). There is clear focus on the initial phase of the movement; that is, the mapping that is emphasized is “the beginning of the air journey → the beginning of the cubist movement”. The early history of the cubist movement was fraught with difficulties. The other

modes of travel would not have lent themselves to conceptually expressing this uncertainty and excitement. Third, there might also be some cultural motivation for this choice, as we'll see later.

The idea of cubism as an (abstract) movement manifests itself at the mental space level in several further specific ways. A new, unconventional mapping is introduced to the frame level metaphor. It is “the initiator / originator of the air journey → the initiator / originator of cubist painting”. In other words, there is some focus on the initiators, originators of cubism: namely, Picasso and Braque. This means that the originators are specified by name, whereas in the frame level metaphor we only have the role of unspecified traveler. Actually, in the painting one of the originators (Picasso) is also the traveler. Thus, the roles of traveler and originator coincide in the painting (i.e., at the mental space level). Moreover, in the painting one of the originators (Braque) is depicted as remaining on the ground, thus receiving secondary status in the movement. Finally, the painting also evokes the Wright brothers, who had completed their first successful flight (in 1903) a few years before Cubism as a movement actually started. The two artists, Picasso and Braque, thought of themselves as the Wright brothers (Picasso often jokingly called Braque Wilbur – the first name of one of the Wright brothers). The parallel brings up for Picasso and Braque, and probably also for Tansey and the viewers of the painting, the initial excitement associated with the two enterprises. In other words, blending occurs at this level: the Wright brothers are conceptually fused with Picasso and Braque. This reading arises from historical knowledge – in terms of the contextualist view of conceptual metaphor theory, the conceptual-cognitive context. The recognition of this parallel may have also functioned as a motivation for the choice of air journey as a frame to conceptualize cubism by Mark Tansey.

5. Conclusions

In this paper I have examined a single painting by the American artist Mark Tansey from the perspective of extended CMT. I started out

from the assumption that CMT and its extended version can help us in understanding how the painter conceptualizes aspects of cubism and how the viewers of the painting conceptualize the artist's conceptualization as represented by the painting. To make clear how the more traditional CMT and the extended CMT would handle the task, I analyzed the metaphoric-metonymic aspects of the painting in two ways.

The multi-level view of metaphor proved especially helpful in accounting for the interpretation of the painting. Both the painter and the viewers approach the work at a variety of different levels of schematicity. The conceptual materials on the image schema, domain, and frame levels are most probably shared by the artist and the viewers. They are, to a large extent, conventional and stored in long-term memory. It is on the mental space level that the artist's creative imagination can be captured. We find that, here, the artist focuses on select aspects of the frame level metaphor, such as the initial period of the cubist movement, the excitement and difficulties associated with this phase of the movement, and the originators of the movement. He also elaborates on the events of the period, thus managing to metaphorically present the leading figure. In short, much of the creative work is represented on the mental space level. But, at the same time, this artistic representation would not be possible without conventional conceptual materials on the three "higher" levels.

The contextualist view of metaphor was less relevant to the overall comprehension of the painting. Nonetheless the small part it played in the process helps us understand why the artist resorted to the concept of air journey, and not some other mode of travel. His knowledge about the Wright brothers' flight and its influence on Picasso and Braque, that is, the conceptual-cognitive context, may have provided the motivation to use this mode of travel as an expression of his views on cubism.

More generally, the application of the extensions of CMT to a painting indicates that the interpretation of works of art share a great deal with how the human conceptual system operates in interpreting everyday experiences. By studying visual art, we can find out not only about what happens in the course of understanding a particular

work of art but also how we (everyday people) utilize our metaphorical conceptual system. It remains to be seen how far these new insights into CMT can take us in how we understand visual art in general and other types of artwork and experiences in modalities other than the visual.

Visual Metonymy and Framing in Political Communication

1. Introduction: Metaphor and Political Discourse

Pericles had a profound influence on Athenian politics and society; during his reign as general of Athens, the city experienced its golden age, also referred to as “the Age of Pericles”. Yet Pericles was not only a statesman; he was also a much-acclaimed orator: one of his most famous speeches is the Funeral Oration that he delivered before the Athenians in the first year of the Peloponnesian War, to honour the dead.¹ Nevertheless, very little of Pericles’ memorable sayings have survived the course of history; even the Funeral Oration is an edited text (and thus it is very difficult to tell how much of the speech can be accounted to Pericles himself, and how much to Thucydides, who recorded it.² This anomaly is also emphasized by Plutarch in *The Parallel Lives*, where the following can be read: “In writing he [Pericles] left nothing behind him except the decrees which he proposed, and only a few in all of his memorable sayings are preserved, as, for instance, his urging the removal of Aegina as the ‘eye-sore of the Piraeus’”.³

¹ David Cartwright, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides: A Companion to Rex Warner’s Penguin Translation*, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1997, p. 87.

² C. M. J. Sicking, “The General Purport of Pericles’ Funeral Oration and Last Speech”, *Hermes*, vol. 123, no. 4 (1995), pp. 404–425, see here p. 404.

³ Aegina was one of the island city-states of the Saronic Gulf. Alarmed by the aggressive politics of Athens, it aligned with other city-states in the Peloponnesian League (led by Sparta). – Plutarch, *The Parallel Lives*, Loeb Classic Library Collection, 1916. Available online: <http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/e/roman/texts/plutarch/lives/home.html>, p. 156.

Why did this one particular metaphorical expression (out of the all the possibly hundreds that Pericles might have used in his speeches) – i.e., *eyesore of the Piraeus* – become so noteworthy that it has survived throughout the centuries? In Musolff's view, this is simply because the expression is an "efficient rhetorical move that kills several communication birds with one stone".⁴ In effect, it manages to shift the attention from a military operation (i.e., attacking Aegina) to an aesthetic problem (the island being an "eyesore"). Further, it also belittles the enemy – after all, an *eyesore* does not sound very threatening –, and places the attacker into the position of a problem-solver, as opposed to an aggressor (and thus relieves the Athenians of any misgivings they might have had on attacking Aegina – see *ibid.*). In other words, this simple figurative – more specifically metaphorical – expression legitimized war.

The idea that metaphor can have such a powerful (and possibly adverse) effect has of course been noted by a long line of philosophers (which the present paper will not go into, due to space limitations, but see Johnson for an overview).⁵ Hobbes, in particular, was particularly apprehensive of metaphor – in *Leviathan* he refers to it as one of the "abuses of speech".⁶ In effect, Hobbes considered metaphor as a deceptive device that could destabilize political discourse by the "stirring up of Passion", leading to "Madnesse" and civil war.⁷

Jumping ahead a couple of centuries, the central influencing role of metaphor, guiding both our thoughts and actions, was emphasized by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their seminal work

⁴ Andreas Musolff, "Metaphor and Persuasion in Politics", in *The Routledge Handbook of Metaphor and Language*, eds. Elena Semino and Zsófia Demjén, London: Taylor and Francis, 2016, pp. 309–336, this passage on p. 309.

⁵ Mark Johnson (ed.), *Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor*, Minneapolis, MN: The University of Minnesota Press, 1981.

⁶ Quoted in Andreas Musolff, "*Ignes fatui* or Apt Similitudes? The Apparent Denunciation of Metaphor by Thomas Hobbes", *Hobbes Studies*, vol. 18 (2005), pp. 96–113, this reference on p. 96.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

*Metaphors We Live By*⁸ and with the birth of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT). In essence, CMT claims that metaphor is not an ornamental device of language but is fundamental in how we make sense of the world around us (and accordingly, how we react to it). No wonder that Lakoff and Johnson have referred to metaphors as “self-fulfilling prophecies”,⁹ by virtue of their perspectival meaning-making status in our conceptualization.¹⁰ For example, their effect on political discourse – and accordingly, ensuing political actions – is well captured by the “War on Terror” campaign that was launched in the USA following the 9/11 attacks. In Lewis and Reese’s view, the expression itself (which was primarily metaphorical), brought with it a “set of assumptions, symbols and worldviews that gain and maintain organizing power as they are naturalized”.¹¹ As the expression acquired increasing popularity and went into general use, it helped institutionalize the USA’s unilateral foreign policy after 9/11, and also helped to ensure wide public support for attacking Iraq, which resulted in thousands of deaths and casualties (on the American side). Lakoff aptly stated that “[m]etaphors can kill. The use of a metaphor ... becomes pernicious when it hides realities in a harmful way”.¹²

⁸ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1980.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

¹⁰ Depending on which metaphor we select for the comprehension of a particular concept, we immediately adopt a way of understanding that concept, which will naturally highlight certain features and background (or hide) others. For an overview, see Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction*, 2nd and revised edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

¹¹ S. C. Lewis and S. D. Reese. “What is the War on Terror? Framing Through the Eyes of Journalists”, *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, vol. 86, issue 1 (2009), pp. 85–102, this passage on p. 88.

¹² George Lakoff, “Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify the War in the Gulf”, *Peace Research*, vol. 23, issue 2–3 (1991), pp. 25–32, this passage on p. 32.

2. Visual Metaphor

Over the past decades, the bulk of investigations on conceptual metaphor have focused mostly on its verbal manifestations. Nevertheless, if metaphor is indeed primarily conceptual (as Lakoff and Johnson have claimed it to be), then it can be very much expected to occur outside the verbal mode as well. Based on this assumption, conceptual metaphor has been successfully identified outside of spoken language as well, in music, gesture and images.¹³ With regard to the latter, metaphor occurring in images has been dubbed by a number of names in the literature: visual metaphor, pictorial metaphor or multimodal metaphor (though in the case of “multimodal metaphor” the visual mode is complemented by another genre as well, such as text).¹⁴ Studies in visual metaphor have largely focused on commercial advertisements (*ibid.*), with some forays into political cartoons, comics and contemporary art.¹⁵

3. Visual Metonymy

Metaphor is yet only one of the cognitive devices that fundamentally govern and structure our conceptualization; its less appreciated – but even more ubiquitous – sister is conceptual metonymy.¹⁶ While met-

¹³ For a fine selection of papers on a wide application of metaphor outside the verbal mode, see Charles Forceville and Eduardo Urios-Aparisi (eds.), *Multimodal Metaphor*, Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2009.

¹⁴ Charles Forceville, *Pictorial Metaphor in Advertising*, London & New York: Routledge, 1996.

¹⁵ Political cartoons: Elizabeth El Rafaie, “Metaphor in Political Cartoons: Exploring Audience Responses”, in Forceville and Urios-Aparisi (eds.), *Multimodal Metaphor*, pp. 173–196; comics: Bart Eerden, “Anger in Asterix: The Metaphorical Representation of Anger in Comics and Animated Films”, in Forceville and Urios-Aparisi (eds.), *Multimodal Metaphor*, pp. 243–264; art: Ágnes Virág, “A kortárs képelemzés kognitív szempontú megközelítése” [Cognitive Approaches to the Analysis of Contemporary Art], *Gyermeknevelés*, vol. 1 (2017), pp. 123–142.

¹⁶ See Réka Benczes, Antonio Barcelona and Francesco José Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (eds.), *Defining Metonymy in Cognitive Linguistics: Towards a Consensus View*, Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2011; and Jeanette Little-

aphor provides understanding of one domain in terms of another (e.g., LOVE IS WAR – as manifested in “conquer” in the expression “to conquer sy’s heart”), metonymy provides mental access to another entity within the same conceptual domain or frame (e.g., BODY PART FOR EMOTION – as exhibited by “heart” in the expression “to conquer sy’s heart”). Thus, what happens here is that one entity stands for another, conceptually contiguous, entity.

The ubiquity of (verbal) metonymy would necessarily entail the ubiquity of non-verbal manifestations of metonymy; nevertheless, research on visual (and multimodal) metonymy is still very scarce (and is a relatively recent area of research), even though – as Forceville rightfully claims – “[i]nvestigating non-verbal metonymy is a logical next step”.¹⁷ Similarly to metaphor, non-verbal modes of metonymy have been primarily investigated in commercial advertisements;¹⁸ with regard to political discourse, visual metonymy has been nearly exclusively dealt with in the form of political cartoons.¹⁹

The aim of the present paper is to expand the research in visual metonymy into the realm of political discourse – more specifically political advertisements – and thereby demonstrate the “dynamic and highly contextualized” nature of visual metonymy (Forceville, “Metonymy”)²⁰ and its persuasive power in political communication, thanks to its subtle and unobtrusive qualities. The paper argues that the multiple and interlocking uses of visual (and multimodal) metonymy exploited in an anti-EU television advertisement created by the

more, *Metonymy: Hidden Shortcuts in Language, Thought, and Communication*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

¹⁷ Charles Forceville, “Metonymy in Visual and Audiovisual Discourse”, in E. Ventola and A. J. Moya Guijarro (eds.), *The World Told and the World Shown: Multisemiotic Issues*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp. 56–74, this passage on p. 56.

¹⁸ See Forceville, *ibid.*; and Paula Pérez Sobrino, *Multimodal Metaphor and Metonymy in Advertising*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2017.

¹⁹ I. Negro Alousque, “Pictorial and Verbo-pictorial Metaphor in Spanish Political Cartooning”, *Círculo de Lingüística Aplicada a la Comunicación*, vol. 57 (2014), pp. 59–84.

²⁰ Forceville, “Metonymy”.

Hungarian government in 2017²¹ has contributed to the success of the ad by a) optimizing the effort–effect balance (via oversimplification and perspectivization); b) compressing seemingly complex relationships via metonymic chains; and c) making implicit visual metaphors explicit. The following section will elaborate in detail on all three aspects of visual metonymy by selecting four images from the advertisement. (Due to space limitations the paper will not be able to focus on all visual and non-visual aspects of the images, or the full ad itself.)²²

4. Analysis

The first image under analysis (see Figure 1) depicts the building of the European Commission in Brussels in the background, with a line of EU flags in the foreground. At this point in the ad, the text at the bottom says the following: “A brüsszeli bürokraták azt követelik, hogy Magyarország változtassa meg bevándorláspolitikáját” (in English, the text can be translated as follows: “The bureaucrats in Brussels are demanding that Hungary should change its immigration policy”). Through the building of the commission (which could, in theory, be any EU building) and the EU flags before it, the image evokes metonymically the EUROPEAN UNION frame, which incorporates the institutions of the EU, as well as the people who work in these institutions. The subtext and the image act together to constitute the following metonymies: “the bureaucrats in Brussels” (people working within the institution) stand for the institution itself (i.e., the EU); and the place of institution (Brussels) also stands for the institution (the EU). In other words, the communicated message in this particular image is that Brussels stands for the EU. The problem with

²¹ The clip can be watched here (in Hungarian): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RlimCZqMzrk>.

²² I would like to emphasize that the analysis to follow is of a post hoc nature – the paper does not wish to claim that the producers created the advertisement with the metonymies identified here. Please also note that the images to be discussed do not strictly follow the sequence of their appearance in the ad.

this PLACE FOR INSTITUTION metonymy is that it oversimplifies the issue and “betrays a subtle political bias in reducing the complex entity of EU Commission (and perhaps the whole of the European Union) to one city reference ... without further regard to other political elements of the European Union”.²³



Figure 1: “The bureacrats in Brussels are demanding that Hungary should change its immigration policy”.

In the second image under analysis (see Figure 2), we see a couple of young men in a street riot. Although it is not clear from the image whom the men are fighting against, the image might be familiar to Hungarian viewers: it depicts the riots that took place between detained immigrants and the Hungarian police force in the border town of Röszke in September 2015. Drawing on the same text as in the previous image, the verbal and visual elements together evoke the IMMIGRATION frame, incorporating the participants (immigrants, the Hungarian government, various bodies of the EU, events related to immigration, etc.), thus producing a number of rather powerful metonymies based on the relationships among the elements within the frame itself. The subtext (“The bureaucrats in Brussels are demanding that Hungary should change its immigration policy”), combined with the image of immigrants, elicits a PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT

²³ Musolff, *Political Metaphor*, p. 9.

metonymy, whereby Brussels (as the producer) stands for the product itself (that being immigration) – thus, the consequences of immigration, such as the clash between the immigrants and the police force that took place in Röszke – are delegated onto an EU institution. We do not know of course who or what this EU institution might be; thanks to the oversimplification of the previous image (i.e., Brussels as EU), the advertisement leaves the identity of the “causer” of the riot hidden (i.e., backgrounded). A further conceptual relationship that is evoked in the image is a PART FOR WHOLE metonymy, whereby part of an event, that being the riot in September 2015, stands for the whole event of immigration as such. This particular metonymy therefore highlights one subevent as being a central, defining feature of the whole concept (or event) of immigration, possibly creating a sense of foreboding and fear with regard to immigration and – naturally – the immigrants themselves (who are depicted in the image). The viewer’s potential dread of immigrants is exacerbated by an EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy, also implied by the image: dangerous, unruly immigrants who are difficult to control are the effect of immigration (which is the cause).



Figure 2: “The bureaucrats in Brussels are demanding that Hungary should change its immigration policy”.

Overall, the metonymies in the image perspectivize immigration by picking out (highlighting) certain elements of the frame (while

completely backgrounding either the humanitarian aspects of immigration or the complexity that the issue has been treated with in the EU institutions and among member states). The metonymies in both images discussed above are quite basic and are very common in our conceptual system. It is in the use of these common metonymies where the persuasive power of the advertisement might lie: the metonymies do not rely on complex cognitive strategies to communicate the intended message of IMMIGRATION FOR DANGER AND CHAOS. The message is built up by the interplay of basic (visual and verbal) metonymies, through oversimplification and perspectivization, ensuring that we arrive at the correct message.

The third image depicts György Soros in black and white, with the subtext “Egy Soros György pénzelt szervezet Brüsszelt támogatva pereket indít hazánk ellen” (in English: “In support of Brussels, an organization funded by György Soros is now initiating legal action against our country” – see Figure 3). This image and the text evokes a larger – expanded – EUROPEAN UNION frame, of which György Soros is also a part (or element). The metonymies evoked by




Figure 3: “In support of Brussels, an organization funded by György Soros is now initiating legal action against our country”.

this frame can be analyzed along a metonymic chain. Accordingly, the close-up of György Soros in the image and the assertion that he is supporting Brussels create the metonymy of ASSOCIATE OF AN INSTI-

TUTION (György Soros) FOR THE INSTITUTION (EU/Brussels). Based on the images discussed previously and the metonymies associated with them, anything connected to Brussels is in favour of immigration, thus Soros stands for Brussels which stands for immigration. Via compression, we arrive at the final stage of the metonymic chain: Soros stands for immigration. Compression is a handy tool by which complex relationships can be reduced into more condensed forms, which – at least in the case of a political advertisement – can contribute to simplifying complex messages to voters (and might also contribute to helping voters accept these messages more readily).

At this point the advertisement continues with a couple of images depicting Hungarian landscapes. The initial scene depicts the Buda Castle and the Danube (located in Budapest), followed by an image of the first abbey constructed in Hungary, that of Tihany, and Lake Balaton (in the background). These landscapes are relatively easily recognizable by a vast majority of Hungarians and conjure up the HUNGARY frame, whereby SALIENT MEMBERS OF THE CATEGORY (LOCATIONS IN HUNGARY) STAND FOR THE CATEGORY (HUNGARY). The last image in the succession of Hungarian landscapes, is, however, not as easily identifiable, and is definitely not a major tourist hotspot in the country (at least not for foreigners). The image shows a




Figure 4: The town of Eger.

small town, Eger, situated in the North-East of the country (see Figure 4). Why did the creators of the advertisement choose a slightly obscure town for this ad, instead of a more easily recognizable location?

The answer is, in fact, quite simple. Eger is the location of one of the most famous and well-known sieges in the history of the country and is also an emblem of Hungarian bravery and heroism: in 1552 the Ottoman forces attacked the Castle of Eger, but the Hungarians – led by István Dobó – defended the castle and managed to repel the attack. It is hypothesized here that the SALIENT MEMBER FOR CATEGORY metonymy aids in making a (visually implicit) metaphor explicit – this being immigration in present-day Hungary (the target domain) conceptualized as the siege of the Castle of Eger in 1552 (the source domain). Accordingly, the Castle of Eger is mapped onto present-day Hungary; the defenders of the castle are the Hungarian government (and consequently the Hungarian people who support the government); the invading Ottoman troops are the immigrants entering Hungary; the fight against the Ottomans is the fight against EU immigration policy; and last but not least, the Ottoman leader of the troops is György Soros himself (see the analysis of Figure 3 above). The result is a very effective political message that is able to legitimize the actions of the Hungarian government against immigration by subtly drawing on (and thus creating a parallel with) a commonly known historical event in Hungary. The possible communicative power of the message lies in the fact that the metaphorical conceptualization remains implicit and can only be inferred by the visual metonymies that appear in the ad beforehand.

5. Conclusions

At the start of the cognitive linguistics research movement, conceptual metonymy was mostly ignored in favour of its more conspicuous – and more spectacular – twin, conceptual metaphor. Over the years, however, there has been a growing interest in conceptual metonymy,

which is now considered to be even more fundamental than metaphor. Despite its basicness, studies on metonymy are still more-or-less limited to the verbal mode (i.e., linguistic manifestations of conceptual metonymy) – in striking contrast to metaphor, which has been extensively studied outside of language, especially within the visual sphere.

The paper aimed to level out some of this discrepancy by analyzing visual metonymy and framing in an anti-EU television advertisement created by the Hungarian government in 2017. The analysis endeavoured to outline how the message was packaged by the multiple uses of visual (and multimodal) metonymies in order to “optimize the effect–effort balance”²⁴ and how these metonymies made salient some aspects of the target (while downplaying others) within a particular frame to best suit the communicator’s—in this case the government’s – communicational needs. Visual metonymies in political advertisements can thus become highly contextualized, thereby shedding light on the dynamic nature of metonymic meaning-making.

²⁴ Forceville, “Metonymy”, p. 59.

Image-Schema-based Folk Models of the MIND

1. Introduction

Experts of the diverse field of cognitive sciences¹ have claimed since the 1980s that human cognition is based on physical experiences among which vision is one of the most salient one. The issue of embodied cognition is still in the center of attention and of scientific arguments.

Accordingly, it can be stated without doubt that (a group of) scientists believe that the mind is entrenched in the body. But what about average people? How do lay people think about their own mind? The way people think can be accessed through language, as language is considered the manifestation of our conceptualization. This paper assumes that by studying expressions about the mind, the lay theory² of the MIND³ can be identified. It also accepts and builds on Barnden's⁴ findings, which prove that "commonsense views of the mind are highly metaphorical". This paper hypothesizes that the con-

¹ E.g. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 2nd edition, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003; Lawrence Shpiro (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition*, London: Routledge, 2014; Fumiya Iida, Rolf Pfeifer, Luc Steels and Yasuo Kuniyoshi (eds.), *Embodied Artificial Intelligence*, International Seminar, Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, July 7–11, 2003, Revised Papers.

² Lay (or folk) theory represents our everyday knowledge about the world (Zoltán Kövecses, *Language, Mind, and Culture: A Practical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

³ In harmony with the practice of cognitive linguistics, concepts, conceptual metaphors and metonymies are small capitalized, while linguistic expressions are italicized.

⁴ John Barnden, "Consciousness and Common-Sense Metaphors of Mind", in Sean O. Nuallain, Paul Mc Kevitt and Eoghan Mac Aogain (eds.), *Two Sciences of Mind*, Amsterdam–Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1997, pp. 311–340.

ceptual metaphors,⁵ which play crucial role in the folk understanding of the MIND are organized by image schemas,⁶ which reflect and convey visual experiences, in a wider extent, perceptual experiences. It also proposes that the lay theory focuses on two aspects of the MIND: its operation and its quality. The operation of the mind is understood by two entirely different folk models driven by force dynamics.

The corpus for the image-schema-based metaphor identification was compiled of dictionary entries,⁷ more precisely of phrases of the *mind*, the *idea* and their synonyms. It is assumed that the concepts of HEAD and BRAIN can stand for the MIND, while the concept of IDEA can be substituted by the concept of THOUGHT due to their metonymic⁸ relationship. Regarding methodology, conceptual metaphors are identified based on the study of the corpus, since metaphorical linguistic expressions are considered the linguistic instantiations of conceptual metaphors. It needs to be noted that this research intends to contribute to the understanding of the folk theory of the MIND, not of COGNITION, hence its scope does not extend to the study of such a well known metaphor as UNDERSTANDING/COGNITION IS SEEING. In other words, due to the length limits of this paper, the corpus does not contain expressions stemming from the source domains of UNDERSTANDING/COGNITION, only phrases relating to the sources of MIND and IDEAS. However, this does not mean that the paper has nothing to say about human cognition.

⁵ Conceptual metaphor is the mental operation during which a conceptual domain provides mental access to another conceptual domain (Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor: A practical introduction*, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

⁶ An image schema is “a recurring, dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that gives coherence to our experience” (Mark Johnson, *The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. xix).

⁷ Dictionaries: Online Oxford Dictionary (<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com>), The Free Dictionary (www.thefreedictionary.com).

⁸ The mental activity during which an entity is referred to by naming another related entity instead is called conceptual metonymy (see Lakoff and Johnson, *op. cit.*).

2. Image-Schema-based Metaphors

This section goes through the metaphors of the MIND and of IDEAS, but only those are listed that are underlain with image schemas. Hence this is not a comprehensive list of metaphors – metaphors were left out such as THE MIND IS AN ENTITY, THE MIND IS A PERSON, and IDEAS ARE PLANTS etc.

2.1. The MIND as a Target Domain

2.1.1. *The Mind Is a Physical Container*

The MIND is conceptualized as a CONTAINER, based on our most basic experiences of boundedness, containment, and in-out orientation. “In-out orientation involves separation, orientation, and enclosure, which implies restriction and limitation.”⁹ Ideas are either in the mind (e.g. *have something in mind*) or out of it (e.g. *put something out of someone’s mind*).

Ideas (SUBSTANCES) can get into the mind (CONTAINER) in two ways: by an agent, which can be a person (e.g. *someone puts an idea into someone’s head*), or the ideas themselves can move into the container (e.g. *something springs to someone’s mind*). The self whose mind it is (THE PERSON WHO POSSESSES THE CONTAINER) does not perform any action that would result the movement of the ideas (SUBSTANCES) into the mind (CONTAINER).

Ideas can get out of the mind either by the physical motion of the ideas (e.g. *go out of mind*) or by the physical activity of an agent (e.g. *put something out of mind*).

Thirdly, ideas can stand still and locate in the container (e.g. *keep in mind*).

The other aspect of the PHYSICAL CONTAINER schema that is essential for the understanding of the mind – besides in-out orientation – is the location of the substance within the container. Ideas (SUB-

⁹ Mark Johnson, *The Body in the Mind*, p. 22.

STANCES) can be situated in the back (e.g. *at the back of one's mind*) or in the front of the mind (CONTAINER).

Furthermore, not only the ideas but also the self can be the substance of the mind (CONTAINER), who can move and locate out of it (e.g. *be/go out of one's mind*).

It must be noted that the phrase *in someone's mind* also activates the PHYSICAL CONTAINER image schema, however it is considered a space builder, which creates the ALTERNATIVE REALITY hypothetical space.¹⁰ This inner world of the self is structured by the person's perception of physical reality, her emotions, and thoughts etc. It is governed by different rules and is exposed to different actions than the outer world, i.e. physical reality is (e.g. *I wrote a letter in my mind. In my mind Michael Jackson is alive*). Distinguishing an inner world and an outer one is enabled by the in-out orientation of the CONTAINER schema.

2.1.2. *The Mind Is Surface*

Related to the human body and to objects one of our primarily physical experiences is that they have surface. The mind is conceptualized as a surface on which ideas (SUBSTANCES) are located (e.g. *something is on one's mind*) or move (e.g. *something flashes across one's mind*).

2.1.3. *The Mind Is a Physical Object*

Relying on our physical experiences, we know that objects have physical attributes (e.g. shape and colour) and one can manipulate them (e.g. carry them).

Expressions like *frame of mind*, *one's mind goes blank*, *warp of the mind* highlight the former aspect of objects.

¹⁰ The term of mental space was introduced by Gilles Fauconnier (*Mental Spaces*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) to mark extremely detailed and specific conceptual packages that are created in the on-line discourse in order to enhance local understanding and action.

A person can physically interact with the mind as an OBJECT (e.g. *set someone's mind at rest, unbend one's mind, open one's mind*). In these cases, it is mostly the self who performs action on her own mind, in other words the mind is conceptualized as a POSSESSED OBJECT, suggesting that more metaphors can be at work simultaneously. Finally the MIND IS A POSSESSED OBJECT sub-metaphor entails that the mind can be owned and also lost (e.g. *lose someone's mind*).

Detailed knowledge about the object can activate specific objects in our mind, like a book (e.g. *mind-reader*), a machine (e.g. *one's mind slipped a cog*) or a firearm (e.g. *hair-trigger mind*).

Objects are perceived as unities, as gestalts. The mind is a WHOLE that is made up of parts (e.g. *a piece of mind, half a mind*). The parts can be even shared by more persons (POSSESSORS) (e.g. *to be of one mind*).

2.1.4. *The Mind is the Human Body*

Two aspects of the human body get to the center of attention regarding the mind: its health condition, namely that it can be healthy or ill and that it has body parts. The former aspect can focus on the mental condition of the self (e.g. *be of sound mind, be of unsound mind*). Among the numerous body parts, the *mind's eye* and the *mind's ear* are salient.

2.2. The IDEAS as a Target Domain

2.2.1. *Ideas Are Substances In/Out of a Container, Ideas Are Moving Entities*

Ideas locate and move relative to the mind (CONTAINER).

Ideas (MOVING ENTITIES) tend to move in three directions:

- 1) from outside to inside the container. E.g. ideas can *come to, spring to, run through, flash through, enter and cross the mind*.
- 2) from inside to outside the container. E.g. ideas can *go out and pass out of the mind*.

3) within the container. E.g. ideas can *turn over in the mind*.

Ideas (SUBSTANCES) tend to have two locations:

1) in the container. E.g. ideas *can be in one's mind*.

2) out of the container. E.g. ideas *can be out of one's mind*.

2.2.2. *Ideas are Objects*

Ideas are possessed objects (e.g. *have a thought, have no idea*) that can be exchanged (e.g. *give a thought, get ideas*) and be physically manipulated (e.g. *take/bring a thought*).

From the perspective of the self, an object can be too heavy and hence uncomfortable to carry. It implies that the person's intention is to get rid of it. This set of knowledge is activated by the IDEAS ARE BURDENS sub-metaphor (e.g. *weigh on one's mind, a load/weight off one's mind*).

2.2.3. *Ideas are Containers*

Ideas can be containers in which a person (mainly the self) is the substance (e.g. *sit deep in thoughts, dive into an idea*).

3. Folk Models of the Mind

The metaphor identification made it clear that multiple metaphors tend to work jointly in the meaning making process. I propose that two aspects of the MIND are highlighted by the metaphors: one of them is the operation of the mind, the other is its state and quality. In other words, two image schema based folk theories can be differentiated: one focuses on the way the mind operates, while the other is about the features of the mind. Both theories are constructed by metaphor-based cognitive models, indicating the interaction of the MIND, the IDEAS, and the SELF.

3.1. How the Mind Operates

The central issue of the operation of the mind is control, which results in two models.

3.1.1. Model 1: *The Ideas Control the Self*

This model is based on the MIND IS A CONTAINER and IDEAS ARE MOVING ENTITIES metaphors.

Ideas that move into and out of one's mind cannot be controlled by the self (POSSESSOR OF THE CONTAINER). The ideas either move on their own or are moved by a third party, hence the self is passive in this process and does not have control over the ideas. Putting it simply, the phenomena of thinking of something or becoming conscious of something are conceptualized as the movement of the idea (ENTITY) into the mind (CONTAINER) of the person. Hence, it is not the person who acts (e.g. thinks, cognizes), but the ideas (e.g. *spring, come, cross, flash*) or a third party (e.g. *something/somebody brings/calls/recalls something/somebody to mind*).

Since the person cannot control the ideas (ENTITIES), she is unable to make them stay in her mind (CONTAINER), which means she cannot fix them in her memory, although she wants to. In other words, the phenomenon of forgetting something unintentionally is conceptualized as the movement of the idea (ENTITY) out of the mind (CONTAINER). Again, the person is passive, the ideas are active (e.g. *go out of one's mind, slip one's mind*).

Consequently, the person is passive while the ideas perform physical action on it. The former is the antagonist, the latter is the agonist in the force dynamic system.¹¹

In sum, the phenomena of 1) becoming conscious of an idea and 2) unintentionally forgetting an idea are both conceptualized as the control of the ideas over the mind, hence over the self. This

¹¹ Leonard Talmy, *Toward a Cognitive Semantics*, vol. I: *Concept Structuring Systems*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000.

model is driven by force dynamics and by the CONTAINER and MOVING ENTITY metaphors.

3.1.2. Model 2: The Self Controls the Ideas

This model is based on multiple metaphors (THE MIND IS A CONTAINER, IDEAS ARE MOVING ENTITIES, THE MIND IS AN OBJECT, IDEAS ARE OBJECTS, and IDEAS ARE CONTAINERS), which have in common that the person is active and is able to control the ideas.

Consciously memorizing something and recalling something is moving entities (IDEAS) within the mind (CONTAINER). It implies that the self is active: she physically manipulates the ideas and makes them stay in her mind (e.g. *keep in mind*, *turn something over in one's mind*).

If the person intends to stop thinking or remembering something, hence intends to control her own mental activity, she can move ideas (ENTITIES) out of her mind (CONTAINER) (e.g. *put something out of one's mind*). It is clear that in this case the person is the agonist, who forces the ideas, which are the antagonist, to move out of the container, hence she overcomes.

If a person changes the physical status of the mind (OBJECT) and of ideas (OBJECTS), it entails that the person has control over them. This can be instantiated in many ways. 1) Considering something is conceptualized as physical manipulation of ideas (OBJECTS) (e.g. *take thought*). 2) Concentrating on something, consciously paying attention to something, recalling something is physical manipulation of the mind (OBJECT) (e.g. *put/set/turn one's mind to something*, *cast one's mind back*, *bend one's mind*). 3) Articulating one's ideas is sharing an object – considered a whole – with others, who hence get pieces of it (e.g. *share one's thoughts*, *give a piece of mind*).

As a response to the force tendency of the ideas (OBJECTS), the person can resist and as a counter-action she can react (e.g. *take a load off the mind*). Consequently, the antagonist can overcome the agonist as it can be stronger.

As we saw, not only the ideas (ENTITIES) can move within the mind (CONTAINER), but also the person (ENTITY) can move within the

ideas (CONTAINER), which means that she consciously considers something. The metaphor implies the passive-active relation of the ideas and of the person (e.g. *dive into an idea*).

Finally, regarding the active nature of the person, it must be noted that possessing something can be regarded as a type of action that implies an active agent. The phenomena of consciously remembering something and thinking of something are conceptualized as having something (SUBSTANCE) in the mind (CONTAINER) (e.g. *have/bear in mind*). Considering an idea is possessing an idea (OBJECT) (e.g. *have a thought*).

In sum, the phenomena of consciously memorizing, remembering, forgetting, and concentrating on something are conceptualized as the self's control over her ideas. This control is manifested in physical action: the person moves entities into, out of or within the mind (CONTAINER); manipulates the mind (OBJECT) and the ideas (OBJECT); possesses the ideas (OBJECTS); and she herself moves within the ideas (CONTAINER).

3.2. The Features of the Mind

The quality of the mind is characterized by duality: it can work properly, in a normal, preferred way, which state is evaluated positively or it can deviate from the right and favoured way, which is considered negative.

Positive attributes of the mind, and – due to the MIND FOR THE PERSON metonymy – of the person are:

- Smart (e.g. *sharp mind, hair-trigger mind*). THE MIND IS AN OBJECT
- Mentally fully competent (e.g. *be of sound mind*). THE MIND IS THE HUMAN BODY
- Nonjudgmental, tolerant (e.g. *open-minded, have/keep an open mind*). THE MIND IS AN OBJECT
- Carefree, relaxed (e.g. *a weight/load off one's mind, unbend one's mind, put one's mind at rest/ease*). IDEAS ARE OBJECTS, THE MIND IS AN OBJECT

Negative attributes of the mind and metonymically of the person:

- Forgetful (e.g. *have a mind like a sieve, one's mind goes blank*). THE MIND IS AN OBJECT
- Have poor mental capacity (e.g. *be of unsound mind*). THE MIND IS THE HUMAN BODY
- Insane (e.g. *derangement of mind, lose one's mind, be out of one's mind*). THE MIND IS AN OBJECT, THE MIND IS A CONTAINER

The quality of the mind can also be influenced by its mental attitude, which is expressed by the MIND IS AN OBJECT metaphor (e.g. *set/frame/cast of mind*).

To sum up, the mental quality of the mind, and metonymically of the person, is conceptualized as the physical quality of an object or as the health condition of the human body, on the one hand. Positive change in the mental status of the person is conceptualized as being able to control an object, while negative change is the lack of control, on the other hand.

4. Conclusion

The lay theory of the mind is organized by image-schema-based metaphors. The core idea of the folk understanding of the operation of the mind is control – whether the self is able to control her ideas or not. The CONTAINER schema suggests that the mind is a bounded region that is separated from what is outside it. Due to physical movement, ideas can get in and out of it or can move within it. The OBJECT schema entails that both the mind and the ideas can be manipulated by the self.

I propose that experts whose work is related to the mind to any extent should be aware of the way lay people think about their own mind. Researchers of the mind (e.g. philosophers, cognitive scientists, AI researchers) should be familiar with the folk model of the mind that might be evoked even by scientific jargon related to the

Image-Schema-based Folk Models of the MIND

mind. Therapists may help their patients struggling with mental illnesses change their metaphors about their mind reflected in their language use. Teachers should treat their students' mind carefully, as even an inappropriate metaphor can ruin the students' view of their own mental ability.

On the Multimodality of Folklore

1. Introduction

In this paper, I will discuss a type of multimodality that I believe to be prevalent in Hungarian folklore, which I call *multimodal source domain representation*. According to Forceville,¹ multimodal metaphors are “metaphors whose target and source are each represented exclusively or predominantly in different modes”. In my examples, the target domain is generated by source domains that originate from different modes of experience, which are activated simultaneously. What makes this analysis more complex is that (1) there are more than one concurrent target domains built up by the same sources, and (2) the source domains are congruent with the cultural context, or in other words, they are *intradiegetic*.²

First, let us outline what I understand by modes. There have been numerous attempts to provide an exhaustive inventory.³ Forceville,⁴ for example, opts for the following list of modes: spoken language, written language, visuals, music, sound, gestures, smell, taste, and touch. In my analysis the source domains derive from spoken language, music, visuals and touch. I will also introduce a further

¹ Charles Forceville, “Non-verbal and Multimodal Metaphor in a Cognitivist Framework: Agendas for Research”, in G. Kristiansen, M. Achard, R. Dirven, F. R. de Mendoza Ibáñez (eds.), *Cognitive Linguistics: Current Applications and Future Perspectives*, Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2006, pp. 379–402, the quoted passage on p. 384.

² Charles Forceville, “Pictorial and Multimodal Metaphor”, in N. M. Klug and H. Stöckl (eds.), *Handbuch Sprache im multimodalen Kontext* [The Language in Multimodal Contexts Handbook], Linguistic Knowledge series, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2016, pp. 241–260.

³ Nina-Marie Klug, Hartmut Stöckl (eds.), *Handbuch Sprache im multimodalen Kontext, Handbücher Sprachwissen (HSW) 7*, Berlin/Boston: de Gruyter, 2014.

⁴ Charles Forceville, “Non-verbal and Multimodal Metaphor”, p. 158.

mode that is not commonly considered a form of self-expression: the choice of performance time, which I believe offers an extra dimension and power to the metaphor that is intended to be construed. For this type of modality, I propose the term *time of performance*.

In the following, I will analyze a minstrel song from Transdanubium, and as an illustration of the song, a so-called *bunned chair* (named after its shape), reflecting the figure of a woman whose hair is combed into a bun. The analysis will apply the methods of conceptual metaphor theory.

2. Metaphors Within an Ancient Minstrel Song

2.1. The Spoken Language Source Domain

Itt is vagyon egy szép legény,

here also there is a beautiful young man

“Here is a beautiful young man”

kinek neve Pista,

whose name+poss Pista

“called Pista”,

amott vagyon egy szép leány,

there there is a beautiful girl

“there is a beautiful girl”

kinek neve Naca.

whose name Naca

“called Naca”.

Isten meg ne mentse,

God pref. do+not(imp.) save+imp.3rdSg

On the Multimodality of Folklore

“God should not save them”,

kebelibe *ejtse,*

chest+poss3rdSg+into drop+imp.3rdSg

“He should lower them into his chest”,

bele pöndörgesse,

into whirl+suff.+imp.3rdSg

“He should whirl them into it”

mint a cica farkát,

like the cat tail+obj.suff.

“like the tail of a cat”

még annál is jobban,

even that+suffix also good+comparative+suff.

“and even more so”,

mint a róka farkát,

like the fox tail+poss.3rdSg+obj

“like the tail of a fox”,

rétöki rigi törvény, hej regő rejtem...

“this is the law called: ‘rétöki rigi törvény’”, Refrain.⁵

The lines of this minstrel song describe the way in which a young woman and a man become a couple. This takes place within the chest of God, propelled by his whirling force. This is the law of “love” as well as “procreation”, an act that ensures the perpetuity of life.

⁵ Gábor Lükő, *A magyar lélek formái* [Forms of the Hungarian Psyche], Budapest: Exodus, 1942, p. 107.

The main conceptual metaphors of “love” are LOVE IS A UNITY and LOVE IS A WHIRLING FORCE. The two are metonymically related by the CAUSE FOR EFFECT metonymy, because the whirling force is the cause of unity. With the combination of these two metaphors, two important aspects of love are brought together: “love” as an emotion (by the FORCE metaphor)⁶ and “love” as a (marriage) relationship (by the UNITY metaphor).⁷ The entire process of falling in love and becoming a couple can be outlined as:

God, as a matchmaker, emits power in the shape of a whirling force → the whirling force couples a woman and a man → unity.

The powerful nature of this love relationship is thus granted by God himself. The complex metaphor elaborated in the song is:

LOVE IS A UNITY EFFECTUATED BY A WHIRLING FORCE
ORIGINATING FROM GOD

- AGENT UNITING THE TWO PARTS (MATCHMAKER) IS GOD
- PATIENTS THAT ARE UNITED ARE THE WOMAN AND THE MAN
- TOOL OF UNIFICATION IS A WHIRLING FORCE
- LOCATION OF UNION IS IN THE HEART OF GOD (inside his chest)

In this context, God is a very special kind of matchmaker. He is not an outsider, but is intrinsically involved in the act of coupling, inasmuch as unification takes place within his chest, where his heart is. This is a manifestation of the LOVE IS A SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER metaphor (CHEST stands FOR HEART [PART FOR WHOLE metonymy]), more specifically, DIVINE LOVE IS A WHIRLING FORCE IN GOD’S HEART. Thus, divine love as a force, contrary to the force of human love that typically attacks the rational self from outside,⁸ is

⁶ Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture, and Body in Human Feeling*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 71–72, 83–84.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 119–222.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 72 and 84.

represented as an internal part of God. Also, because the heart is located at a central position in the body, it is conceptualized as a central feature of God (IMPORTANT IS CENTRAL metaphor).

A frequently occurring source domain of “marriage” in folklore is the REMOVAL OF A PLANT representing a human.⁹ It refers to the beginning of a new phase of life. Here, people, rather than plants, are removed, in this case into the chest of God. The underlying metaphor is STARTING A NEW PHASE OF LIFE IS REMOVAL OF PEOPLE, more specifically, MARRIAGE IS REMOVAL OF A MAN AND A WOMAN TO THE SAME LOCATION. In addition, in this new location man, woman and God are now three, together. “Three” is a sacred number in folklore, symbolizing as it does that “through the unity of heaven and earth people were created, thus it signifies divine order and perfection”.¹⁰ Through this unity, God passes on his love to the couple, who are his collaborators in creation, and this effectuates marital love and the opportunity for new life. Therefore, the target domains represented by the WHIRLING FORCE source domain are: DIVINE LOVE, MARITAL LOVE, (PRO)CREATION.

The fact that God is eternal and His love has no end implies that human love originating from God will also be eternal, based on the CAUSE FOR EFFECT metonymy. If this is so, then this kind of “love” oversteps the boundaries of everyday human life. This meaning is supported by the shape of a spiral: it has no end, and as such, it accurately conveys the continuity of “love” and “life”. This can happen in two ways: (1) it lives on through the descendants of the couple, this meaning being reinforced by the presentation of whirling elements in the form of animal tails (PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphor: HUMAN PROCREATING ORGAN IS THE TAIL OF AN ANIMAL). (2) it continues in the afterlife (as granted by God, who is eternal). The fact that this act of unification is called *a law* in the song, gives an extra

⁹ Veronika Szelid, “Poetic and Visual Metaphors in Hungarian Folklore”, forthcoming in Réka Benczes and Veronika Szelid (eds.), *Cognitive Linguistic Studies*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

¹⁰ Mihály Hoppál, Marcell Jankovics, András Nagy, György Szemadám, *Jelkértár* [Store of Symbols], Budapest: Helikon, 1995, pp. 194 f..

power to the metaphors above, as law is something that cannot be changed by ordinary people. The metaphor is structured by the following correspondences:

LOVE / MARRIAGE / PROCREATION IS A LAW

- GOD IS LAWMAKER
- COUPLE IS SUBJECT TO THE LAW

2. 2. The Music Source Domain

The metaphorical messages conveyed by the melodies of folk songs is an underresearched field of cognitive studies. According to Hungarian ethnographer Gábor Lükő,¹¹ the free rhythm found in melancholic Hungarian folksongs is a sign of the “timelessness of time”. In these songs, whenever one wishes to prolong a syllable over one or more notes, one can freely do so. At such times one has the opportunity to enjoy the nature of the actual singing itself and to think about the transcendental world that the song describes.

Looking at the music of minstrel songs in general, we can observe repetitions of short, very simple lines (new ones can be improvisationally added), the melodies of which have a rising end-tune, with rhythms that tend to accelerate.¹² Thus, melody and rhythm seem to build up a similar kind of force as was mentioned above: WHIRLING FORCE IS ACCELERATED REPETITION OF SHORT MELODIES WITH RISING END TUNE. This helps the construal of the interrelated DIVINE LOVE/ HUMAN LOVE / (PRO)CREATION IS A WHIRLING FORCE metaphors.

¹¹ G. Lükő, *op.cit.*, pp. 291–319.

¹² *Magyar Néprajzi Lexikon* [Hungarian Ethnographic Lexicon], 2006, see <http://mek.oszk.hu/02100/02115/html/4-885.html>.

2.3. The “time of performance” Source Domain

Bearing in mind that nothing ever happens in folk culture by accident,¹³ it needs to be taken into account that the time of the year when minstrel songs were performed was normally Midwinter night. I argue that this circumstance plays a role in the construal of the metaphorical message of the song, as an additional mode of representing the target. Midwinter (winter solstice) is the time of the year with the shortest period of daylight and the longest night. It signifies the time one of the Earth's poles tilts away the furthest from the Sun. In the Northern Hemisphere Midwinter is marked on 21 December.

How is this connected to the song under scrutiny? The darkest day of the year also signifies the moment when light starts to reappear into the world. LIGHT is a metaphorical source domain of GOD¹⁴, LIFE or LOVE, while DARKNESS is a source of EVIL, DEATH and THE LACK OF LOVE. Also, this is the time when Jesus was born, He who defeated death and darkness by his crucifixion, and gave the possibility of resurrection and eternal life to the world. Thus, this time of the year conveys the following metaphorical messages:

LIFE IS A YEAR

- DEATH IS WINTER
- BIRTH IS SPRING

GOD/LOVE/LIFE IS LIGHT/THE SUN

- EVIL/LACK OF LOVE IS DARKNESS
- BIRTH OF JESUS/ LOVE IS THE BREAK OF DAYLIGHT

¹³ István Győrffy and Károly Viski, *A magyarság tárgyi néprajza*, vol. 2 [The material ethnography of Hungarians], Budapest: Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, 1934, p. 279.

¹⁴ Vilmos Tánzos, *Nyiss kaput, angyal: Moldvai csángó népi imádságok* [Open the gate, Angel! Archaic prayers from the Moldavian Csángós. Archetypal symbols and social context], Budapest: Püski Kiadó, 2001, pp. 77–94.

Performing coupling songs at this sacred time of the year (when DIVINE and HUMAN LOVE, EARTHLY and ETERNAL LIFE coincide, contributes to the effectiveness of the fertility enchantment rituals (by the CAUSE FOR EFFECT metonymy). This understanding of “love” emphasizes its powerful nature and places the perpetuation of life into focus.

3. Metaphors of a *bunned chair*

In this section I will analyze a folkloric artefact called a *bunned chair* (see Figure 1). As we will see, this can be thought of as an appropriate visual representation of the minstrel song discussed above. First, I will study the painted image on the chair, followed by an analysis of the shape and function of this piece of furniture.

3.1. The 2D Visual Source Domain

On the back of the chair, there is a tree of life motif, emanating from a spiral. For an outsider, it may appear to be no more than an attractive decoration. However, for those who live within the culture, it represents an entire world. The so-called AGRICULTURAL metaphor¹⁵ (one of the central metaphors in folk poetry¹⁶ and folk art)¹⁷, the LOVE/CREATION IS A WHIRLING FORCE metaphor and the LOVE IS A UNITY metaphor are all combined here. The provenance of the tree of life is represented by the spiral of life motif, indicating the complex message of the whirling force of “love” and “creation” investigated above. This time, the spiral appears in the soil, thus com-

¹⁵ Oncins J. L. Martínez, “Notes on the Metaphorical Basis of Sexual Language in Early Modern English”, in J. G. V. González, M. M. Vázquez and P. R. Vaz (eds.), *The Historical Linguistics – Cognitive Linguistics Interface*, Universidad de Huelva, 2006, pp. 205–224.

¹⁶ Veronika Szelid, *Szerelem és erkölcs a moldvai déli csángó nyelvhasználatban* [Love and Morality in Moldavian Southern Csángó Language Use], Budapest: ELTE, PhD thesis.

¹⁷ Szelid, forthcoming.



Figure 1: A bunned chair from Homoródalmás, 1863.¹⁸

binning the AGRICULTURAL metaphor with the FORCE metaphor. The tree of life is a representation of both the MARITAL LOVE IS A UNITY OF TWO PARTS LIVING IN SYMBIOSIS metaphor as well as the PEOPLE ARE PLANTS/ CHILD IS A TREE OF LIFE metaphor. The targets are in a metonymical relationship, in that love is the cause of the creation of new life. The most essential metaphors are combined in this way:

PROCREATION IS A WHIRLING FORCE, CHILD IS A TREE OF LIFE

- AGENT CREATING NEW LIFE IS MALE FORCE (GOD and MAN in collaboration, represented by the spiral motif)
- PATIENT CONCEIVING NEW LIFE IS WOMAN (the soil)
- LOCATION IS THE WOMAN’S WOMB (center of the soil)

¹⁸ Márta Kocsi and Lajos Csomor, *Festett bútorok a Székelyföldön* [Painted Furniture in Székely Land], Budapest: Népművelési Propaganda Iroda, 1982, p. 145.

- EFFECT OF THE FORCE IS THE BIRTH OF NEW LIFE (tree of life)

DIVINE/ HUMAN LOVE IS A WHIRLING FORCE, MARITAL LOVE IS A TREE OF LIFE

- GOD CREATING NEW LOVE RELATIONSHIP IS THE AGENT
- MAN AND WOMAN FALLING IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER ARE PATIENTS
- LOCATION IS THE EARTH
- EFFECT OF THE FORCE IS A NEW RELATIONSHIP/UNITY (which is the source of creating new life)

3.2. The 3D Visual Source Domain

The fact that the “tree of life” is painted on a so-called *bunned chair* design based on the shape of a woman is not by accident. It is particularly noteworthy that the spiral of life is depicted on the lower part of the back of the chair, exactly where the womb of the woman represented by the shape of the chair would be. This provides extra weight to the target domain of creation as a central part of marital love by the following metaphor:

PEOPLE ARE OBJECTS / WOMAN IS A CHAIR

- WOMB OF THE WOMAN IS THE LOWER PART OF THE CHAIR’S BACK
- FERTILIZING FORCE IN THE WOMB OF THE WOMAN IS A SPIRAL IN THE LOWER PART OF THE BACK OF THE CHAIR

3.3. The Tactile Source Domain

However beautiful a chair was, its role in a house was not only to be displayed, but also to have a functional use. Whenever it was being actively used by its owner (the woman of the house), the metaphor of creation existed at its fullest. The womb of the woman is located at the same place as the womb represented by the structure of the chair and the spiral of life motif in the picture. By the act of sitting down,

the woman became an active part of the metaphor of creation. This layer of the figurative meaning is more concrete than those listed above, as the womb of the woman sitting down on the chair is the real place where creation is intended to happen.

It is also noteworthy to mention that peasant culture motifs often served as incantations, which means that people believed in the close relationship between the human and the transcendental spheres. This is the reason why, for example, ancient minstrel songs were performed on Midwinter night, and also why certain archaic folk prayers needed to be recited three times a day.¹⁹ Both of these rituals are based on the CAUSE FOR EFFECT metonymy: PERFORMING RITUALS FOR THE WELL-BEING OF THE PERFORMERS. In the same vein, embroidered, carved and painted folk culture objects displaying protection signs are all instantiations of the CAUSE FOR EFFECT metonymy: APPLICATION OF SPECIFIC MOTIFS ON OBJECTS OF USE FOR THE WELL-BEING OF THE USERS. In addition, on the *bunned chair* described above, the spiral of life is repeated several times around the tree of life on the chair, serving as a protecting symbol.

All in all, I argue that in this example, the act of sitting down on the chair represents a complex message of creation and life, ensuring and protecting the fertility of the woman, and giving an additional layer to the meaning-making process.

4. Conclusion

In this study, I introduced a type of multimodality present in Hungarian folklore, which I call multimodal source domain representation. The intended target domains of my examples were represented by several, simultaneously active source domains that made the targets all the more powerful.

¹⁹ Zsuzsanna Erdélyi, *Hegyet hágék, lőtőt lépék: Archaikus népi imádságok* [Archaic folk prayers], Budapest: Magvető Kiadó, 1976.

My analyses introduced a morality-based model of “love”, in which “love” is intertwined with the concepts of “life” and the “transcendent”, and in which the perpetuation of life is emphasized. Folklore offers an ideal model of “love” and “life”, and the representations of these targets also functioned as incantations that helped people live their lives (CAUSE FOR EFFECT metonymy).

METAPHOR AND VISUALITY

Understanding Visual Metaphors: A Cognitive Linguistic Perspective

1. Introduction

It is obvious that the social media in our modern society have completely revolutionized the means by which we communicate and interact with others. One of the most striking features of the social media is to visualize things that are not in themselves visual, that is, the knowledge of our everyday life can be visualized. In 1911, Arthur Brisbane, an American newspaper editor, gave a talk to the *Syracuse Advertising Men's Club*. His well-known suggestion is “Use a picture. It's worth a thousand words”. The implication of his advice is that a picture may present a different thousand words to each viewer. This is illustrated in Figure 1, where two images, both of Paris, are present.



Figure 1: Paris (all the pictures in this paper are from websites such as Wikipedia).

The left-hand picture in Figure 1 gives a typical view of Paris thanks to the use of the Eiffel Tower that we know very well. By

contrast, the right-hand picture is the city of Paris, and it is a panorama of buildings and streets which stretch out to the horizon, viewed from the Eiffel Tower. As a matter of fact, it is Paris, but it does not tell us anything about its actual place. If there was no symbol showing that the picture is of Paris, it would seem to be any city anywhere in the world.

The premise of this article is a conviction that multisensory perception has become a more and more important factor in shaping our current lifestyle, communication, reasoning, technology, and many things else. Visual metaphors are undoubtedly one of the most powerful and common cognitive tools in visual representation of the world. Just as Daniel Pink (2008) said: “A picture is worth a thousand words, but the right metaphor is worth a thousand pictures”.¹

“[M]etaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language, but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.”² Metaphor also exists in some other fields such as pictures (cartoons in particular), music and dreams. Metaphor in pictures (films, comics and cartoons) is called visual or pictorial metaphor. A visual metaphor presents a picture or an image of an easy-to-recognize object or entity that represents another, so we can mentally – in a transposed mode almost visually – compare something that is not easily understood as something visible.

The past few decades have witnessed a large number of studies in metaphor, both linguistic and conceptual, but little attention is paid to the investigation into the understanding of visual metaphors. This paper is a tentative research into the understanding of visual metaphors from the perspectives of conceptual metaphor theory.

¹ Rick Wormeli, *Metaphors and Analogies: Power Tools for Teaching Any Subjects*, Portland: Stenhouse Publishers, 2009, p. ix.

² George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980, p. 3.

2. The Theoretical Foundations

Traditionally, metaphor is a figure of speech in which one thing is compared to another by saying that one is the other, as in *He is a tiger*. Or, as the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* puts it: “*metaphor* [is a] figure of speech that implies comparison between two unlike entities, as distinguished from *simile*, an explicit comparison signaled by the words ‘like’ or ‘as’.”

(1) The world is like a mirror: Frown at it and it frowns at you; smile, and it smiles too. (H. L. Samuel)

(2) Language is a city, to the building of which every human being brings a stone.

Obviously, (1) is simile, while (2) is a metaphor. The word “city” is used metaphorically in order to achieve some artistic and rhetorical effect. Indeed, this is a widely shared view – the most common conception of metaphor, both in scholarly circles and in the popular mind. Metaphoric language was studied for thousands of years before metaphor was considered as a cognitive phenomenon by Lakoff and Johnson. Aristotle’s *Poetics* describes metaphoric language as “giving the thing a name that belongs to something else such as when old age is called ‘evening’ or ‘sunset of life’”. Aristotle presents metaphor as a linguistic ornamentation, not as a way of thinking or a cognitive strategy. This view of metaphor is obviously based primarily on the idea of fixed meanings of linguistic expressions. But Lakoff³ rejected any pre-cognitive approaches to figurative meaning which involves what he terms “the objectivist paradigm” or “a God’s eye view” of meaning.

The cognitive linguistic theory of metaphor that challenged the powerful traditional theory in a coherent and systematic way was first developed by Lakoff and Johnson in their famous 1980 book. According to them: “Metaphors as linguistic expressions are possible

³ George Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987.

precisely because there are metaphors in a person's conceptual system."⁴ That is, rather than a rhetorical strategy that exists only at the level of language itself, metaphor actually is a cognitive process that surfaces in language. Metaphor is conceptual in nature, and many of the metaphors we use in language are based on conceptual metaphors.⁵ That is, we speak in metaphors because we think in metaphors.

Today, an increasing number of cognitive scientists, including cognitive linguists, engage in the study of metaphor. The major reason is that metaphor plays a role in human thought, understanding, and reasoning and, beyond that, in the creation of our social, cultural, and psychological reality. Trying to understand metaphor, then, means attempting to understand a vital part of who we are and what kind of world we live in.

In the cognitive linguistic view, metaphor is defined as understanding one conceptual domain in terms of another conceptual domain. Lakoff defined it as a "a cross-domain mapping in the conceptual system ... from a source domain ... to a target domain".⁶ A convenient shorthand way of capturing this view of metaphor is the following:

CONCEPTUAL DOMAIN (A) IS CONCEPTUAL DOMAIN (B)

Here, B is the source domain, and A is the target domain. So, a conceptual metaphor consists of these two conceptual domains, in which the target domain is understood in terms of the source domain. A conceptual domain is any coherent organization of experiences. For example, we have coherently organized knowledge about journeys that we rely on in understanding love. Thus we have the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY. And this conceptual metaphor is real-

⁴ Lakoff and Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁵ Zoltán Kövecses, *Where Metaphors Come From: Reconsidering Context in Metaphor*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

⁶ George Lakoff, "The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor", in A. Ortony (ed.), *Metaphor and Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 202–251, these wordings on pp. 203 and 207.

ized or manifested in various metaphorical linguistic expressions such as:

Look *how far* we've *come*. We're *at a crossroads*. We'll just have to *go our separate ways*. We can't *turn back* now. I don't think this relationship is *going anywhere*. *Where* are we? We're *stuck*. It's been a *long, bumpy road*. This relationship is a *dead-end street*. We're just *spinning our wheels*. Our marriage is *on the rocks*. We've *gotten off the track*. This relationship is *foundering*...

Forceville sets out a theoretical framework for the analysis of pictorial or visual metaphor.⁷ According to him, a visual metaphor occurs when one visual element (tenor/target) is compared to another visual element (vehicle/source) which belongs to a different category or frame of meaning. To exemplify this, he provides the example of an advert seen on a British billboard to publicize the use of the London underground.⁸ The picture features a parking meter (tenor/target) framed as the head of a dead creature whose body is shaped as the fleshless spinal column of a human being (vehicle/source). In this example, the vehicle visually transfers, or maps, the meaning of “dying” or “dead” (because of lack of food) onto the parking meter, resulting in the metaphor PARKING METER IS A DYING FEATURE.⁹ Considering that the advert wants to promote public transport, having lots of parking meters wasting away in the streets of London can only be a positive thing for underground users and the underground system itself.

So, a visual metaphor is a metaphor in which something (the metaphor's “target”) that is presented visually is compared to something that belongs to another category (the metaphor's “source”) of things than the first, also presented visually. As in verbal metaphors (such as “Football is war” or “The world is a stage”), at least one fea-

⁷Charles Forceville, *Pictorial Metaphor in Advertising*, London and New York: Routledge, 1996.

⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 127–135.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 131.

ture or association is “mapped” from the source domain to the target domain. Often, a whole set of (interrelated) features is mapped from source to target.

Undoubtedly, Forceville’s idea is not wrong. But still here we would like to claim that there are two important things that one should take into consideration: First, just like linguistic metaphors, visual metaphors are, in essence, the realizations of conceptual metaphors as well, and the only difference is that visual metaphors are realized in pictures or images. Second, in visual metaphors, usually the tenor is something invisible. For example, cartoons usually contain visual metaphors, such as “steam coming out of a person’s ears” (Figure 2), which indicates anger. This is a visual metaphor which is the realization of the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER.




Figure 2: An angry young man.

This is a portrait of an angry young man, blowing steam coming out of his ears, about to have nervous atomic breakdown, indicated by an isolated gray background. Once you have a look at this picture, you can identify that the young man is very angry. Here, the visual element (the vehicle/source) is “steam coming out of a person’s ears”, while the invisible element (the tenor/ target) is “anger”.

Visual metaphors are used by the cartoonist to trigger a metaphoric rather than literal thought. They are pervasive in cartoons, but it is hard for us to understand them without common ground. The meaning an observer attaches to a visual metaphor ultimately depends on the nature of his or her engagement with the social-cultural context. The observer is likely to bring his or her own experiences to the interpretation process.

3. Visual Communication and Visual Metaphors

Communication is one of those human activities that everyone recognizes but few can define in a satisfactory way. Generally speaking, the process of communication is commonly held to consist in the transmission of information from a sender to a receiver. This is the “code model” or “conduit model”¹⁰. However, communication is as much a means of mutuality, joint understanding and dialogicality as it is medium of influence and control. It can be verbal or non-verbal. And one way of the non-verbal communication is visual communication.

Visual communication is a type of communication through visual means, and is described as receiving and transmitting messages and ideas in forms that can be read or looked upon. Visual communication is primarily expressed with two- or three-dimensional images or pictures, including signs, drawing, typography, graphic design, illustration, industrial design, advertising, animation color and electronic resources. It also explores the idea that a visual message accompanying text has a greater power to inform, educate, or persuade a person or audience. For example, in the front of United Nations Headquarters there is a statue of a gun, from which we can understand that it stands for non-violence (Figure 3).

¹⁰ Michael J. Reddy, “The Conduit Metaphor”, in A. Ortony (ed.), pp. 162–201.



Figure 3: The statue of a gun in the front of United Nations Headquarters.

Visual communication can be metaphorically expressed, that is, an image or picture can be used to stand for another thing. Phenomena of this kind are visual metaphors. A visual metaphor is an image that the viewer is meant to understand as a symbol for something else. Visual metaphors can be obvious, subtle, funny, or scathing, but they form a nexus of imagery that artists have used across the centuries to help communicate information without words. In the history of art, the visual metaphor is king. A visual metaphor is the representation of a person, place, thing, or idea by means of a visual image that suggests a particular association or point of similarity. For example, Figure 4 and Figure 5 are two visual metaphors which mean TIME IS MONEY. Figure 4 reminds us of the way in which people in ancient times usually used the passing of sands in a funnel or hopper to measure the time. But in this picture, it is the passing of gold, not of sands, which is compared to the passing of time. So it is a visual metaphor which is the realization of the conceptual metaphor TIME IS MONEY. Figure 5 is a special clock in which the position of 12 is occupied by the symbol “dollar”. The picture also can make us easily think of the passing of time as the passing of money. So it is a visual metaphor as well which is the manifestation of the conceptual metaphor TIME IS MONEY.

Understanding Visual Metaphors




Figure 4: Time hopper.



Figure 5: A clock with the symbol “dollar”.

These two examples demonstrate that pictures or images can be compared to other things which are not visible. Visual metaphors of this kind are ubiquitous in our daily life. We will now give some examples to support this idea.

4. Visual Metaphors in Different Fields

Visual metaphors may be different from fields to fields, from culture to culture, from society to society, and from age to age. In this section, we will demonstrate the varieties of visual metaphors in art, political cartoons and advertising.

4.1. Visual Metaphors in Art

For centuries, artists have used visual metaphors to subtly communicate the subject of their works. For example, rather than paint Jesus Christ walking through Renaissance Florence, many 16th-century Italian artists would use symbols that represented Christ, like a lamb or dove. These symbols were metaphors of Christ's presence that audiences of the time would have understood. Other examples of visual metaphors can be even more subtle. Check out the 1765 painting *A Philosopher Lecturing at the Orrery* by Joseph Wright of Derby (Figure 6). An orrery was an 18th-century interactive model of the solar system.



Figure 6: The painting of a lecture.

In this painting, the center of the orrery is the sole source of light as a lecturer uses it to teach, creating a visual metaphor where scientific education is literally the light in the darkness and the hope for humanity. It should be noted that this painting premiered at the height of the Enlightenment movement, which sought truth through science.

Understanding Visual Metaphors

Chinese paintings are full of visual metaphors. There is a very famous picture (Figure 7) called 喜上眉梢 (xǐ shàng méi shāo):




Figure 7: xǐ shàng méi shāo.

xǐ shàng méi shāo is a Chinese idiom. The Chinese character xǐ stands for both xǐ què (pica pica, magpies) and xǐyuè (happiness), because xǐ in xǐ què and xǐyuè is a homonym which makes a pun. shàng actually is a word of orientation in Chinese, but here it means “on”. The Chinese character méi stands for both méi (eyebrow) and méi huā (Armeniaca mume Sieb, plum blossom), because méi is a homophone which makes a pun as well. méi shāo means the tip of the eyebrow. So, the picture xǐ shàng méi shāo is a pun, one meaning of which is “Magpies are on the plums”, and the other meaning of which is “Happiness appears on the eyebrows” or “Happiness appears in one’s face”. Obviously, this picture is a pun, but it is also a visual metaphor which can be called “homophonic metaphor”.

4.2. Visual Metaphors in Political Cartoons

Visual metaphors are a cornerstone of high art but are not limited to it. They are prominent parts of other art forms as well, like political

cartoons. Political cartoons are a venerable tradition in places like the United States, and as with high art, they often rely on symbolic imagery in order to communicate lots of information in a limited amount of space.

For example, from the 1912 cartoon of the Monroe Doctrine, we can recognize that person standing over the map of the Western Hemisphere (see Figure 8). That person is Uncle Sam, a personification metaphor of the United States. Uncle Sam is a commonly used visual metaphor who represents American ideologies, traditions, citizens or government. In this case, he represents the American government claiming a role as protector of the Western Hemisphere. So, here, the conceptual metaphor STATE IS A PERSON is realized by this visual metaphor.




Figure 8: The 1912 cartoon of the Monroe Doctrine.

Similarly, Canada is usually metaphorically personified by a fictional person named Johnny Canuck, a fictional lumberjack and a national personification metaphor of Canada. Johnny Canuck is a Canadian cartoon hero and superhero who was created as a political

Understanding Visual Metaphors

cartoon in 1869 and was later re-invented, most notably as a Second World War action hero in 1942 (see Figure 9).



Figure 9: An editorial cartoon of Johnny Canuck.

John Bull is a national personification metaphor of the United Kingdom in general and England in particular, especially in political cartoons and similar graphic works. He is usually depicted as a stout, middle-aged, country-dwelling, jolly and matter-of-fact man (see Figure 10).




Figure 10: An 1897 editorial cartoon with John Bull, Uncle Sam, and a dog symbolizing Japan from the newspaper the Hawaiian Gazette. The dog follows the "Hawaii" sausage in Uncle Sam's pocket (from Wikipedia).

All the three examples above are visual metaphors which are the manifestations of the conceptual metaphor STATE IS A PERSON, a personification metaphor of nations. Of course, it is common for large ideas or entities to become representable by a single visual metaphor. The United States may also be represented by an eagle, while Canada, for example, could be embodied through a maple leaf, and a Mountie.

4.3. Visual Metaphor in Advertising

Modern advertising relies heavily on visual metaphors. Figure 11 is a very popular visual metaphor which is widely used by marketers.




Figure 11: Advertisement for Bergedorfer Beer.

In this advertisement for Bergedorfer Beer, for example, a beer product is compared to the process of bringing a child into the world. The metaphor of giving birth to something is overused, but it is effective here because of the unconventional imagery. From this picture we can see very clearly that it is quite useful for us to communicate a product's benefit by linking it to something different but with a similar quality. The conceptual metaphor underlying this visual metaphor is MORE IS BIG.

5. Conclusion

Visual metaphors are inherent in our thought, and thus enable us to translate invisible and abstract ideas into a realm of familiar actualities that we can see. They are artistic devices or cognitive strategies used to help us understand the invisible things by relating them to something familiar and visible. This paper, from the perspective of cognitive linguistics, first set up the theoretical foundation, then explained visual communication and visual metaphors, and has finally shown various visual metaphors in art, political cartoons, and advertising. It demonstrated that visual metaphors are, in essence, the realizations of conceptual metaphors in pictures or images, and their tenors are something invisible. Just like conceptual metaphors, visual metaphors are everywhere in our daily life. The correct interpretation of visual metaphors can help us to learn and understand various realms such as politics, economy, and culture.

Alessandro Cavazzana

Imagining: The Role of Mental Imagery in the Interpretation of Visual Metaphors

1. Introduction

First of all, we must define what we mean when we talk about visual metaphors. Let's consider Noël Carroll's account, according to which visual metaphors are "visual images that function in the same way that verbal metaphors do and whose point is identified by a viewer in roughly the same way that the point of a verbal metaphor is identified by a reader or a listener"¹. In my opinion, this definition has the advantage of generalizing our subject, identifying a common denominator. Carroll's definition, indeed, draws attention to the mechanism through which an interpreter of visual metaphors discovers the meaning of the picture. The mechanism used is the one of verbal metaphors.

Now, according to Arthur C. Danto, we could assume that verbal metaphors work in the same way elliptic syllogisms do,² where we have two premises (X and Y), and we have to infer the conclusion (Z).

If the syllogistic structure is the underlying mechanism of verbal metaphors, then, following Carroll's definition, it is also the basic mechanism through which a viewer interprets a visual metaphor. And, if the syllogistic structure is the underlying mechanism of all kind of metaphors, then what changes is the knowledge an inter-

¹ Noël Carroll, "Visual Metaphor", in Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), *Aspects of Metaphor*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, pp. 189–218, repr. in Noël Carroll, *Beyond Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 347–368, the quoted passage on p. 347.

² Arthur C. Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art*, Cambridge, MA – London: Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 171.

preter uses to solve the puzzle. The more we know, the better we interpret.

My basic idea is that, when interpreting visual metaphors, *mental imagery* plays the role that the inference plays in comprehending verbal metaphors. In the verbal modality, indeed, I say that X (Peter) is metaphorically Y (a lion) but I mean that he is literally Z (brave), where Z should be inferred. Quite the same happens for visual metaphors (Figure 1); we see a cigarette (X) taking the place of a bullet (Y) in the gun cylinder and we deduce that smoking kills (Z).



Figure 1

How do we deduce Y and Z? I argue that we do this by means of mental imagery.

2. Noël Carroll's Account of Visual Metaphors

Before continuing, I would like to isolate three key points in Carroll's argumentation:

- (1) a visual image is a visual metaphor if it exhibits homospatial and noncompossible elements. Homospatiality and noncompossibility are necessary conditions for a picture to be considered a visual metaphor. We have homospatiality when two objects, that belong to different categories, share the same space inconsistently. We have noncompossibility when those objects cannot coexist in the real world;
- (2) homospatiality and noncompossibility are directly derived

from verbal metaphors. While homospatiality corresponds to the “is” which creates identity between the two terms involved in a verbal metaphor (“A is B”), noncompossibility corresponds to the falsehood which is characteristic of every metaphorical utterance;

(3) visual metaphors suggest insights, visions to the interpreter. The ambiguity between what the viewer supposes the target is and what he supposes the source is leads to imaginative exploration of the visual metaphor.

Carroll derives (3) from Donald Davidson.³ It is known that Davidson is the primary exponent of the so-called *image theory* of metaphor,⁴ according to which the goal of a verbal metaphor is not to convey cognitive contents but to evoke mental images.⁵ It is then reasonable to think that Carroll has in mind Davidson when he talks about “imaginative exploration”⁶ of a visual metaphor.

Points (1) and (2) lead to (3). According to Carroll, the message conveyed by a visual metaphor is usually reversible. For example, considering Man Ray’s *Le Violon d’Ingres* (Figure 2), saying that “the female body is a violin” is as valid as saying that “the violin is a female body”. Pictures are ambiguous when they come to show that one thing *is* another thing: A is B, but also B could be A. We have a sort of symmetrical interpretation. But, if symmetry could be an acceptable characteristic of the examples selected by Carroll, this is not – as we know – a characteristic of verbal metaphors too. Consider an utterance like “a football player is an artist” and its reverse “an artist is a football player”. The first statement makes us think that the ele-

³ Noël Carroll, *op. cit.*, pp. 365–366.

⁴ Martin Davies, “Idiom and Metaphor”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, New Series, vol. 83 (1983), pp. 67–85, see in particular p. 67. See also Robyn Carston, “Metaphor: Ad Hoc Concepts, Literal Meaning and Mental Images”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, New Series, vol. 110 (2010), pp. 295–321, in particular p. 298.

⁵ Donald Davidson, “What Metaphors Mean”, *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 5, no. 1 (1978), pp. 31–47, repr. in Donald Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. 245–264, see pp. 262–263.

⁶ Noël Carroll, *op. cit.*, p. 366.

gance of the sport gesture is like a brushstroke on a canvas, while the second metaphor probably encourages us to imagine an artist as rich and famous as a football player. The two interpretations are totally different, because the metaphors are totally different.



Figure 2

In Carroll's opinion, the "is" in "A is B" expresses identity between A and B, between the target and the source of a verbal metaphor, but I venture to say that this is not true.⁷ We would have identity if the "is" were to predicate a definite description of A. For instance, in a proposition like "a football player is the person whose job is playing football", "the person whose job is playing football" is the definite description of "football player". In this case we have identity between A and B.

⁷ Josef Stern, "Metaphors in Pictures", *Philosophical Topics*, vol. 25, no. 1 (1997), pp. 255-293, see in particular pp. 264-265.

The “is” in “A is B”, on the contrary, predicates identity between A and a connotation of B which the interpreter must grasp through the analysis of the context. If a connotation of “artist” is “the person who arouses feelings through his art” then we have “a football player is the person who arouses feelings through his art”. In this case the “is” expresses identity between A and a peculiar way in which B is. According to Danto, in fact, metaphors reduce the subject only to certain features selected by the metaphorizing term.⁸

So, homospatiality cannot correspond to the ‘is’ which creates identity between A and B, because the ‘is’ in verbal metaphors does not create identity between A and B.

If this is true for verbal metaphors then, following Carroll,⁹ it must be true for visual metaphors, too.

Therefore, if the verbal “is” does not suggest identity, then homospatiality doesn’t either.

Finally, it is not the possibility to explore the visual metaphor reversing its message that evokes mental images in the viewer. A visual metaphor does not admit symmetrical interpretations, nor is its message reversible. One of the two homospatial entities is always more salient than the other, both because of the pictorial context and because of extra-iconic elements, and this determines the direction of mapping the source on the target. An interpreter can try to avoid contextual elements only focusing on the pictures – by means of a “perception not mediated by codes”, like Carroll argues – but could the perception be really purified by codes? Carroll also says that in a picture one recognizes what one is already familiar with, what one already knows.¹⁰ However, a single notion always brings with it many other notions. So, how innocent should the eye be, in order to interpret visual metaphors? I think there is another way in which visual metaphors and imagination can work together.

⁸ Arthur C. Danto, *Beyond the Brillo Box. The Visual Arts in Post-historical Perspective*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, p. 83.

⁹ «[T]here is a striking structural analogy between ... visual metaphors and verbal metaphors», Noël Carroll, *op. cit.*, p. 348.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

3. Visual Mental Imagery

We now need a definition of visual mental imagery that is useful for our proposal. Mental imagery refers to “our ability to reactivate and manipulate visual representations in the absence of the corresponding visual stimuli... Visual mental imagery is employed when one answers questions, e.g., about the shape of the tail of one’s dog, in the absence of the corresponding visual stimulus.¹¹ Let’s now integrate this definition with the one provided by Kosslyn: “Visual mental imagery is ‘seeing’ in the absence of the appropriate immediate sensory input... Imagery is distinct from perception, which is the registration of physically present stimuli.”¹²

4. Mental imagery and Visual Perception

Visual mental imagery is also essential in visual perception. Bence Nanay expresses an interesting point about the relation between mental imagery and perception. In Nanay’s opinion, mental imagery is necessary for some forms of perception, like amodal perception, and he defines amodal perception as the representation of the occluded parts of perceived objects. We perceive a part of an object *amodally* if we do not receive any sensory stimulation from that part of the object. Nanay claims that if we are looking at a cat whose tail is not visible because it is occluded by a picket, we represent the tail by means of mental imagery. He explains that this could be argued on empirical basis. First of all, it has been shown that modal completion – which, according to Albert Michotte, is the ability to perceive as distinct objects those areas that don’t exhibit any difference of colour and shape if compared to the surrounding areas – and amodal completion depend on the same neural mechanisms. Secondly, neuro-

¹¹ Giorgio Ganis, Haline E. Schendan, “Visual Imagery”, *WIREs Cognitive Science*, vol. 2 (2011), pp. 239–252, the quoted passage on p. 239.

¹² Stephen M. Kosslyn, Marlene Behrmann, Marc Jeannerod, “The Cognitive Neuroscience of Mental Imagery”, *Neuropsychologia*, vol. 33, no. 11 (1995), pp. 1335–1344, the quoted passage on p. 1335.

scientists noted that looking at the sides of the Kanizsa triangle (Figure 3) and visualizing objects in our mind activate the same patterns in the primary visual cortex. Now, it is known that, following Michotte's account, "seeing" the Kanizsa triangle relies on modal perception, thus there is a very close link between modal perception and visual mental imagery. If modal and amodal perception depend on the same mechanisms, then also amodal perception and visual mental imagery share the same neural processing. Finally, according to Nanay, this means that representing the occluded parts of perceived objects is a form of mental imagery.¹³ Since we move in a non-transparent world, we experience amodal perception continuously in our everyday life, therefore we represent those non-visible part of objects through visual mental imagery again and again.¹⁴




Figure 3

So, if mental imagery is so pervasive, then it is also fundamental in perceiving, appreciating and interpreting pictures, as well

¹³ Bence Nanay, "Perception and Imagination: Amodal Perception as Mental Imagery", *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 150, no. 2 (2010), pp. 239–254.

¹⁴ "[W]hat we take to be perception is really a mixture of two things: sensory stimulation-driven perception and amodal completion", Bence Nanay, "The Importance of Amodal Completion in Everyday Perception", *i-Perception*, vol. 9, no. 4 (2018), pp. 1–16, the quoted passage on p. 8.

as, for our scopes, visual metaphors. But, how? We need now to introduce another of Bence Nanay's notions, that of *aesthetically relevant properties* (ARP).

5. Aesthetically Relevant Properties and Mental Imagery

Nanay explains ARP in this way: "properties are aesthetically relevant if attending to them makes an aesthetic difference".¹⁵ In relation to pictures, an ARP induces a new experience of the picture itself. Consider the *Allegory* painted by Bronzino in 1546 (Figure 4). At first



Figure 4

glance the picture seems a beautiful scene of love, with Venus and Cupid in the foreground. If we look carefully, we can see that the girl

¹⁵ Bence Nanay, *Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, the quoted passage on p. 67.

in the green dress hides a reptile-like body and her hands are inverted (Figure 5). According to Erwin Panofsky, this figure is a crisis of De-




Figure 5

ceit, Hypocrisy and Fraud allegories¹⁶. After we discover the meaning of the hands inversion trick, the painting immediately appears different: it no longer looks like a handsome scene of love. So, the inversion of the hands is an ARP. This is a case of ARP depicted in the painting, but not all these properties are actually visible, some must be represented by the viewer through mental imagery.¹⁷ Let's consider a painting like *A Bigger Splash*, by David Hockney (Figure 6).



Figure 6

¹⁶ Erwin Panofsky, *Studies in Iconology* (1939), Boulder: Westview Press, 1972, pp. 86–91.

¹⁷ Nanay, *Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception*, p. 87.

It depicts a splash in a Californian swimming pool. We have to represent by mental imagery that a few seconds before someone dove into the pool, which probably is, in the context of the painting, the most relevant moment.

6. Occlusion Shape and Visual Metaphors

The last element I will introduce before concluding is what John Hyman calls the *occlusion shape*. The *occlusion shape* is the dark spot that an observer should sketch on a hypothetical glass panel, standing between her and the perceived object, in order to cover the object itself.¹⁸

By means of what does a visual metaphor suggest resemblance between target and source? Verbal metaphors do so by syntax, while in the pictorial mode things work differently. My claim is that visual metaphors often suggest resemblance by the sharing of the occlusion shape. In Man Ray's *Le Violon d'Ingres* the occlusion shape of the woman's torso resembles that of a violin, while in the cigarettes-gun visual metaphor the occlusion shape of the cigarette resembles that of a bullet.

7. Sketching a Theory

My guess is that the visual metaphor interpretive process, involving mental imagery, can be summarized in two stages.

In the first stage we see a picture like the cigarettes-gun visual metaphor. Because of our beliefs, we have some expectations: in this case, we expect to see a pistol with bullets instead of this clear incongruity. As I said before, one of the premises of the elliptic syllogism involved in the picture are bullets. Bullets are an aesthetically relevant property which is not visible and that the interpreter must represent by means of visual mental imagery. Mental imagery is triggered by the sharing of the occlusion shape between cigarettes

¹⁸ John Hyman, *The Objective Eye: Color, Form, and Reality in the Theory of Art*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006, pp. 75–76.

and bullets. So, if the cigarette is one of the premises of the syllogism, which in this case assumes the role of metaphor target, the interpreter completes the visual metaphor providing the other premise of the syllogism (the metaphor source) through mental imagery. The match between the mental representation and the real picture enables the interpretive process.

In the second stage, the interpretive process has begun and provides for a second, more complex, visual mental image. In this second image, we visualize the interaction between the target (cigarette) and the source (bullet), inferring many implicatures: not only “a cigarette is a bullet”, but also “smoking kills like a gun does”, and so on. This second order mental imagery involves inspectable mental images, which play an important role in cognition. According to Ronald Finke, visual mental images can be reinterpreted. More specifically, the content they express never corresponds to the one used to create them. Reinterpretation adds more information, that is the essence of their cognitive peculiarity.¹⁹ The process begins from interpreted, encoded, and memorized contents (the concepts of “smoke”, “disease”, “bullet”, “gun”, and so on). When these contents take form in the mental image, they then produce something new, which is similar to a percept and enables some of the visual system processes.

Several experiments have shown that there is an overlapping between visual mental imagery and visual perception. If mental images and perceived stimuli are represented in the same way, then they can be processed in a similar manner.²⁰ Probably this is the key for starting a discussion on the role of mental images in the interpretation of such complex pictures as visual metaphors.

¹⁹ Ronald A. Finke, Steven Pinker, Martha J. Farah, “Reinterpreting Visual Patterns in Mental Images”, *Cognitive Science*, vol. 13, no. 1 (1989), pp. 51–78.

²⁰ Gregoire Borst, Stephen M. Kosslyn, “Visual Mental Imagery and Visual Perception: Structural Equivalence Revealed by Scanning Processes”, *Memory and Cognition*, vol. 36, no. 4 (2008), pp. 849–862.

Visual Metaphors and Pedagogical Practices in the New Century

1. Introduction

A particular kind of early active engagement with metaphors happens when children enact them through their actions, in a process where the relevant substitution occurs primarily through gestures.¹ In this sense, enacting metaphors may well mean acting them out through an embodied process,² an argument supported by Lakoff and Johnson's idea that metaphor can be instantiated through nonlinguistic modalities such as gestures and images, if we consider metaphors to be primarily not a figure of speech, but a way of thought.³ According to Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), the roots of metaphorical thoughts lie in the broad bodily interactions with the environments experienced: such interactions contribute to creating those embodied structures, also referred to as image-schemata, which enable metaphorical thought processes and, at least in part, abstract reasoning.⁴ By leveraging this very epistemological basis, we can reinterpret one of the earliest informal learning contexts experienced by children:

¹ Ellen Winner, Margaret McCarthy, Sandra Kleinman and Howard Gardner, "First metaphors", *New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development*, 1979/3, pp. 29–41.

² Shaun Gallagher and Robb Lindgren, "Enactive Metaphors: Learning through Full-body Engagement", *Educational Psychology Review*, vol. 27, no. 3 (2015), pp. 391–404.

³ George Lakoff, "The Neural Theory of Metaphor", in Raymond Gibbs (ed.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought* (Cambridge Handbooks in Psychology), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

⁴ George Lakoff, "The Invariance Hypothesis: Is Abstract Reason Based on Image-Schemas?" *Cognitive Linguistics*, vol. 1, no. 1 (1990), pp. 39–74.

pretend play. Traditionally defined as symbolic play, it has been outlined as a form of playful behaviour that involves nonliteral action, meaning that the acts directed towards the object do not have a real effect on it.⁵ Recent scientific research supports the idea that the concept of enactive metaphor can provide a better understanding of pretend play.⁶ In particular, building on the premise that seeing an object as something else requires a decentering process, a shift of perspectives in representational terms,⁷ we can reconsider symbolic play as an enactive process based on the capacity to perceive different affordances in objects. Such a hypothesis is consistent with the enactive account of social cognition carried out through an extension of the sense-making concept to the social domain.⁸ By referring to constructionists theory of narrative as a meaning-making act deeply related to cognitive processes and their development,⁹ we shall highlight how through digital storytelling activities carried out in several Reggio Emilia Preschools' ateliers¹⁰, children aged 3 to 6 years old have been provided with an ideal context in which to find new af-

⁵ Deena Skolnick Weisberg, "Pretend Play", *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science*, vol. 6, no. 3 (2015), pp. 249–261.

⁶ Zuzanna Rucinska, "Basic Pretending as Sensorimotor Engagement?", in John Mark Bishop, Andrew Owen Martin (eds.), *Contemporary Sensorimotor Theory*, Cham: Springer, 2014.

⁷ Gregory Currie, *Arts and Minds*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

⁸ Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo, "Participatory Sense-making", *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, vol. 6, no. 4 (2007), pp. 485–507.

⁹ Jerome Bruner, "The Narrative Construction of Reality", *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 18, no. 1 (1991), pp. 1–21.

¹⁰ In Reggio Emilia Preschools, each school building provides an Atelier, a space dedicated to aesthetic exploration and expressive languages. Ateliers are coordinated by the Atelieristas, professionals whose background is often in the visual arts. They work alongside teachers as to "support and develop children's and adults' visual languages as part of the complex process of knowledge building". (Vea Vecchi, *Art and Creativity in Reggio Emilia: Exploring the Role and Potential of Ateliers in Early Childhood Education*, Routledge, 2010. The quoted passage on page xiii.)

fordances and metaphorize everyday unstructured objects by actively exploring and including them within a visual narrative structure.

2. Metaphors, Enactivism and Social Cognition

Within the enactive theoretical framework, cognition is theorized as an embodied action.¹¹ Therefore, experience is firstly considered to be intertwined with enacting processes of meaning making, and at second instance to play a central role in all cognitive processes. A participatory sense-making process can therefore be defined as the coordination of intentional interactive activities where new domains of social sense-making are generated.¹² By referring both to this framework and to the sensorimotor theory of perception (SMTP), a paradigm based on the idea that perception is intimately linked with action,¹³ it is possible to achieve a better understanding of symbolic play by reinterpreting it along more enactive lines, defining it therefore as the children's capacity to point out new affordances. Furthermore, we consider a decentering process – that is, the capacity to view the world from a different perspective – to be necessary in order to make possible a primary “as-if” response to the environment, the basis of any symbolic play activity.¹⁴ The notion of perceptual capacity, or the ability to detect new affordances, fosters the understanding of symbolic play as an activity directed at things that are not

¹¹ Daniel Hutto, Michael Kirchhoff and Dor Abrahamson, “The Enactive Roots of STEM: Rethinking Educational Design in Mathematics”, *Educational Psychology Review*, vol. 27, no. 3 (2015), pp. 371–389.

¹² Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequiel Di Paolo and Shaun Gallagher, “Can Social Interaction Constitute Social Cognition?”, *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, vol. 14, no. 10 (2010), pp. 441–447.

¹³ J. Kevin O'Regan and Alva Noë, “A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness”, *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, vol. 24, no. 5 (2001), pp. 939–973.

¹⁴ Zuzanna Rucinska, *op. cit.*

perceptually present through an active action of *seeing-in*.¹⁵ This hypothesis finds support in phenomenological accounts of perception as a meaning-making act, or a process where meaningful perceivable elements allow new possibilities to be perceived.¹⁶ Applying enactive metaphors in education means offering children a context where they actively explore and act out their understanding. A bodily involvement in didactic activities can accompany higher levels of understanding: gestures can add relevant information to children's learning processes, information that is not available in a solely verbal-representational format.¹⁷ Educative interventions, especially those designed to foster learning through metaphorical processes, have in fact shown positive effects in terms of didactic results.¹⁸ Furthermore, contexts where children can explore perceptual similarity in terms of colour, shape, texture and orientation between the source and the target have been shown to facilitate metaphorical comprehension and foster creative interpretation.¹⁹

3. Enactive Metaphors in Digital Learning Environments

Emergent technologies show significant potential in relation to the possibility of combining children's perceptions with immersive imageries, as to allow a more extensive interaction with the contexts ex-

¹⁵ Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft, *Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

¹⁶ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, Paris: Gallimard, 1945.

¹⁷ Jonathan Cole, Shaun Gallagher and David McNeill, "Gesture Following Differentiation: A Phenomenologically Informed Experimental Study", *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, vol. 1, no. 1 (2002), pp. 49–67.

¹⁸ Dedre Gentner and Phillip Wolff, "Metaphor and Knowledge Change", in Eric Dietrich and Arthur Markman Lawrence (eds.), *Cognitive Dynamics: Conceptual Change in Humans and Machines*, Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum Associates, 2000.

¹⁹ Bipin Indurkha, *Metaphor and Cognition: An Interactionist Approach*, Springer Science & Business Media, 2013.

plored by children.²⁰ If we consider perception to be active and based on a set of interaction possibilities,²¹ digital technology can hence be reinterpreted as a tool that contributes to predispose those peculiar contexts defined by Kirsh as *enactive landscapes*, meaning structures that offer chances to find new affordances based on the involved subjects' current interests.²² By affordances we mean not only objects' perceptual properties, but also relational qualities: even though many properties are absent in unstructured objects, the shape of a peculiar object can suggest new affordances when explored and manipulated. When children act on props, their actions can be considered to be "guided" by the affordances perceived. Acting affordances can therefore explain the processes that allow children to perceive something different from what is present in terms of perception. Within learning contexts offering access both to non-structured materials and the possibility to explore it through digital technologies – for example, to create a visual narrative structure – we can offer preschoolers the possibility to augment their metaphorical imageries by not being limited to seeing a single possibility of interaction with objects. It appears, moreover, that the inherent meaning of an object is not what solely defines it. Instead, the social and communicative elements are those that appear to be central: what affects the objects, more than an individual instance, is in large part the fact that it is acted within intersubjective engagements. As claimed by enactivist accounts of meaning-making processes, new meanings can be established within an intersubjective space by leveraging social affordances and mutual understanding.²³

An object can thereby afford different actions in the context of symbolic play. Yet, importantly, to consider such domains transfer as

²⁰ Shaun Gallagher and Robb Lindgren, *op. cit.*

²¹ James Gibson, *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception*. Classic edition. Psychology Press, 2014.

²² David Kirsh, "Embodied Cognition and the Magical Future of Interaction Design", *ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction*, vol. 20, no.1 (2013).

²³ Hutto Daniel and Erik Myin, *Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2012.

metaphorical activities, certain limitations need to be set. Drawing on Winner's instance, we can consider children's instances of metaphor (both verbal and visual) to be genuine if the new meaning-making process appears adequately grounded in resemblance,²⁴ even though – by comparing them to metaphors made by adults – we usually notice a lower level of metalinguistic awareness of the former.

4. Instances of Metaphor in Digital Stories' Creation Process

Within the Erasmus Plus STORIES²⁵ research project (2015–2018), a European project involving four countries aimed at promoting media literacy practices in early childhood education through the paradigm of digital storytelling,²⁶ various digital stories were created starting from the exploration of daily unstructured objects. During the creation of the story “A worm and a bird find new friends”, a small group of 4-year-old children decided that a scene should be set in swamp, where some characters of the story they invented live (see Figure 1).

In this process, we can identify some propaedeutic elements of metaphorical processes: nevertheless, it represents a process centered on the search for resemblances, without implying a genuine production of visual metaphors,²⁷ like those about to be discussed.

²⁴ Ellen Winner et al., *op. cit.*

²⁵ The Research project “STORIES - foSTering early childhOod media liteRacy competencIES”, funded by the European Union within the Erasmus + program, involves 17 Preschools and 4 Universities located in Finland, Germany, Italy and Turkey. Further information on the project, including some of the digital stories realized can be found at www.digitalstorytelling.eu.

²⁶ Chiara Bertolini and Annamaria Contini, *Digital Storytelling for Education: Theories and Good Practices in Preschool*, Rome: Aracne, 2018.

²⁷ According to Cathy Dent's study on visual metaphorical processes in children (Cathy Dent and Lois Rosenberg, “Visual and Verbal Metaphors: Developmental Interactions”, *Child Development*, vol. 61, no.4, 1990, pp. 983–994), to consider a visual image as metaphorical, one element must be depicted in terms of another that differs in kind but bears an actual resemblance to the first. By referring to the above-mentioned study by Winner, Dent does not consider abstract and nonrep-



Figure 1: Children creating a digital story. Nicolò, in a dialogue recorded and transcribed by the teachers, argues that “swamps are black”, and “they’re always dark”. Matilde agrees, arguing that in order to represent a swamp they could use a black mat, which they had been using during a previous moment of free play.

During the creation of the digital story “The consommé’s city”, for example, a group of 5 years old children decided to use a yellow balloon falling from a bottled water dispenser to narrate a scene where a spaceship throws a bomb of broth on a coloured word (see Figure 2). As underlined in the scientific literature, young children tend to focus on perceptual or surface-level similarities, such as

representational blocks to be visual metaphors. Moreover, drawing on Kogan’s study (Nathan Kogan, Kathleen Connor, Augusta Gross and Donald Fava, “Understanding Visual Metaphor: Developmental and Individual Differences”, *Mono-graphs of the Society for Research in Child Development*, vol. 45, no. 1, 1980, pp. 1–78), pairs of depiction showing metaphorically similar objects are not considered to be visual metaphors, given the lack of a topic-vehicle interaction. Both elements have been considered within the hereby pursued analysis.

colour, shape or texture in order to make categorizations.²⁸ Focusing on the similarities that children identify on perceptual bases can make it possible to shift from usual conceptualizations, as well as to foster the exploration of possible novel ones.²⁹ The identified resemblance, in this case, is based on shape and colours, but in order to understand the scene the visual code must inevitably be connected to the verbal code. As suggested by Roland Barthes' "Rhetoric of images", the written message has an anchoring role: it reduces the polysemy of the image, by connecting it to a defined range of possible meanings.³⁰

In order to show the explosion of the bomb, and the subsequent falling of the broth on the city, Marisol – a 5-year-old child – proposes to us a piece of yellow wool, and to throw it from a table while she's filmed. Before making such decision, the group discussed other possible solutions with the teacher (see Figure 3).

In this process we can observe how an important component of visual metaphor processing, namely the act of comparing objects belonging to different conceptual domains, can be positively affected by similarities that children identify in objects' characteristics. From the conversations, recorded and reported by the researchers, we observe how the children involved possessed the literal names of the objects in question, allowing us to consider the discussed processes as genuine instances of metaphor.

²⁸ Laura Namy and Dedre Gentner, "Making a Silk Purse out of Two Sow's Ears: Young Children's Use of Comparison in Category Learning", *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, vol. 131, no.1 (2002), pp. 5–15.

²⁹ Lisanne Van Weelden, Alfons Maes, Joost Schilperoord and Reinier Cozijn, "The Role of Shape in Comparing Objects: How Perceptual Similarity May Affect Visual Metaphor Processing", *Metaphor and Symbol*, vol. 26, no.4 (2011), pp. 272–298.

³⁰ Roland Barthes, "Rhétorique de l'image", *Communications*, vol. 4, no. 1 (1964), pp. 40–51.

Visual Metaphors and Pedagogical Practices



Figure 2: Children preparing the set for the recording of the story. “We could represent the broth with some yellow temperas”, says Marisol. “We could also find a circle-shaped object, like a balloon”, answers Luca.



Figure 3: Children recording the story.

5. Conclusion and Discussion

Drawing on Lakoff and Johnson's Conceptual Metaphor Theory we have firstly discussed the concept of enactive metaphor, to then re-interpret early childhood symbolic play as a process of enactment based on children's capacity to perceive new affordances in objects. We have shown how this concept builds on the idea that seeing an object as something else demands a decentering process in representational terms, hence a participatory process generating new domains of social sense-making. We claim that this process can be facilitated by designing learning activities in contexts where preschoolers are offered the possibility to augment their metaphorical imageries by exploring non-structured materials and are offered access to digital technologies for the purpose of creating narrative structures including visual components. In order to consider the visual domains transfer processes carried out by preschoolers to be actual metaphorical activities, some limitations have been set by the authors.³¹ Granted the lower level of metalinguistic awareness occurring in children's metaphorical instances, we ought to be certain of preschoolers' awareness of the literal names and the functions of the objects involved in the transferring process in order to consider such instances to be metaphors.

³¹ AC is author of the sections 1,2. LM is author of the sections 3,4,5.

Gerard Martin C. Suarez

Metaphors Made Live: Multimodal Metaphor Analysis in Animation

1. Introduction

The theoretical treatment of metaphor has gone through dynamic changes since the ancient discussions of the Greeks. What was first described as a mark of genius,¹ became an act of deviance² eventually leading to an assertion of its pervasiveness³ in most facets of human experience; with the paradigm still shifting. In probing the limits of the implication behind “metaphor [is] not a figure of speech, but a mode of thought”⁴ researchers such as Forceville et al. have begun the work in describing metaphorical manifestations beyond simply written and spoken language. The range of mediums explored is both wide (i.e. music, film, manga, TV commercials, etc.) and studies varied linguistic contexts (i.e. Spanish, American, Japanese, etc.); establishing a firm foundation from which to continue the exploration of the current paradigm shift. But in examining the subjects of inquiry found in that collection, one finds that most were self-contained in nature. A finished movie or a printed political cartoon, for instance, does not change once it reaches the eyes of the intended viewer nor does the work have to refer back to previous works by the same creator(s). In other words, the content found in these works are static in nature. On the other hand, authors of serialized works such

¹ Aristotle in *Poetics*, Book 12, English translation by S. H. Butcher.

² Thomas Hobbes, *The Leviathan*, Part 1 (1651), p. 21 for an explicit example.

³ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 2nd ed., Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003, p. 3.

⁴ Charles Forceville and Eduardo Urios-Aparisi (eds.), *Multimodal Metaphor*, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2009, p. 4. The reference is to George Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor”, in Andrew Ortony (ed.), *Metaphor and Thought*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 210.

as episodic television or weekly manga have time, in between the production of each segment, to hear the perceptions and feedback of their audience which can potentially change subsequent content.⁵ Further, more often than not, there is a narrative continuity among episodes. Following this perspective, a new line of inquiry is available – how pervasive is a conceptual metaphor when studied as part of an ongoing discourse?

Building from that foundation, this work aims to do more of the same as previous research – articulating how conceptual metaphors manifest in a particular medium: serialized animation. On the other hand, in adding to the discourse, the analysis considers how the established conventions of, and the serialized nature of animation, affect the structuring and consistency of conceptual metaphor. The American cartoon, *Steven Universe*,⁶ was selected as the subject of inquiry because it met the following criteria:

- (i) it was a series which built a narrative based on the events of previous episodes,
- (ii) it had a persistent phenomenon integral throughout episodes of the series,
- (iii) that phenomenon was definitively non-literal, empirically speaking, and lastly,
- (iv) it had a fanbase that was reported to have an impact on the creators.⁷

The in-show phenomenon “fusion” was the topic of focus, having been found to be a metaphorical representation for relationships. The first three seasons of the show and internet-based ani-

⁵ Mark Lawson, “Sherlock and Doctor Who: Beware of Fans Influencing the TV They Love”, *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/tvandradio/blog/2014/jan/03/sherlock-doctor-who-fans-influencing-tv> (Jan. 3, 2014).

⁶ Rebecca Sugar (Creator), Rebecca Sugar & Ian Jones-Quartey (Executive Producers), *Steven Universe*, Burbank, CA: Cartoon Network Studios, 2013.

⁷ Beth Elderkin, “Steven Universe Artist Quits Twitter Over Fan Harassment”, *Gizmodo*, <https://io9.gizmodo.com/steven-universe-artist-quits-twitter-over-fan-harassmen-1785242762> (Aug. 13, 2016).

mated shorts⁸ served as the phenomenon's contextual background. Among which, 20 episodes and 3 internet shorts were transcribed into a corpus because *fusion* was explicitly present in those episodes. To better understand *fusion* though, one must understand how constructions are formed in the medium of animation.

2. The Language of Film and Televised Animation

The composition of television episodes, and by extension televised animation, heavily draws and appropriates techniques from film which in turn drew from theatre. Loosely speaking, these techniques of composition are what is meant by the language of a medium.

In film for example, the term *mise en scène* refers to arrangement of formal patterns and shapes within an enclosed frame. The director can manipulate four distinct elements within that frame:

- (i) the staging of action,
- (ii) the physical setting and décor,
- (iii) the manner in which these materials are framed, and
- (iv) the manner in which they are photographed [filmed] in order to achieve a desired effect.⁹

To give an example of *mise en scène* in use: different meanings¹⁰ can be evoked depending on where elements are placed within

⁸ This encompasses 103 episodes averaging 20 minutes each and 6 internet-shorts averaging 5 minutes. These were released in a period of just under three years (November 2013 – August 2016) with only content that was officially released by Cartoon Network being included in the data set.

⁹ Louis Giannetti, *Understanding Movies*, 9th ed., New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2000, pp. 44–45. It is important to mention Giannetti's distinction between the *mise en scène* of film and television in that television makes use of a smaller frame than of film (p. 49) as the smaller space fundamentally alters considerations for how the elements are arranged. This in turn carried over into animation.

¹⁰ Maria T. Pramaggoire and Tom Wallis, *Film: A Critical Introduction*, 2nd ed., Hong Kong: Pearson, 2008, p. 112. In addition, reiterating underlying themes may also be another reason to consider placement.

the frame¹¹. The center area is reserved for the most important visual elements, where element(s) can dominate over others. Conversely, elements placed in the left and right edges tend to suggest its insignificance. Alternatively, directors can make use of the relative obscurity of the edges to suggest the unknown, the unseen, or the fearful. Elements placed in the top portion of the screen can suggest ideas about power, authority, and aspiration. In contrast, elements placed at the bottom express the opposite: subservience, vulnerability, and powerlessness. Further, because objects and figures placed there seem like it'll "fall off" the frame, if those elements are cared about, a sense of danger can be evoked in the viewer.¹² As will be shown in a later section, the notion of *mise en scène* contributes to the structure of meaning in animation.

Animation as a medium has also developed its own distinct techniques which add further considerations when analyzing meaning in the medium. Collectively they were termed the principles of animation¹³ which are formal considerations and specific methods of drawing to produce predictable ways of creating "believable" animation. These concepts not only enabled animators to produce closer-to-life animation in a technical sense, it also allowed them to convey clearer and more nuanced messages/emotions through the more refined imagery and motion. For example, a rule-of-thumb table regarding the number of drawings "inbetween" poses was coined by Disney animators; each signifying a different type of feel to the final animation. No inbetweens, for example, make it seem as if the character has been hit by a tremendous force – as if his head just snapped off. Five inbetweens on the other hand make the moment feel "more

¹¹ Frame refers to the physical edge surrounding the screen. For a movie screen, it refers to the wall around the screen while in television it refers to the casing of the unit.

¹² Giannetti, *op. cit.*, pp. 49–53.

¹³ Frank Thomas and Ollie Johnston, *The Illusion of Life: Disney Animation*, New York: Walt Disney Productions, 1981, pp. 47–70. The twelve principles are: Squash and stretch, Anticipation, Staging, Straight Ahead Action and Pose to Pose, Follow Through and Overlapping Action, Slow In and Slow Out, Arcs, Secondary Action, Timing, Exaggeration, Solid Drawing and Appeal.

friendly” while nine inbetweens are reserved for when the character needs to do a more thoughtful action like appraising or pondering.¹⁴ Once again, it is argued that this animation-language contributes to the structuring of the metaphor underlying *fusion*. With that said, what exactly is *fusion*?

3. Fusion in Steven Universe

In the aptly named internet-short: *Fusion*,¹⁵ *fusion* is defined as the act when two or more “gems” [characters] combine into one. The resulting combination gets the combined heights and strengths of each participant individual. This is visually demonstrated during the 21st through 29th seconds of the video where a blue character and a red character fuse together and make a purple character with three eyes, double the size of the initial two. Likewise, alongside them, a whiter character and a violet character fuse together in order to create a taller, lighter-violet-skinned, four-armed character. In addition, not only can characters merge, merged characters can also separate back into their constituent parts. This shown during the 35th through 37th seconds of the video when the four-armed character splits back into two. During the study, it was found that *fusion* served as a metaphor for relationship leading to the conceptual metaphor FUSION IS RELATIONSHIP. Moreso, there were two representations of *fusion* presented in the series. “Ideal” *fusion* is structured by the LOVE IS UNITY metaphor while problematic *fusion* is structured by the LOVE IS AN ECONOMIC EXCHANGE metaphor.¹⁶ As will be explored in the rest of this

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

¹⁵ Katie Mitroff, “Steven Universe | Fusion | Minisode | Cartoon Network”, uploaded by Cartoon Network, January 1, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P3T83SKO66M>. Timestamps quoted in this and the subsequent paragraph all refer back to this video.

¹⁶ Zoltan Kövecses *Metaphor in Culture: Universality and Variation*, New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 168. The difference being the UNITY source sees lovers as parts to a greater whole – one completes the other and both are enriched by the union. On the other hand, the ECONOMIC EXCHANGE source (pp. 179–180)

section, these metaphors are consistently evident all throughout the entire series and each mode (linguistic, visual and audial) is reinforced by the language of animation.

3.1. Love Is Unity

The scene mentioned above presents a prototypical example of *fusion* structured by the metaphor LOVE IS UNITY. In line with the articulation by Kövecses, characters are psychically shown to become an entity that is more than the sum of its parts – the additional height and limbs. This is taken even further with a final *fusion* at the 52nd second part of the clip having six arms. The placement of the fused entity vis-à-vis the unfused characters also reinforces the concept of UNITY. Characters wanting to fuse move towards each other in the center, suggesting the more powerful presence they've become. Conversely, the result of a separation presented at the 37th second places the characters farther away from one another compared to their initial starting position and sitting to lower their initial height, visually reinforcing that distance implies a weaker relationship. The relationship angle is supported by each character's angry facial expressions – further communicating the rift between the two. Lastly, not only does the visible animation reflect the idea, the inbetween also reinforce the metaphor. Pausing at the 26th second mark and scanning the frames¹⁷ reveals that the left participant of the purple pairing is smiling just before their *fusion* while in comparison, the right participant of the right pair looks hesitant to participate. Further, scanning the frames at the 35th second mark onwards reveals inbetweens of visibly angry faces on both participants, foreshadowing the rift.

The language surrounding the imagery above further reinforces the claim. For example, the greatest reason to fuse is claimed to be love. The imagery as the word love is said is of the *fusion* pos-

emphasizes what one partner can “get out of” the other without much, if any, regard to the other.

¹⁷ This can be done using the “,” key to move backwards and “.” to move forward respectively.

ing with its hands formed in the shape of a heart and of hearts growing in the background. Further, it is stated that a successful *fusion* is when “gems must be in perfect synch: physically, mentally, [and most relevantly,] emotionally – indicating that *fusion* serves more than just a practical function, *fusion* also serves as an expression of emotion (i.e. to successfully *fuse* with someone means that the two feel the same about one another). Lastly, the fusion’s use of pronoun, referring to itself as an I rather than a We, gives further reason to believe that the *fusion* is a metaphor for relationships and in this context, that relationship is structured by the concept of UNITY. Further sentences from the corpus are presented below to better substantiate the claim:

- a. “I [fusion] embody my... I mean Ruby and Sapphire’s love... the strength of that love keeps me together.” (From *Keeping it Together*.)
- b. “You are not two people and you are not one person. You are an experience.” (From *Alone Together*.)
- c. “What are they [participants] doing?
“Flirting.” (From *Hit the Diamond*.)¹⁸

3.2. Love Is an Economic Exchange

This section discusses the interactions between two characters Jasper (Yellow) and Lapis (Blue). In the first clip, the framing of the two characters beginning at the 22nd second mark through the minute and 8th second mark is mostly asymmetrical; Jasper is almost always above Lapis.¹⁹ This begins to hint that this type of *fusion* is different

¹⁸ All three citations (a–c) refer to Rebecca Sugar, *op. cit.* (see note 6 above).

¹⁹ The relevant clips are: clip 1: Joe Johnston, Jeff Liu, & Rebecca Sugar, “Steven Universe | Malachite Clip | Jailbreak”, uploaded by xdarkstar, July 2, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MZV-I1TZw10>; clip 2: Lamar Abrams & Lauren Zuke, “Steven Universe | Finding Lapis | Cartoon Network”, uploaded by Cartoon Network UK, January 10, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SK318mGNhMg>; and clip 3: Hilary Florido, Kat Morris, & Rebecca Sugar, “Steven Universe | Alone At Sea | Cartoon Network”, uploaded by Cartoon Network UK, December

from the one previously discussed. Jasper's motivation is made clear: she wants to fuse in order to exact her revenge and projects this motivation onto Lapis. In short, there is a clear gain for Jasper in this situation without consideration for her partner's feelings; this *fusion* is structured as an ECONOMIC EXCHANGE. Lapis agrees but eventually betrays the fused entity at the minute and 32nd mark. The *fusion* asks: "What are *you* doing?", the pronoun signaling that the pair's intentions are not in synch; it states "...Now you're *my* prisoner" in response to itself. These conflicting motivations at the expense of the other make it clear that this type of *fusion* is structured differently – by LOVE IS AN ECONOMIC EXCHANGE. Affirming this notion, the clip ends with one protagonist stating "they are really bad for each other", making salient that despite its differing conception, this type of *fusion* is still to be understood through the relationship framework.

This adversarial relationship is visualized in clip 2 where the internal consciousness of the *fusion* is depicted. The floor represents its subconscious and the speaking character above depicts the partner in control. In the first half of the conversation, Lapis claims she needs to keep Jasper bound under her control but chains pull her down. When she loses control and gets submerged at the 45th second mark, Jasper immediately surfaces bound in chains herself, supporting the shared subconscious interpretation. Interestingly, when Lapis gives up her identity, at the minute and 20th second mark onwards, she switches the use of pronoun from I to We – implying a formed connection between the two. Clip 3 explores this idea, Lapis explicitly states her feelings about the *fusion* at the 45th second mark that despite their constant struggles, she misses Jasper. Later at the 2 minute and 22nd mark, Jasper drops to her knees and begs Lapis to fuse with her again. This asymmetrical posturing of the two characters once again brings to mind their unequal dynamic. In this scene, despite Jasper mentioning the UNITY structure of *fusion*, "Malachite

15, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2FQbsOINz8k>. Interesting is how this representation stays consistent overtime.

was bigger and stronger than the both of us...”, they still discuss their *fusion* in terms of gains and individual action.

Lapis: “I liked taking everything out on you. I needed to. I hated you! It was bad!”

Jasper: “It’ll be better this time. I’ve changed, you’ve changed me. I’m the only one who can handle your kind of power. Together, we’ll be unstoppable.”

After Lapis verbalizes her intention never to fuse again, the interaction concludes with Lapis physically sending Jasper away. In sum, despite sharing similar qualities with the *fusion* of the previous section, the participants’ affectual reasons for fusing differentiate the two. This difference is structured in two ways: either as UNITY or an ECONOMIC EXCHANGE and this is reflected and actively reinforced in all modes and techniques available to animation.

4. Conclusion

The analysis of *fusion* reveals how conceptual metaphors can manifest in animation – each modality, significantly construed by the medium, works in tandem in order to deliver a consistent message: FUSION IS RELATIONSHIP. The representation of the conceptual metaphor remained consistent throughout years of varying situations and representations, adding further support to the claim of the persistence of metaphor.

Charles Forceville

Reflections on the Creative Use of Traffic Signs’ “Micro-Language”

1. Introduction

In a world where information is expected to be accessible ever more fast and efficiently, visuals – alone or accompanied by language (or sound, or music) – are an attractive medium for communication. It is thus hardly surprising that research on visual and multimodal discourse is on the rise.¹ Evidently, to help visual studies (and multimodal studies with a visual component) mature into a serious humanities discipline, it is crucial to be able to unveil patterns in the way visuals can communicate. Finding patterns requires first of all that it should be possible to identify recurring “building blocks” in visuals. Only if any recurring elements are found, it is sensible to ask whether any “rules” or “conventions” exist that prescribe how these elements can interact to create meaning – and how they cannot.

2. Visual Grammar?

In language we call the constituting building blocks its “words” or “vocabulary”, and the rules that govern the acceptable interaction between these words its “grammar”. Only if the same, or highly sim-

¹ E.g., Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen, *Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design*, 2nd edition, London: Routledge, 2006; Carey Jewitt (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Multimodal Analysis*, 2nd edition, London: Routledge, 2014; David Machin (ed.), *Visual Communication*, Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 2014; Nina-Maria Klug and Hartmut Stöckl (eds.), *Handbuch Sprache im multimodalen Kontext [The Language in Multimodal Contexts Handbook]*, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016; John Bateman, Janina Wildfeuer, and Tuomo Hiippala, *Multimodality: Foundations, Research and Analysis – A Problem-Oriented Introduction*, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017.

ilar, phenomena to verbal language's vocabulary and grammar occur in the visual realm does it make sense to say that visuals constitute a "language". Neil Cohn does not hesitate to adopt the term "visual languages".² I agree with him that in certain situations it is possible to say something about constitutive elements as well as about the way these can, or even should, be conjoined to convey meaning, but in my view Cohn goes too far in his claims. My reservations are by and large the following: there are innumerable entities and phenomena in the world, and they can be drawn and photographed and filmed in innumerable ways. Consequently, we cannot have a "visual dictionary" that specifies all the admissible building blocks in the sense that a verbal dictionary can more or less exhaustively list the words that exist, at a given moment in time, in a language, and provides their correct spelling. For this reason I counsel that when talking about the visual mode we use the concept of "vocabulary" with great caution. (Of course, there can be, and indeed are, domain-specific *thesauri* of visuals.)

Similarly, it is misleading to use the word "grammar" to refer to relations between visual elements, since this suggests a degree of precision in specifying the (non)acceptability of combinations of visual elements that is untenable. My proposal is to use the word *structure* instead of *grammar*, or else, as with "vocabulary", to use quotation marks ("grammar") to emphasize its metaphorical nature when applied to visuals. This is not pedantry: in my view it is to a considerable extent Kress and Van Leeuwen's over-stretching of the notion of a "grammar of visual design" that leads them to several serious misrepresentations of the way visuals can communicate meaning.³

Although the medium of visuals as a whole, then, has neither vocabulary nor grammar, there is evidence that certain *genres*, or certain visual phenomena within genres, dispose of qualities that one might nonetheless want to call a rudimentary "language" – that is, a

² Neil Cohn (ed.), *The Visual Narrative Reader*, London: Bloomsbury, 2016.

³ Charles Forceville, "Educating the Eye? Kress and Van Leeuwen's *Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design* (1996)", *Language and Literature*, vol. 8, no. 2 (1999), pp. 163–178.

(very) limited set of elements with a specific meaning that can be combined with each other and with other elements only in restricted, rule-governed ways. Both Neil Cohn and myself have investigated the "language" of comics, and found recurring elements and patterns.⁴ Forceville and Clark have suggested that brand logos and pictograms constitute genres of visuals that have language-like properties.⁵ We could use the term "micro-languages" for closed sets with only a few items (a "micro-vocabulary") and just a few rules specifying the relations among these items and their relation with other elements (a "micro-grammar").

3. Visual Rhetoric in Creative "Traffic Signs"

Like pictograms, traffic signs constitute a good genre to investigate language-like qualities of visuals, as proposed by Forceville and

⁴ Cohn, *op. cit.* and Neil Cohn, *The Visual Language of Comics: Introduction to the Structure and Cognition of Sequential Images*, London: Bloomsbury, 2013; Charles Forceville, "Visual Representations of the Idealized Cognitive Model of Anger in the Asterix Album *La Zizanie*", *Journal of Pragmatics*, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 69–88; Charles Forceville, "Pictorial Runes in *Tintin and the Picaros*", *Journal of Pragmatics*, vol. 43, no. 3 (2011), pp. 875–890; Charles Forceville, "Creative Visual Duality in Comics Balloons", in Tony Veale, Kurt Feyaerts, and Charles Forceville (eds), *Creativity and the Agile Mind: A Multi-Disciplinary Exploration of a Multi-Faceted Phenomenon*, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2013, pp. 253–273; Charles Forceville, Tony Veale, and Kurt Feyaerts, "Balloonics: The Visuals of Balloons in Comics", in Joyce Goggin and Dan Hassler-Forest (eds.), *The Rise and Reason of Comics and Graphic Literature: Critical Essays on the Form*, Jefferson NC: McFarland, 2010, pp. 56–73; Michael Abbott and Charles Forceville, "Visual Representation of Emotion in Manga: LOSS OF CONTROL IS LOSS OF HANDS in *Azumanga Daioh* Volume 4", *Language and Literature*, vol. 20, no. 2 (2011), pp. 91–112; Charles Forceville, Elisabeth El Refaie, and Gert Meesters, "Stylistics and Comics", in Michael Burke (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Stylistics*, London: Routledge, 2014, pp. 485–499; Dušan Stamenković, Miloš Tasić, and Charles Forceville, "Facial Expressions in Comics: An Empirical Consideration of McCloud's Proposal", *Journal of Visual Communication*, vol. 17, no. 4 (2018), pp. 407–432.

⁵ Charles Forceville and Billy Clark, "Can Pictures Have Explicatures?", *Linguagem em (Dis)curso*, vol. 14, no. 3 (2014), pp. 451–472.

Kjeldsen.⁶ In this earlier paper we concluded that traffic signs have three text-internal meaningful visual elements: their form; their colour(s); and, often, a stylized picture of an object or person (what Peirce would call an “iconic” sign) in it. In many cases, overall meaning furthermore depends on the fact that this visual information is often accompanied by verbal information in or underneath or above the traffic sign, turning it into a multimodal sign. Finally, one *pragmatic* element is always crucial, namely *where* the traffic sign is located. We could thus say that the micro-language of traffic signs has a more or less exhaustive number of meaning-carrying elements – and hence a micro-vocabulary – as well as certain rules specifying how these elements could be correctly used in relation with each other, thereby revealing a rudimentary micro-grammar. It is because of these genre-specific qualities, we argued, that the genre of traffic signs could also be used creatively to make rhetorical or even argumentative claims that need not be restricted to the domain of traffic.

In the present chapter I revisit this idea by elaborating on the way in which traffic signs function as (verbo)visual “speech acts”, analyzing new examples. Speech acts, or performatives, first theorized by J. L. Austin,⁷ are utterances that make something happen by the very act of uttering them. Examples are “declaring war”, “pronouncing two people man and wife”, and “promising”. Traffic signs function in the same way: they are thus a kind of (verbo-)visual “speech acts” (see Figure 1).

It is to be noted that none of these four types of signs allow for varying their *colour* without affecting the nature of the “speech act” they convey, but that Figures 1c and 1d (but not 1a and 1b) allow for some variation in their *form*. This is presumably no coincidence: ignoring the messages in 1a and 1b leads to more dangerous situations in traffic than ignoring those in 1c and 1d, and thus are strictly coded

⁶ Charles Forceville and Jens E. Kjeldsen, “The Affordances and Constraints of Situation and Genre: Visual and Multimodal Rhetoric in Unusual Traffic Signs”, *International Review of Pragmatics*, vol. 10, no. 2 (2018), pp. 158–178.

⁷ J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.

Traffic Signs' "Micro-Language"

both in terms of colour and in terms of *form*. In many cases, the traffic signs feature an iconic silhouette, or language, or both, to make clear what the traffic user is warned or informed about, or forbidden/permitted to do.



Figure 1a: "You are warned that..."

Figure 1b: "You are forbidden to..."

Figure 1c: "You are permitted/
/instructed to..."

Figure 1d: "You are informed that..."

Because of the highly coded "speech act" the traffic sign templates present, it is possible to deploy them for humorous purposes, or even to persuade viewers to adopt ideas, or undertake actions, that are not related to behaviour in traffic. In Forceville and Kjeldsen (*op. cit.*) we discussed some examples of both. An example of a "traffic sign" in which a rhetorical point is made is Figure 3. We are all familiar with Figure 2, an "instructive" sign indicating a footpath. Figure 3, by varying on Figure 2, makes the point that it is odd that the adult and child on the official sign by default seem to be male, exposing this gender bias by depicting the two humans as female. Even though this traffic sign probably was an embellished actual sign in the real world (rather than a photoshopped version of a picture of such a sign), from a rhetorical perspective its precise location does not matter much anymore: unlike in Figure 2a, one can relocate the sign to make a more general point: "it is wrong to (standardly) use the male variety of the species as the default to depict 'people'."

Figure 4a, an art work by Carlos No, makes a proclamation in a less playful manner. In order to understand the point, one must first of all recognize the silhouette within the sign as a group of refugees. The traffic sign then means: "forbidden to refugees". The "forbidden

to” is entirely conveyed by the category of traffic signs to which this one belongs. It is to be noted that if one were to manipulate the colours in 4a to result in 4b, the meaning would change into something like “refugees are welcome here”.



Figure 2: Standard traffic sign “this is a footpath”.

Figure 3: Manipulated footpath sign.⁸

Figure 4a: Forbidden for refugees, art work by Carlos No.⁹

Figure 4b: Manipulated version of Figure 4a.¹⁰

But it turns out that not all communicators making use of traffic sign’s “micro-language” are in full command of its code. In particular, the “forbidden” sign appears to be regularly used in situations where a “warning” sign would be more appropriate. Consider Figure 5, a sign featuring a stylized depiction of a face with a raised index finger in front of the mouth, thereby signaling: “it is forbidden to talk here”. Whereas this traffic sign may occur in a traffic-related situation (for instance in certain coaches in a train), this is not necessary; one can also imagine encountering it, for instance, in a library, or in a church. It is to be noticed, however, that what is forbidden is *not* what is depicted in the iconic silhouette (namely: be silent!). As it stands, the sign is a kind of visual “double negation” (I owe the observation to Paul Boersma). This “double negation” is arguably also found in Figure 6. One can imagine an environmental activist living in a house just before a gas station might plant it into her garden to

⁸ Art by Petra McKinnon, see <https://www.pinterest.com/pin/571886852654505100>.

⁹ See <http://www.artsblog.it/galleria/carlos-no-europe/3>.

¹⁰ Thanks to Pieter Manders for creating this version.

Traffic Signs' "Micro-Language"

remind car drivers about to fill up. The silhouettes of Figures 5 and 6 would have been more "grammatical" in the triangle of Figure 1a: "you are *warned* that you must be silent here" and "you are *warned* that (over)using gasoline amounts to mankind committing suicide".

I submit that the café table with a male, red devil and a female, black angel in Figure 7, too, has the wrong form. Since these icons, when used together, are conventionally used to signal bad temptations and good advice, respectively, the meaning could be something like, "in this café you are exposed both to the bad and the good" (pleasant versus excessive drinking? interesting contacts versus people who want to seduce or deceive you?). There is some freedom of interpretation here, but this freedom is constrained by (1) the fact that this is a prohibition sign; and (2) its location in a café. But surely this café table is not meant to issue a "thou shalt not ..." message. Rather, it suggests something along the lines that *here* (i.e., in this café) there are both bad and good things that may attract your attention. A warning sign would have been more suitable (but a triangular café table is probably inconvenient ...).



Figure 5: *Be silent.*¹¹



Figure 6: *Using gasoline is committing suicide.*¹²



Figure 7: *Devilish temptation and angelical good advice. Café table Budapest, April 2018.*¹³

¹¹ Retrieved from the internet, provenance unknown.

¹² See <https://www.drive2.ru/b/2488336/>.

¹³ Photographed by Luc Pauwels, whom I thank for permission to use this photo.

Figure 8 has the correct form, but violates traffic-sign grammar by being blue with white letters instead of red with white letters. It was undoubtedly not lack of knowledge about the “code” that plays a role here. This Hawaiian sign appears on private property – and on Hawaii it is unlawful to use official traffic signs on non-public premises; hence, apparently, the adaptation.

The “traffic sign” in Figure 9 is a forbidding sign which, by virtue of the iconically depicted photo camera, presumably has something to do with photographing. Without the text one could easily envisage coming across it on a spot where one is not allowed to make photographs – but as a matter of fact the sign is placed in front of a photo shop, and therefore would be expected to invite or instruct people in a positive way about photographs, as the accompanying (Dutch) text indeed corroborates: “passport photographs – immediately ready”. In this case, the sign should have been of the *informative* variety (cf. Figure 10).



*Figure 8: Traffic sign on private property in Hawaii.*¹⁴



*Figure 9: “Traffic” sign in front of a photo shop (Haarlem, The Netherlands) offering a passport photographing service.*¹⁵



Figure 10: Manipulated version of the “traffic” sign in Figure 9. (Thanks to Pieter Manders for creating this version.)

Even though their “grammar” may be faulty, all of the above examples intend to make rhetorical points. This is not the case with

¹⁴ See <http://nowiknow.com/they-blue-it/>.

¹⁵ Photo by the author.

Traffic Signs' "Micro-Language"

manipulated traffic signs such as the “forbidden entry from this side” signs in Figures 11a–d.



Figure 11a: Street art by Clet Abraham.¹⁶



Figure 11b: Traffic sign in Budapest, April 2018.¹⁷



Figure 11c: Florence, Italy, photographed by Nick Phewing.



Figure 11d: Florence, Italy, photographed by Nick Phewing.

These signs are clever and funny – but they do not manifest any persuasive power, nor are they ostensibly intended to do so. Their creativity is purely formal – although it is in principle always possible that when used in different circumstances (i.e., by changing the prag-

¹⁶ See <https://www.amusingplanet.com/2013/01/altered-street-signs-by-clet-abraham.html>.

¹⁷ Photographed by Luc Pauwels, whom I thank for permission to use this photo.

matic dimension of their meaning-making), they *do* make a point. I propose they are best described as “visual puns”.

4. Concluding Remarks

Having considered the quasi-traffic signs above, let me draw a few brief conclusions. In the first place, the genre of quasi-traffic signs enables the creation of persuasive messages, even without the use of language. In the categorization of performatives, or speech acts, that Austin proposes, they would be “exercitives”, which pertain to “the giving of a decision in favour of or against a certain course of action, or advocacy of it”.¹⁸ The quasi-traffic signs can fulfill this role because they transform and adapt visual templates that already have a clearly coded meaning. Something similar can be done in the genre of critical anti-advertisements, so-called “subvertisements”.¹⁹ More generally speaking, many genres (e.g., advertisements, political cartoons) have such strong conventions that visuals alone may suffice to make rhetorical or argumentative points.²⁰ In the second place, it is clear that not everybody uses the template well: sometimes the wrong, or not the best, “speech act” template has been chosen, making for an ambiguous or confusing message. In Austinian terms, we could say that they “misfire”, more specifically representing “mis-executions”, the latter manifesting “wrong formulas”.²¹ Thirdly, the examples show that the quasi-traffic signs constitute a genre that arguably has both a “vocabulary” and a “grammar”, the former consisting of colours, forms, and icons (the icons, to be sure, exempli-

¹⁸ Austin, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

¹⁹ Assimakis Tseronis and Charles Forceville, “Arguing Against Corporate Claims Visually and Multimodally: The Case of Subvertisements”, *Multimodal Communication*, vol. 6, no. 2 (2017), pp. 143–157.

²⁰ See Assimakis Tseronis and Charles Forceville (eds.), *Multimodal Argumentation and Rhetoric in Media Genres*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2017, for other genres in which the visual component plays a central role in persuading people.

²¹ Austin, *op. cit.*, pp. 16–17, 36.

fyng an open-ended category). This means that at least some types of visuals allow for communicating explicit information, because they convey meaning that depends primarily on "decoding" and is relatively independent of context.²²

²² See for more discussion: Charles Forceville, "Relevance Theory as Model for Analysing Visual and Multimodal Communication", in David Machin (ed.), *Visual Communication*, Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 2014, pp. 51–70; Forceville and Clark, *op. cit.* (cf. note 5 above).

THE POWER OF THE IMAGE

Anna Botalova

The Visual Perception of Jacques Derrida's Haunting Philosophy

1. Introduction

I have not read Derrida's philosophy before I watched a movie about him. However, I had a chance to immerse myself into his philosophy before encountering any of his writings.

We are accustomed to the fact that a text is a traditional way for philosophy to exist. We read a book, we learn philosophical concepts through it, and that is how philosophy had been perceived during the centuries. However natural it was to entwine words and thinking, some new ideas started to emerge. The perceptual richness proper to the cinema enables it to reflect on a wide variety of things. So, what philosophical powers do images have? What powers do films have as they operate images in motion? Now, we argue, it is possible to live through a concept cinematically as it happened to me and the film *Derrida*¹. But even if it is so, why should we prefer a film over a book? One of my major arguments is that film-philosophy, this alternative way of concept's existence, can be extremely vivid, comprehensive, important and, simply, different. During the analysis of the documentary film *Derrida*, we will see how major concepts of Derrida's philosophy, such as deconstruction, differance, metaphysics of presence, trace, hauntology may be transmitted through the film's structure and montage.

As Stanley Cavell puts it, some films can exist in a state of philosophy.² They can be self-reflexive, self-referential and attentive

¹ Philosophy Matters, *Derrida: The Documentary* (2002), online video clip, *YouTube*, 15 July 2017, see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pn1PwtcJfwE>.

² Stanley Cavell, *The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979, p. 102. For example, he claims that

to the searching of values and meanings. If we turn to Gilles Deleuze in order to get more understanding on how film can do philosophy, we will find him writing that some films may actually be more serious and thoughtful investigations of philosophical concepts than classical philosophy. For example, Deleuze writes that *The Last Year in Marienbad* reflects on memory as deeply as Bergson's works.³ However, not all movies can do philosophy – not all movies investigate problems that had been haunting philosophy for centuries. Nevertheless, some of them question our understanding of such fundamental concepts as time, space and memory.

In this regard, David Frampton proposed an idea of a film-mind – the mind of a movie which thinks its own characters through colours, camera movements and a set of events. Frampton argues that a film is more than just a sum of human technical and creative work. In fact, he writes, the cinema experience has nothing to do, in most cases, with noticing the crew's work. The true cinematic experience is more direct, wild and inexplicable. That is the reason why he turns to the idea of a film-mind – in order to try to talk more accurately about our true experience of living through a movie.

2. Cinema and Derrida

First of all, we want to discuss correspondences between Derrida's philosophy and a film as a medium.

Cinema is temporal so it is interested in questions of time perception, memory, nostalgia and in events that never happened. Being itself a ghostly substance, not quite material, not really tangible, a film serves as a perfect medium for hosting ghosts. People in a film are present without being present actually. We know that they existed

comedies of remarriage make characters reevaluate their lives and lead them to the change.

³ See Jeremy J. Shapiro, "Still Searching for Lost Time: On Leutrat on Resnais", *Film-Philosophy*, vol. 9, no. 39 (July 2005), <http://www.film-philosophy.com/vol9-2005/n39shapiro>.

in front of a camera some time ago but now they are absent, we see only shadows on the screen. Shadows and phantoms on the screen are projections of real things whose illusiveness is less noticeable than in traditional arts such as painting. In this regard, a film is better than an academic text or the literature to get in touch with the haunting philosophy of Jacques Derrida whose spirit is always in elusiveness and scintillation.

Differance is a twofold deformation of time and space as a basis of perception and knowledge. So differance is an act of a delay, a dislocation and an interval; meanwhile, presence is a unity of here and now. The film is an embodiment of the differance forasmuch it fixates here-and-now and at the same moment alienates it. We have a shift between a moment of here-and-now in a film and here-and-now of watching a film.

From our point of view, while watching a film we do not see the absence, we are in a position of witnessing the absence and the presence at the same time. As a matter of fact, we frequently do not detect the differance consciously, the film is just present to us. This absence of real things which were replaced by their projections is the only presence we have.

Hauntology and differance are ideas of Derrida's philosophy which concentrate on presence and absence, on dislocation and interval. Same categories recur in the opposition of writing and speech. The film *Derrida* consists of interviews, lectures and private conversations with Derrida, as well as of his texts read aloud. The difference between a written text and speech becomes extremely notable. The text, the extracts from Derrida's books, is read by a woman's voice. The text sounds comparably more difficult and saturated than a speech. Although we listen to the fragments out of contexts, which complicates our understanding, they actually stand out as independent pieces of art. Completed, perfect, frozen, detached pieces, with all disadvantages of a monument – the absence of presence, of here-and-now.

Therefore, the film actively responds to Derrida's appeal to the opposition of speech and writing by directly contrasting them in the frame. Derrida stresses the fact that in Western culture the absolute

presence has been always connected with an act of speech. The voice has been perceived as ontologically primal. In his works, however, he seeks to deconstruct the logocentric priority of speech over writing. He argues that writing is ontologically primal as it is the only condition of articulation that exists before any letter or sound.

After we have discussed how film as a medium resonates with the same questions as Derrida's philosophy, it is time to look at how the film itself works.

3. *Derrida*, the Film-Mind

The format of a TV interview presupposes various conventions. In most cases, we may be confident that on television we will see a philosopher in a formal shirt sitting behind a desk or in a chair, surrounded by books. Like here in Figure 1.




Figure 1

In this scene (*Derrida*, 14:05), we see Derrida in an elegant red shirt. Unsurprisingly, there are bookshelves in the background. He is asked to clarify the definition of deconstruction, the major concept he is mostly known for. Here, a decisive moment for the whole

movie and for us happens. Probably, as for readers of this article, this picture of Derrida may seem completely natural and harmless. However, in exactly this episode, we actually realize the work the film has done on us. We immediately notice that this image was constructed and that it is totally fake and lacks any sort of truthfulness. Replying to our intuition, Derrida starts his comment by saying that the whole situation is artificial. He points out that technical conditions that surround all them cannot be ignored. He refuses to fake “naturalness” which “doesn't exist”.

I want to underline rather than efface our surrounding technical conditions and not feign the “naturalness” with doesn't exist... one of the gestures of deconstruction is not naturalizing what isn't natural – to not assume that what is conditioned by history, institutions, or society is natural (14:29–15:00).

The film tries to pursue the same strategy. It actualizes one of the gestures of deconstruction which is directed against “feigning naturalness”. The film achieves this goal on several levels. First of all, it creates a conflict among various conventional images Derrida is associated with (the main image is Derrida as a Philosopher). Secondly, the film constantly notices that it is being shot. This fact is underlined by the frequency of scenes when we see the shooting crew or a resolve of organizational problems. Thirdly, it notices that surroundings have been set. As Derrida expresses this point: “This is what you call cinema verite? Everything is false. Almost everything. I'm not really like this... when I stay alone at my home in the daytime, ... I stay in my pajamas and a bathrobe” (19:15).

By that, the documentary urge of the second level is subverted after we find out that many scenes were not spontaneous nor documentary but have been arranged and, probably, even had a script. Finally, it highlights distortions caused by the camera. Let's look at the first and second points. In one of the first scenes (1:55), we watch how Derrida is awkwardly looking for his coat. This episode is interrupted by a TV program's shots where Derrida is characterized as one of the most brilliant philosophers of our time. The personal

aspect and the media image are confronted in this short episode. What is more, we constantly see how the film was made. Operators and sound designers are all characters in this movie. Against conventions, their presence is not hidden. Derrida himself reacts to an operator. For example, when they all cross the street, Derrida addresses her and holds her hand. “Americans exist to be filmed. It's their natural condition”, says Kirby Dick, the director. “See how Americanized I am”, answers Derrida (Derrida, 5:05).

In the red shirt scene, Derrida prolonged the pause before starting to answer the interviewer's question. In fact, it is a recurrent move of his. When he is asked to talk about love (36:07), he refuses to do that. He asks questions and looks for something to speak of but he cannot talk about love in general. Similarly, like deconstruction constantly freezes any situation and makes it problematic, Derrida freezes any attempts of philosophy to explain and clarify. As a whole, the film does not focus on answers so much, because it is more attentive to what precedes the answer.

Like in *Samsara*, past repeats itself over and over in a film. We understand Derrida's concern when he says holding a plate of chips at a party: “The people who watch these images will think I am a fanatic of chips” (42:39).

In fact, the moment which is documented on film becomes excluded from the normal way of living and from ordinary circumstances. It becomes privileged – the singular moment almost as defining as the moment of death. As Pasolini said⁴ the moment of death montages life. The film montages Derrida's life. Everything we will know about him from the movie is only a decision of an editor. Derrida stresses that by saying the following: “You will keep exactly what you think has to be kept. That will be your signature and your autobiography in a certain way” (1:18:07).

Although every film is deceptive, this film obligingly undermines its own fabrications, one after other. This is how the film gets its own voice and gets an opportunity to capture the real – by literally

⁴ Pier Paolo Pasolini, “Ora tutto è chiaro, voluto, non imposto dal destino”, *Cineforum* 68, October 1967, p. 609.

failing to capture it. However, this voice is not able to tell a story. It can accuse, argue but cannot speak frankly. Derrida stops at the edge of impossible sincerity. When he is asked a personal question, he gets confused. Complete sincerity in front of a camera is his final frontier. When an interviewer asks him to describe his traumatic experiences, Derrida answers "I had them" (Derrida, 2002,1:20:35). Then there is a big pause before Derrida realizes that everyone is waiting for a full answer. He is so confused that he says "No" not one, but seven times. He just freezes in front of complete openness. The naturality is impossible, once again.

4. Conclusions

Cinema corresponds to the main questions of Derrida's inquiry – the metaphysics of presence, differance, the opposition of speech and writing. Moreover, the film itself operates deconstruction, similarly to Derrida, continually putting into question the authority of the author and the neutrality of representation. Therefore, deconstruction is not an operation which is done later on the work, it already works within a work. During the film, we start to perceive the film from the point of view of Derrida's philosophy. Without controlling this process, we notice "the cinematic" of the cinema. There is a consonance between us and Derrida's thought.

Another important moment is that every thought in the film belongs to Derrida with no alternative thoughts whatsoever. Even his wife, Marguerite, cannot tell a story of their encounter. The only voice of the Other is the voice of a student of the North African university. She makes a remark after Derrida's lecture on pure forgiveness, that it is ironical and hypocritical to talk about pure forgiveness in front of the white audience which is a potential object of forgiveness. This critical remark seems to be present in the movie because it provides with fuel Derrida's following comment later on clarifying the act of true forgiveness. As a whole, the film consists only of questions posed to Derrida and his answers. What is more, the narrator's voice quotes only his works. In general, using Frampton's terminol-

ogy, the film *Derrida* is the film-mind of Derrida which reproduces the world of Derrida's philosophy. Fragmented as his works, fully existing in his discourse and in his speech. But why, after all, do we insist on the idea of a film-mind? Because it is an alternative, non-anthropomorphic way of thinking which is not concentrated around words but operates with pictures. The film is a unique way of transmitting philosophical concepts. At the same time film is a form of philosophy itself. It forms a visual philosophy which questions, claims and pays attention to meanings and values. Cinema does philosophy but could it be another way? Is it possible for a film not to reflect on problems, not to create concepts in an epoch of symbol dominance?

Wittgenstein said that most philosophy questions originate from the misunderstanding of the logic of language.⁵ Although this film exists within the logocentric tradition, as it is centered around acts of speech, it also seeks out opportunities to use specific cinematographic ways to signify. For instance, it operates empty signifiers – the film is flooded with scenes which have a vague or no meaning at all. Sometimes we see how Derrida silently eats his lunch, listens to the TV or trifles with a pan. However, as Derrida points out, these empty signifiers will someday find a way to signify. In the future, the Other may find a way to decrypt them.

As viewers, we do not necessarily detect all those connections with Derrida's own writing. In fact, we may not know them. However, this film provokes us to think about problems that Derrida poses. That is where true philosophy starts and our thoughtful encounter with Derrida happens. When we do not read his reflections but try to resolve questions posed by him – by ourselves.

⁵ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 1922 (transl. by C. K. Ogden), for example 4.003: "Most questions and propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language. (They are of the same kind as the question whether the Good is more or less identical than the Beautiful.) And so it is not to be wondered at that the deepest problems are really *no* problems."

Trischa Goodnow

Omission as Silence: Extending a Theory of Invisuality

1. Introduction

During funerals for members of the United States' military, there are several symbolic exercises that recognize the permanent absence of a deceased service person. For example, during funeral services there may be a jet flyover in what is called the "Missing Man Formation" in which four jets fly in a 'v' formation. At a point in the flyover, one jet casts off to leave a space in the formation to represent the death of a military person. Likewise, when there are funerals for commanders or presidents, a riderless horse with empty boots placed backwards in the stirrups mark the passing. Memorial ceremonies seek to mark the absence of the individual.

Memorials in general recognize the deaths of individuals and provide a place where the absence can be mourned. Traditionally, public memorials are white granite structures that list the names of the fallen. However, in the last forty years, public memorials have begun to use different strategies for memorializing the dead. Beginning with the Vietnam Veteran's Memorial in Washington, D.C., the traditional form of memorial was cast aside.

Continuing the work of Kimble and myself on a theory of invisuality, I argue in this paper that omission plays a vital role as a rhetorical strategy of invisuality. To make this argument, I begin with an examination of a theory of invisuality and the possible role of omission as a rhetorical choice in public memorials. Then I examine the Berlin Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe as an exemplar of omission invisuality, before finally drawing conclusions. Such a study furthers the understanding of the relationship between presence and absence as rhetorical activities.

2. Invisuality

In a Spring 2016 lecture at the Visual Learning Lab at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics, James Kimble presented a paper introducing a theory of invisuality based on research by Kimble and myself.¹ This theory suggests that absence plays an important role in constructing the meaning of an artifact. Consequently, what is left out of an image may be just as important as what is actually in an image. When an image maker produces an image both what is present and what is absent influence the viewer's perception of the message. Further, we suggest that this purposeful use of absence can be used as a rhetorical strategy to persuade audiences.

The initial configuration of the theory suggested that there were three types of invisuality: accidental, covert, and overt. Accidental invisuality occurs when a natural wearing away creates absence such as when the features in an old coin are smoothed away. Secondly, covert invisuality is a purposeful hiding of elements that lead the viewer to an incorrect conclusion. This happens as a mainstay in advertising. That fluffy stack of pancakes enticing you to a breakfast establishment conceals the cardboard and toothpicks that support the pancakes in an illusion of height. While covert invisuality aims to keep its visual absences from the viewer's perception, *overt invisuality* aims for the opposite objective. Here, the absence, and the apparent intent that prompted it, are on full display. Perhaps the most famous example of this is photograph of Josef Stalin's missing commissar. An original photo showed Stalin and several high powered Soviet officers, including Commissar Nikolai Yezhov. In February 1940, Yezhov lost Stalin's favor and was executed. Thereafter, the famous photo of Stalin's officials was recirculated with a retouched image that removed Yezhov from the picture. The message was clear; getting on Stalin's bad side meant an erasure of any evidence that you ever existed.

¹ James J. Kimble, "On the Margins of Perception: Toward a Theory of Invisuality – From an ongoing research project to be co-authored with Trischa Goodnow". Talk given at the Budapest VLL, May 5, 2016.

As we develop this theory, the notion of accidental invisuality would fall beyond the bounds of invisuality as a rhetorical strategy as there is not a purposeful leaving out. Further, though, we would add a true third type of invisuality identified as omission. Perhaps the most complex of the types of invisuality is the omitted invisuality where elements of an image were never there. We find two types of omitted invisuality, intended and unintended. Intended omission refers to the purposeful omission of an expected element. A good example of this is a black and white photograph. Almost all photos are representations of a world in which colour is omni-present. However, black and white photos impact the viewer's impression of the image. In a 2009 study, I compared photographs of Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton published as photo essays in *Time* magazine during the 2008 Democratic primaries. The Obama photos were in colour with rich tones that depicted warmth. Clinton's photos, conversely, were in black and white. The absence of colour in these photos, I conclude, presented Clinton as colder and more removed from the viewer.²

Another way in which omitted invisuality can be intended is when an expected element in an established genre is absent. For example, there is a sculpture at the Dachau Concentration Camp Memorial that is a sculpture of all the triangles worn by prisoners in Nazi concentration camps. Absent in the memorial is a black triangle which was worn by a-socials, many disabled prisoners. In fact, many memorials to the Holocaust omit the black triangle.³ This omission creates a hierarchy in which some victimized in the Holocaust are again marginalized. Those who view sculptures, such as the one at Dachau, may perceive that some prisoners were less important than the oft memorialized.

The second form of omitted invisuality is unintended. In these instances, the absence is noted not in the creation of the artifact but in

² Trischa Goodnow, "Visual Bias in Time's 'The Great Divide': A Semiotic Analysis of Clinton and Obama Photographs", *American Behavioral Scientist*, vol. 54, no. 4 (2010), pp. 406–416.

³ See <https://furtherglory.wordpress.com/2013/07/29/concentration-camp-prisoners-who-wore-a-black-triangle-will-be-honored-in-a-new-berlin-memorial/>.

the final product. In July 2016, the U.S. Speaker of the House Paul Ryan posted a selfie with Republican interns. When the photo was posted on social media, it became immediately obvious that the interns were all Caucasians. The photo went viral with the hashtag #InternsSoWhite. Democratic interns then published their own photo that depicted the great diversity in the opposing party's interns. The absence of diversity in the Republican interns was only noticed when the photograph was posted. Consequently, the unintended omission of a diversity of interns became apparent when the omission was revealed. The material absence of a quality impacts the perceptions of those who view the subject.

In addition to the categorizing of invisuality, Kimble and I also assert three principles associated with the theory: relevance, revelation, and rhetoricity. First, the absence, in order to persuade, must have relevance to the issue at hand. As is the case with covert invisuality, the hidden elements of an advertisement, such as toothpicks and cardboard, create false impressions on the viewer. However, if the same advertisement does not contain silverware, that absence has no relevance to the overall persuasive message. Revelation indicates that the absence must be recognized by the audience at some point. If the absence is never noted, then it has no impact on the perceptions of the viewer. Consequently, the revelation is the point at which the viewer's interpretation of an artifact is impacted. Finally, there is the notion of rhetoricity. This principle necessitates that the absence is a choice of a persuasive strategy. Certainly, in the unintended omission category, having only Caucasian interns is somehow a choice by those hiring the interns. The image reflecting that choice may unintentionally reveal these selections. As a result, the interpretation of the image is impacted by the absence.

3. Absence as a Theoretical Construct

Whether accidental, covert, overt, or by omission, it seems evident that invisuality can play an integral part in one's experience of the visual. And while visual scholars have at times alluded to the role of

unseen elements in the interpretive process, my aim here is to build on the initial theorizing on absence posited by Kimble and myself. Such theorizing satisfies calls for such research. For example, Brian L. Ott, Eric Aoki, and Greg Dickinson's analysis of the Cody Firearms Museum concludes that there is a need for "a practice of criticism ... that attends to absence as well as presence".⁴ To be clear, this theory should be seen as an adjunct to existing approaches to visibility. In Guerin's edited collection *On Not Looking*, the authors of the various chapters attempt to examine how producers and audiences tempt the gaze to look away. However, the perspective is not a rhetorical one as the prospect of invisuality is.⁵ Further, the book does not offer a new theoretical perspective as invisuality does. It is, in other words, an additional consideration that scholars of visual texts can bring to bear in their analysis. In fact, when invisible elements are afoot, visual elements are almost certainly present as well. Analysis of the former, then, most likely emerges from and merges with analysis of the latter.

The subject of this study, the Berlin Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, has certain relevant characteristics common to most memorials on the one hand. On the other hand, it lacks some of the hallmarks of more traditional memorials. Memorials create a fertile ground for examining the role of absence and presence in visual artifacts. After all, memorials seek to mark the absence of what was once there. Consequently, memorials readily contain elements that commonly point to that which they memorialize. For example, consider an ordinary gravestone in a cemetery which will most likely contain the name of the deceased, dates of birth and death, and perhaps relationships to the living (e.g. "Loving wife and mother"). More contemporary gravestones may even have photographs of the deceased encased in acrylic. All of these indicators point to the per-

⁴ For example, Brian L. Ott, Eric Aoki, and Greg Dickinson. "Ways of (Not) Seeing Guns: Presence and Absence at the Cody Firearms Museum", *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 8 (2011), p. 235.

⁵ Frances Guerin (ed.), *On Not Looking: The Paradox of Contemporary Visual Culture*, Routledge, 2015.

son who is no longer present. Consequently, absence and presence are essential to the nature of memorials.

To understand better the relationship between absence and presence, Walter Benjamin offers a perspective that may prove helpful in examining the rhetorical strategy of invisuality and its reliance on absence. In Benjamin's *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*, he argues that mechanical reproduction (mass production) removes the aura of the original work of art.⁶ Because of this, the viewer is removed from the authenticity of the original. The implication for the notion of invisuality is that the absence alludes to the aura of that which is absent. Instead of mechanical replication removing the aura the intended absence calls to mind the original and its aura. So, for Benjamin, it is the multiplicity in the reproductions which, in essence, cheapens the potential authenticity in any reproduction. Take the Mona Lisa, for example. This is one of the most reproduced images in all of history. But reading about the Mona Lisa and seeing a picture of it in a textbook, pales in comparison to standing in front of the original in the Louvre. In viewing the original, one can see the brushstrokes and other details that are eliminated in any reproduction. Thus, the aura of the original is lost.

In memorials, the absence calls to mind not just the physical person but the intangible aura of the person. No matter the detail that may be elucidated on a memorial, it will never be the original because the original is gone. For invisuality this implies that the absence can never completely recapture the essence of that which is absent, but it can point to the aura of the original. With this in mind, let's turn now to the Berlin Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe.

⁶ Walter Benjamin, *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction* [Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit, 1935], Prism Key Press, 2010.

4. Berlin Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe

Imagine walking down the Ebertstraße in Berlin from the Reichstag, the seat of German government, past the Brandenburg Gate and about a block later, you come across a field of 2,711 stelae or cement slabs that look like pillars. These stelae are tall and short yet spaced evenly in rows – almost five acres of them. Coming from the Brandenburg Gate, you may or may not see a sign explaining what you are seeing, as the sign is on the small side, hidden in the shade of a tree. You have stumbled upon the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, otherwise known as the Holocaust Memorial.

Dedicated in May 2005, after seventeen years of debate, the memorial was designed by the Jewish American architect Peter Eisenman and his work is an example of a non-traditional memorial made popular by Maya Lin's Vietnam Veteran's Memorial in Washington, D.C. Berlin's Holocaust Memorial is by necessity non-traditional. After all, how often do the perpetrators build a memorial to their victims?⁷ In the debate over the selection of American architect Peter Eisenman's design, the memorial committee noted the elements that were absent in the original design. Namely, there was no history about the Holocaust attached to the memorial. Further, the bare stelae lacked the traditional listing of names that accompanies most memorials.

As is often the case with controversial memorials, a compromise was reached and an interpretive center was added to the design. The interpretive center is underground so as not to interrupt the field of stelae. The center offers a timeline of the Holocaust the visitor walks through and ends with a database listing the victims.

What I wish to focus on, for the purpose of this essay, is the absence of names in the memorial proper. The nature of the mem-

⁷ For a discussion of the creation of the mural, see the architect's account in Peter Eisenman, *Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe*. Leo Baeck Institute, 2006.

orial is complex as a visitor experiences feelings of claustrophobia and confusion as one wanders through the field. It is easy to get lost as one meanders through the center of the memorial. The intention was to allow the viewer to experience some of the feelings associated with being separated from family and sent to unknown destinations. However, how can a memorial elicit the feelings of those victimized by the Holocaust?

The absence of names also creates a feeling of inadequacy in the memorial. As Richard Brody suggests in *The New Yorker*⁸:

It would have been fitting for six million names to be engraved, individually, into the stelae – maybe individual Germans could have volunteered to take part in the engraving. ... And if abstraction were deemed absolutely necessary, why not six million stelae to convey that there were six million individual people who were treated with savage contempt by Germany and its satellites? The very act of manufacturing, counting, and placing them would embody something of the scale of the crimes.

This abstraction in the memorial, as a rhetorical choice, denies the visitor the aura of the original suffering. Consequently, the invisibility of the actual victims of the Holocaust denies the viewer a true accounting of the magnitude of the Holocaust. While traditional memorials reveal elements of those who were lost (absent), the Berlin Holocaust Memorial fails to call to mind the tragedy of those absent.

An alternative interpretation of the absence of names is the desire on the part of Nazi Germany to erase Jews from the landscape. In this regard the memorial achieves those ends. Perhaps, while the aura of the individual is not represented because the names are not visible, the aura of the Holocaust itself becomes abundantly clear. The absence of names reinforces the extermination of Jews as the purpose of Hitler's Final Solution. Perhaps, more importantly, the

⁸ See <https://www.newyorker.com/culture/richard-brody/the-inadequacy-of-berlins-memorial-to-the-murdered-jews-of-europe>.

ambiguity in possible interpretations of the memorial reflects Germany's own struggle to adequately memorialize that which they themselves wrought.

5. Conclusions

The purpose of this essay is to explore the extension of a theory of invisuality by illuminating the possibility of omission as a rhetorical strategy. To those ends, examining the Berlin Holocaust Memorial suggests the complex utility of omission in invoking the aura of that which is absent. While absence has been considered in the visual realm, the theory of invisuality suggests a perspective for understanding omission as an effective persuasive tool.

James J. Kimble

Vectors, Left-Right Directionality, and Time: An Exploratory Analysis

1. Introduction

One of the quickest ways to grasp the basic principles of Kress and Van Leeuwen's notion of image vectors¹ is to apply it to the famous Iwo Jima photograph (see Figure 1). In doing so, it is clear at a glance that the image's ascending flagpole is a vector. To wit, the pole functions as a directional cue along which the viewer's eyes can naturally move at a dynamic angle. The flagpole, Kress and Van Leeuwen would suggest, thus anchors a narrative moment, with the soldiers as dramatic protagonists straining along the prominent axis of the vector to pierce the Other's territory.



Figure 1: Raising the Flag on Iwo Jima is a photograph taken by Joe Rosenthal on February 23, 1945, which depicts United States Marines raising a U.S. flag during the Battle of Iwo Jima.

¹ Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen, *Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design*, New York: Routledge, 1996, see esp. pp. 40–47 and 57–75.

As Schilperoord observes, a vital aspect of the photograph's potency lies in the "left-right orientation" of its flagpole-as-vector. From the viewer's perspective, the action transpires from left to right, signifying a narrative shift "from past to future".² This orientational implication is likely unconscious for most viewers. However, it is immediately more apparent by contrast: if one reverses the photograph (see Figure 2) so that the vector's directional cue suddenly moves from right to left, "a lot of its pictorial impact gets lost" in the unfamiliar orientation.³ With the sudden reversal of the vector, in other words, the once-powerful photo feels listless and out of place.



Figure 2

In this chapter I forward an explanation for the impotence of the reversed Iwo Jima image, for the power of the more familiar original photo, and – in a more general sense – for the visual mechanics of narrative images. The central factor in my explanation is the role of horizontal directionality in the vectors of those images. Specifically, I maintain that horizontal directionality is inevitably

² Joost Schilperoord, "Raising the Issue: A Mental-Space Approach to Iwo Jima-Inspired Editorial Cartoons", *Metaphor and Symbol* 28 (2013), pp. 185–212, quotations from p. 192.

³ *Ibid.*

fused with the viewer's conceptualization of time, a connection that enriches our understanding of vectors and how they function. While the role of time has occasionally served as a subtext in discussions of Kress and van Leeuwen's notion, here I offer a deeper scrutiny of that pairing.

2. An Anatomy of Vectors

In their book, Kress and Van Leeuwen draw on a number of previous works to introduce the idea of *vectors*. Their initial point is that some still images tell stories. As opposed to *conceptual images*, which highlight visual elements in a moment of "stable and timeless essence", *narrative images* involve "processes of change". Although they are unmoving, such images encourage the viewer's mind to intuit a background context for the depicted scene as well as to predict a course of events subsequent to its singular moment.⁴

Kress and Van Leeuwen then offer a number of useful details about the characteristics of narrative images. *Action*, for instance, is a crucial marker. The viewer can see immediately that something is happening in the image, whether it is a deed, a gesture, or an activity. The people (or things) who bring the action to life in the scene are *Participants*. Some Participants are *Actors*; they are the most salient Participants because their action predominates within the image. Other Participants are *Goals*; it is they "*to whom* the action is done, or *at whom* the action is aimed". Narrative images therefore depict a *transaction* in which the Actor is taking action in a way that targets the Goal.⁵

The unifying factor among these elements is the vector, which connects Actors and Goals, and thereby reveals patterns of causality,

⁴ Kress and Van Leeuwen, *Reading Images*, p. 79. For earlier resources that informed their conception, see Rudolf Arnheim, *The Power of the Center*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982, and M. A. K. Halliday, *Language as Social Semiotic: The Social Interpretation of Language and Meaning*, London: Edward Arnold, 1978.

⁵ See the discussion in Kress and Van Leeuwen, pp. 61–64; the quotation is from p. 62.

relationships, or implied motion. In the Iwo Jima image, for instance, the Marines are the Actors while the Japanese soil is the Goal. The transaction is a violent penetration, or an invasive thrust, whereby the Actors are forcing their will upon the target. The flagpole serves as the highly visible vector that connects the Participants and characterizes the nature of the action.

Vectors are not always as obvious as the Iwo Jima flagpole, of course. As Kress and Van Leeuwen's many examples indicate, one can identify a vector in elements as varied as arrows, sun rays, gestures, and motion lines. A given image's vector might even be *implied* rather than visible, as in the imbalanced pose of a character, a purposeful eye gaze, or what cartoonists term the "path of action" in a drawing.⁶ For every image whose vectors are easily apparent, there is a contrasting image whose vectors remain implicit.

Whether obvious or implied, however, vectors provide a useful means of analyzing the dynamic meanings hidden within narrative images. Acting as orienting forces, they "direct the viewer's eye to specific aspects of the image" even as they "provide valuable clues about the relationship between various compositional elements".⁷ They are, in sum, a potent way of visually encoding action and the relationships among disparate aspects of a given visual. Yet as the reversed Iwo Jima image suggests, a vector with an unexpected positioning can be confounding. In the next section, I contend that this problem is a factor of our perceptions of time in relationship to the horizontal axis.

3. Directionality, Time, and Vectors

Schilperoord's earlier connection of the Iwo Jima flagpole's "left-right orientation" with a narrative shift "from past to future" is

⁶ Norman M. Klein, *Seven Minutes: The Life and Death of the American Animated Cartoon*, New York: Verso, 1993, p. 224.

⁷ Charles Goehring, Valerie Renegar, and Laura Puhl, "'Abusive Furniture': Visual Metonymy and the Hungarian Stop Violence Against Women Campaign", *Women's Studies in Communication* 40 (2017), pp. 440–457, quotation on p. 443.

wonderfully suggestive.⁸ It points to an important connection that is either missing or passed over quickly in discussions of vectors: directionality and the viewer's conceptualization of depicted time. Simply put, because narratives typically feature a beginning, middle, and end, a narrative image encourages the viewer to contextualize the depicted moment by imagining the events that have lead up to it and those that will follow it. A horizontal vector, in turn, can function as a temporal locus within the image, inviting the viewer to plot those imagined narrative moments along its axis.




Figure 3

Consider, for example, the narrative image in Figure 3. One of four pendentives on Michelangelo's Sistine Chapel, it portrays a singular moment from the biblical story of David and Goliath. Even those unfamiliar with the plot can quickly intuit the ongoing action: momentarily, David will use the sword to sever Goliath's head. Note that Michelangelo has placed the sword at the left side of the image,

⁸ Schilperoord, *op. cit.*

with the giant's head situated lower and to the right. If the sword's current position represents the present moment, then its imminent destination, Goliath's neck, represents a future moment. This present moment and future moment are connected by an obvious vector, formed both by David's gaze and by the line extending along his outstretched arms. The vector is not perfectly horizontal, to be sure. However, it clearly flows to the viewer's right. The implication is unmistakable: in this image, at least, time flows from left to right, implacably moving in a rightward direction along with the incipient slash of David's sword.

As it turns out, Michelangelo was invoking a routine visual trope. Numerous fields of inquiry indicate that time, at least in most Western cultures, tends to be understood as flowing into the future from left to right. Examples are plentiful. In mathematics, for instance, the Cartesian coordinate system frequently features an *X*-axis where time, typically an independent variable, places earlier events to the left and subsequent events to the right. The psychologists Santiago, Román, Ouellet, Rodríguez, and Pérez-Azor find that mental representations of movie sequences seem to flow from left to right. The historian Plamper speculates that in Soviet iconography, Lenin ordinarily appears to the left, "thus in the place marked as beginning", while Stalin appears to the right, "the place of ending". Business professors Chae and Hogg conclude that the marketing of products tends to follow "a spatial representation of time" in which "the past is visualized on the left and the future is visualized on the right". And, in the area of visual cognition, Walter points to an association of lateral movement with a "rightward bias ... in still images" while – importantly – static subjects tend to have a neutral bias or even a *right-left* orientation.⁹

⁹ Julio Santiago, Antonio Román, Marc Ouellet, Nieves Rodríguez, and Pilar Pérez-Azor, "In Hindsight, Life Flows from Left to Right", *Psychological Research* 74 (2010), pp. 59–70; Jan Plamper, *The Stalin Cult: A Study in the Alchemy of Power*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012, p. 73; Boyoun (Grace) Chae and Joandrea Hoegg, "The Future Looks 'Right': Effects of the Horizontal Location of Advertising Images on Product Attitude", *Journal of Consumer Research* 40 (2013), pp. 223–238, quotation on p. 223; Peter Walker,

Even our routine life experiences tend to exhibit this association of time's forward-moving orientation with a rightward directionality (or, in tandem, a leftward directionality if one is imagining a reversal of time). Stock market tickers and EKG heart readings record specific moments from left to right. Cartoon strips similarly depict events as transpiring in a rightward direction. Interestingly, even italic fonts, by leaning to the viewer's right, convey a sense of forward motion. Conceived spatially, therefore, events typically unfold in a left to right direction from the viewer's perspective. Kress and Van Leeuwen even acknowledge this idea when they note that left-side elements in an image have "already given" meanings while right-side elements are "new".¹⁰ However, this revealing suggestion is, for some reason, unconnected to their earlier discussion of vectors.

How, then, can one characterize the relationship between the horizontal axis and time from the perspective of an image's viewer? To generalize from this wide-ranging series of clues, it is possible to forward some conjectures:

1. The horizontal axis is a locus of time conceptualization in narrative images.
2. The past is typically depicted to the left, the future to the right.
3. Rightward directionality connotes movement into the future.
4. Leftward directionality connotes a static state or movement into the past.¹¹

If these conjectures hold consistently, then Kress and Van Leeuwen's notion of vectors is necessarily implicated. Vectors, after

"Depicting Visual Motion in Still Images: Forward Leaning and a Left to Right Bias for Lateral Movement", *Perception* 44 (2015), pp. 111–128, quotation on p. 124.

¹⁰ Kress and van Leeuwen, pp. 186–187.

¹¹ Many scholars connect this left-right phenomenon to the process of reading. Some cultures, of course, read in a *right-left* direction. In such cultures, appropriately, horizontal directionality appears to depict time as flowing to the left. See Marc Ouellet, Julio Santiago, Ziv Israeli, and Shai Gabay, "Is the Future the Right Time?", *Experimental Psychology* 57 (2010), pp. 308–314.

all, are visible or implied lines that are apparent to the viewer, if only at a subconscious level. It is not difficult to see that when vectors in a narrative image appear along a horizontal axis (or, at least, an axis whose movement clearly flows to the left or to the right), a viewer is then liable to overlay those vectors with an imagined chronological sequence. Just as with the Iwo Jima photo, or with Michelangelo's pendentive, the vectors fall neatly into a perceivable progression of time. The result is the impression of motion and narrative development – despite the still nature of the images themselves.

4. Vectors, Time, and WWII Posters: A Brief Series of Cases

The discussion so far has hopefully made a convincing case that vectors have an association with the viewer's perception of the flow of time in a given image. In concluding, I offer several examples of this association from my own area of research: the imagery of the U.S. home front in WWII. I draw from a population of 108 posters presented online by the Norman Rockwell Museum for an interactive exhibition feature called *Potent Pictures: The Propaganda Posters of World War II*.¹²

Within that population of posters, depictions of American soldiers in combat situations routinely feature rightward vectors, with the Actors looking, leaning, or rushing toward (an often offstage) Goal in an immediate future. "Back 'Em Up with *More Metal*" (see Figure 4) is a good example. Here two soldiers look rightward, their gazes and weapons serving as vectors that point to the unseen enemy to the viewer's right. Private Joe Louis (see Figure 5) is not gazing to the right, but his body leans that way, and his weapon provides a clear vector toward that same enemy in his immediate future. In both

¹² I worked with the museum to create this interactive throughout 2017 as part of its traveling international exhibition *Enduring Ideals: Rockwell, Roosevelt, & the Four Freedoms*, see <https://rockwellfourfreedoms.org/topic/posters/>. While the collection covers a number of categories of war-era posters, it is of course a convenience sample.

Vectors and Left-Right Directionality

cases, the vectors encourage a perception of rightward movement into a future moment of combat.



Figure 4



Figure 5

Depictions of domestic activities, in contrast, tend to exhibit leftward vectors. If movement depicting a soldier's imminent clash with the enemy is usually to the viewer's right, then scenes of the home front often feature American characters looking in the opposite direction. Consider "Civil Air Patrol" (see Figure 6), which presents a home front pilot whose gaze parallels both the text ("Eyes of the Home Skies") and the distant horizon in looking intently to the left.



Figure 6



Figure 7

Similarly, "America Calling" (see Figure 7) features a fierce eagle in leftward flight, the vector marked by its gaze, positioning, and several horizontal strips. In both cases, the home front events are moving not toward the battlefronts but rather away from them, toward a depicted home front – a conceptual place in the distant past of the nation's combatants. This reversed orientation also appears for military personnel who are in static positions, such as in "A Strange Sort of Prayer" (see Figure 8), which presents a combat soldier who has stopped to contemplate the death of a comrade.

Interestingly, two posters in the exhibition show battlefront soldiers whose vectors indicate a strong leftward movement, even

Vectors and Left-Right Directionality




Figure 8

though they seem to be engaged in imminent action. Here the enemy appears to be to the viewer's left (see Figures 9 and 10). The exception becomes understandable when one considers that both posters are American portrayals of Allies understood to be “down under”, to



Figure 9



Figure 10

use slang that was already popular at the time. If poster artists conceptualized the battlefield to be to the right for American troops, it makes sense that they would conceive of it as being to the left for those Allies situated on the opposite side of the world (and, thus, on the opposite side of the enemy).

Nonetheless, such posters appear to be anomalies within the exhibition's collection. Instead, the general rule seems to be that battlefield actions are depicted along rightward vectors into an imminent future engagement, while both home front and wholly contemplative activities emerge along leftward vectors, indicating an imagined space associated with the past of America's combatants. Even Uncle Sam, as in Figures 11 and 12, follows this implicit visual logic.



Figure 11



Figure 12

Therefore, it makes sense that the Iwo Jima photo is potent in its original version, and less so when reversed. For viewers in most Western cultures, at least, seeing the flag-raising in the context of a leftward vector would seem to connote a reflective or home front-related activity – an association that would contradict the dynamic of the image itself. In contrast, when the famous photo appears within

Vectors and Left-Right Directionality

its original, left-to-right orientation, the rightward vector appropriately matches the action and its movement into a future moment. In the eyes of American viewers in 1945, it would seem, such an orientation was not only natural, but also magnified the potency of the famous image. The visual mechanics of its left-right vector, in other words, might have drawn from an age-old trope of horizontal directionality in order to unconsciously activate the perception of time in the eyes of its millions of viewers.

Izabella Grexa

Photography and Autobiography

1. Some Thoughts about Photography, Everyday Life and Research

Pictures, photos and visuals play an ever larger role. Social sciences look at these objects as valuable sources and not only as illustrations. Applying visual sources for talking of links between society, individuals and pictures has been a practice in the field of ethnography and anthropology for decades. Beside specific themes that pictures portray, one may learn more about family and relationships, value systems and strategy of life. The social network that represents the importance of relationships is a distinguished target in the investigation of photographs. In an analysis of the way of life, photographs are important because they represent the environment of ordinary people, farmers and workers:

...at the same time, it fixes, reflects and documents the culture of the society studied. Apart from studio photos, amateur photography became more and more important as amateur photographers took pictures of their respective social groups. The simple technology and the affordability of the craft allowed photography to become popular. It became a visual language accessible to a number of social groups; it became possible for more families, small social groups, to cultivate their own public and private myths. For example with public and private photographs: family, social and team albums, photographs become interior design objects, and piles of photographs were preserved in candy boxes, prayer books in the form of photograph bundles.¹

¹ Ernő Kunt, *Fotóantropológia: Fényképezés és kultúrakutatás* [Photo-Anthropology: Photography and Cultural Research], Miskolc – Budapest: Árkádus Press,

In my paper I am going to examine how a photo collection is able to represent a marginalized labour woman, Erzsébet Király's everyday life, taking into consideration her social background and including her written reminiscences. In this paper, the entire heritage will not be presented. Instead, the reader will be introduced to some main items of this special picture collection.

2. Photo Heritage and Personality

Király's everyday life is documented broadly and reflected by her memoir, diary, letters and circa two hundred mostly black and white private photographs.² As an orphan, without any family ties, moving from flat to flat, changing her workplaces, photographs played important roles in Király's life, confirming her identity and status in her social group. She was at a loss without these photos as she mentioned describing an unfortunate event in her diary:

One morning I put a gold chain, twenty-four thousand forints and four various silver chains into my handbag because I wanted to buy a telly. I was about to go to work, but I had to leave my flat for a moment since the water tap was next the toilet. I carried the water from there to my flat. I took the bucket full of water and placed it where I always kept it. I wanted to leave when I did not find my handbag, only a plastic bag, in which there was circa one thousand and five hundred forints that the cloak room girl used to change for me at the post office. I had no choice just to go to work. The sneaky thief was lucky. When I finished my work in the shop for the day, I went to the police station. One month later, I was informed by a police officer that they did not find the thief. Of course they

1995, p. 28. – The period from the 1920s to the beginning of the 1940s could be characterized as a new intensive phase in the development of photo technique. Amateur photos appeared and they have taken over the role of the professional ones. We may date the breakthrough of this field to the second part of 20th century.

² The heritage was found in a flat in the 7th district of Budapest in 2009, and it is my own property.

didn't, because they had not done anything. I was in distress because my private documents and my irreplaceable photographs were also in my handbag. I used to show my pictures and prided myself how beautiful I used to be.³

In her diary, Király wrote many times about the occasions when photos were taken. On the back of most photos, there are notes, names or dates, so the identifying of personalities and places was relatively simple. The photographs were arranged in two photo albums in her heritage. It seems that one of the photo albums in particular was perused a lot over the years, the other one is a newer one depicting Teddy bears. The photographs are not in chronological order, but were placed in accordance with their theme. Király's figure is found on one hundred and eighteen photographs out of two hundred and eighteen. We can distinguish four major themes: self-portraits, pictures of her social groups, portraits of her friends and acquaintances and pictures of her friends' children. These photographs lend visibility to Király's past. Private photo collections are suitable for introducing closed microworlds and local societies. Her heritage contains some studio photos, but most pictures were taken on different social occasions, spontaneously. Someone of her circle of friends had a camera and shot some pictures. Maybe this is the explanation why she did not have photos of the heyday of her life, for example her wedding ceremonies.

Amateur photographers caught the moment well: they chronicled the picnic and the sunbath with friends with skill. There were two brothers in the social circle who had a camera: "Janika Sz. was the same age as me and a had pretty face, he would have liked to have me as his girlfriend, but we were only friends. I also liked his older brother. They took a lot of photos of us that remained with me as memory."⁴ (See Figure 1.)

³ Izabella Grexa (ed.), *Erzsébet Király, Kedves naplóm! Egy munkásasszony emlékei* [Dear Diary of Mine: The Reminiscences of a Laborer Woman], Budapest: Corvina Press, 2015, p. 171.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 45.



Figure 1

3. Social Environment

Király lived during the Communist and post-Communist era. In the present paper, her life is analyzed in the following social framework: She lived without a strong and reliable social network. Her social position was further weakened by the low esteem of female labour and its consequences: low wages and a general weakness of advocacy. The Communist transformation was characterized by the post-war period of Soviet occupation, the reconstruction of political relations, and nationalization. The reconstruction process did affect not only the political and economic elite, but the lower classes, such as peasants and industrial workers, as well. The regime undermined traditional industrial workers' privileges at the workplace through work competition, new waging forms, and different management structures. At the same time, the regime pushed to expand the labour market, which reordered the hierarchy of genders, generations, and

urban-rural relations. A sociologist known for his research on poverty in Hungary, István Kemény explained in the 1970s:

the closed culture of the working class of the previous generation is breaking up today: the Hungarian working class is not a closed social strata with clear traditions, clear coherence system, but rather a huge camp of people on the move. Half of the working class has turned from a farmer into industrial worker, living between traditional and urban lifestyle. But those who were born as industrial workers are on the road between old and new types of working life. Some of them become line managers, foremen, technicians or engineers, some are employed in the laboratory of the plant or in service workplaces, still others look for part-time positions, and live the most important part of their life outside the factory; one way or another, most of them depart from traditional lifestyle.⁵

Considering women's employment in the beginning of the 1970s, their proportion was the highest in the light industry; it was 60% percent. This percentage was 34% in the heavy industry and 47% in the food industry. 60% of women working in industry were semi-skilled, 23% skilled and 17% unskilled. In 1972, women's wages were 34% lower than men's, on average: 45% lower in administration and 31% in blue collar jobs. In 1972, men's wages were found higher than women's wages in 32 different jobs. Female advocacy was weak. Even though women took part in trade unions and various other social organizations, this did not mean effective support for women workers to fight lower wages, ordering overtime work and demand more social care.⁶

⁵ István Kemény, "A magyar munkásosztály rétegződése" [The Hungarian Working Class' Social Stratification], *Szociológia*, vol. 1, no. 1 (1972), p. 39.

⁶ Júlia Turgonyi – Zsuzsa Ferge, *Az ipari munkásnők munka- és életkörülményei* [Work Conditions and Life Circumstances of Industry Women Workers], Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1969, pp. 32–33; *Adatgyűjtemény a kereső nőkről* [Data Collection about Employed Women], Budapest: Central Statistical Office, 1977: I-IV attachments.

4. Király's Private Life

Király was born in 1942 in the countryside as a child of an agricultural servant, out of wedlock. Without an income, her mother was not able to raise her, and thus she was brought up in an orphanage, first, at Budapest Magyar Királyi Állami Gyermekmenhely, then at the children's home in Nagyvárád and, finally, with foster parents. After World War II, she lived in Debrecen's rural neighbourhood: first, she stayed with foster parents, then she spent her teenage years in a girls' home in Hajdúnánás. Having graduated from the professional textile training school at Szeged in 1959, she, just like her former schoolmates, became an industrial worker in Budapest. She started working as a weaver at the Csillaghegyi Lenáru in Budapest, later worked in the telecommunications industry and heavy-industry as well. In the first half of the 1970s, she left the industrial factories in the hope that she would find easier work and higher wages. She was employed in the catering industry. She found a job as a waitress at a fancy restaurant, but later on she worked at different run-down pubs. In the 1970s Erzsébet Király became marginalized. Her private life was getting more and more confused having to do with the fact that the regular customers at her workplace in suburban pubs came from the margins of society; the suburbs offered her degraded living conditions. She had a limited number of opportunities to change her life – this contributed to dismantling her private life and her social marginalization.⁷ Erzsébet Király's way of life may be characterized as a series of attempts to break out and failure. We may interpret her frequent migration from one workplace to another workplace, from rented room to another rented space as an imprint of

⁷ In peripheral social strata the self-destructive lifestyle – suicide and alcoholism – were regular aspects. The political power considered these as a social taboo. There were attempts at treating these social problems in the 1960s, as for example in István Kemény's investigations of marginalized social groups and poverty. The Hungarian Central Statistical Office sometimes made surveys, examined these social problems, but the head of Hungarian Central Statistical Office stopped the surveys in the early 1970s. Studies were continued only in the beginning of the 1980s, rebranded as examination of underprivileged groups.

this life story. About these years she confessed problems of alcoholism, depression and suicide attempts in her diary. Apart from her photo heritage, there are written reminiscences about her life.

In her private life, she divorced twice and she had uncountable affairs but she was not able to keep long-term relationships. Although she got married two times, she did not have photographs of the ceremony. We may argue that neither the bride nor the groom attributed the wedding such an importance that they would go to a photo studio as was customary of that age or invited a friend who had a camera. The part describing one of the weddings supports this hypothesis:

I woke up to beautiful sunshine in the morning. I prepared myself for the ceremony. I put on my tight red linen dress that I had painted black. I had not told even the neighbouring lodgers that I was preparing for my wedding. I was sure they would laugh at me for this black dress. While I was waiting, it became hot. I thought I should have bought seven bottles of beer. The coffee was not yet regular at that time and I could not have made coffee without a gas cooker anyway. Poor uncle Vili came in a suit in this hot weather and he had gotten tired also because the street was steep. But he arrived, finally. I made him sit on my bed because I did not have much space and I offered him a glass of cold water. When he took a rest he told me enthusiastically that he had bought lot of things for her daughter's wedding. I had an old alarm clock I looked at it and I was little afraid as Gyuri was late and I would have been embarrassed at the town council. Finally, he appeared along with his mother with a smile on his face. I gave them a glass of water, too. Gyuri brought a bunch of flowers for me, but they were not exactly pretty; weeds in a garden look more beautiful than these ones did. Finally, I told them to hurry up because we were running late. "You were afraid that I would not come – Gyuri said. I did not want to upset Gyuri's mood saying I was afraid of the council not of him not turning up, so I said nothing"⁸

Erzsébet preserved the photos of her husbands. One of the photos taken of her first husband and herself was cut in two pieces (Figure 2). It is common that in case of disappointment or rancor the lover's image is torn from a photograph. I suppose this photo was tak-

⁸ Grexa (ed.), *Erzsébet Király*, p. 67.

en by a professional photographer at some time before or after the wedding ceremony. There is no photo of her and her second husband, although the photo heritage contains photographs of him together with his friends or co-workers (Figure 3).



Figure 2



Figure 3

5. Photos and Her Broad Social Background

The photographs in some cases also represent Király's social group. There are a lot of photographs of the group of friends and acquaintances during the time she was working as a factory worker. Moreover, there is preserved a picture about her and her co-worker nearby the loom machine (Figure 4). The rules of taking photos in factory areas were pretty strict, and photos were taken mostly for propaganda



Figure 4

purposes. With the purpose of community building, employers and institutions of the party state influenced also how employees spent their free time. We know from archival documents that the Hungarian Young Communist League at one of Király's workplaces organized trips to the countryside and to the satellite neighbour countries. Her photographs mainly represent her and her friends' and co-

workers' leisure time. I found a photograph of Király's which may have been taken on the occasion of such a trip to a holiday resort building in Agárd near the Lake Velence (Figure 5).



Figure 5

One of her friends took a whole series of photographs of the important party's festival, 1 May picnic (see Figure 6):

I took part in the procession that the factory organized on 1st of May in 1961 for the first time. It was cold, and I had enough money by that time to have a decollated tight red dress made for myself. I put it on with a white loafer and a black coat that I inherited from the girl who was made to be infuriated with me in Szeged with a nylon scarf around my neck and a paper flag in my hand. Gyuri O. appeared next me with whom I used to dance a lot but we were only good friends. He stood by me and he made his friend take some photos of us.⁹

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 40.



Figure 6

There are no photographs of the period while she was working as a barmaid; no photos of her workplace, only her leisure time at home, at her acquaintances' or a public space. Some of them depict her and her friends leading a loose life (see e.g. Figure 7), confirmed by her written memoirs. After 1989, she became a pensioner and lived alone with her dog, who was her only true friend. We can see her in a picture among her photographs and memorable souvenirs that were at display on the wall of the living-room (Figure 8). Recall that in farmers' homes we also find a wall adorned with photos, tiny souvenirs and perhaps a mirror. These "memory walls" were located in the living-room where the photos were hanged around the window, mirror, and icon.

6. Summary

The act to evoke her reminiscences through writing a diary, letters, and preserving photos meant joy to her. Also because she felt she had unconsciously left traces of her life for posterity. She created her identity and constructed herself and her past over and over again. In Király's society, taking photos was a spontaneous act and depended on



Figure 7



Figure 8

whether someone had a camera at the specific social gathering. She did not create visual memories of memorable occasions. At the same time, photographs were the prints of the past and had an important part of maintaining or reinterpreting her identity.

Erik P. Bucy

The Vulnerability of Images to Diverse Interpretation: Issue Attitudes, Visual Framing, and Individualized Readings

1. Introduction

The pictorial turn in education follows, rightly, the rise of images in society¹ as icons of social-political messaging, vessels of persuasive intent, and valuable forms of social information for citizens of increasingly harried societies. To a large extent, public understanding of and attitudes toward important policy issues hinge on the media messaging about them – and, centrally, the imaging used in that messaging. Issue understanding depends not just on the volume of available information, whose provision is assumed to fill a supposed “deficit” in knowledge, but how important developments are *framed in media*.² Given the cultural ubiquity and psychological accessibility of images,³ how issues are visually framed in public communication should occupy a central place in our thinking about persuasion.

The following analysis considers two case studies that illustrate the ways in which images convey meaning and contribute to understanding about controversial issues—hydraulic fracturing (fracking) in the U.S. and Syrian refugees in Europe—independent of a narrative text about the issue (e.g., news coverage). While both case stud-

¹ Mitchell Stephens, *The Rise of the Image, the Fall of the Word*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

² Matthew C. Nisbet, “Communicating Climate Change: Why Frames Matter for Public Engagement”, *Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development*, vol. 51, no. 2 (2009), pp. 12–23.

³ Maria Elizabeth Grabe and Erik Page Bucy, *Image Bite Politics: News and the Visual Framing of Elections*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

ies address highly charged issues, they vary significantly in their degree of familiarity. There is a general lack of awareness about fracking among members of the public who are not immediately impacted by this newly enhanced method of extracting oil and gas, and considerable ambivalence exists towards the practice,⁴ but there is relatively high awareness of the refugee crisis among citizens of European countries that are potential recipients of asylum seekers – and much more issue certainty.⁵

2. The Interpretive Process

The wider opinion environment plays a vital role in shaping the acceptance or rejection of social policies. Public attitudes are formed in large part through media coverage, of which visuals are a consequential element.⁶ Additionally, values such as political ideology and moral outlook have been shown to impact the formation of attitudes.⁷ When individuals derive meaning from images, they engage in an interactive process driven in part by the stimulus properties of the visual and their prior knowledge, political and moral commitments, and situatedness.⁸ This dynamic interplay between image features and individual characteristics discounts the idea of a fixed relationship between an image and a monolithic interpretation; rather, view-

⁴ Hilary Boudet, Christopher Clarke, Dylan Bugden, Edward Maibach, Connie Roser-Renouf, and Anthony Leiserowitz, “‘Fracking’ Controversy and Communication: Using National Survey Data to Understand Public Perceptions of Hydraulic Fracturing”, *Energy Policy*, vol. 65, issue C (2014), pp. 57–67.

⁵ Jacob Poushter, “European Opinions of the Refugee Crisis in 5 Charts”, Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, (16 September 2016), <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/16/european-opinions-of-the-refugee-crisis-in-5-charts/>.

⁶ Grabe and Bucy, *op. cit.*

⁷ Shirley S. Ho, Dominique Brossard, and Dietram A. Scheufele, “Effects of Value Predispositions, Mass Media Use, and Knowledge on Public Attitudes toward Embryonic Stem Cell Research”, *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, vol. 20, no. 2 (2008), pp. 171–192.

⁸ Amber Krause and Erik P. Bucy, “Visual Framing of Fracking: How Standing Attitudes Shape Perceptions of Environmental Risk and Economic Benefit”, *Environmental Communication*, vol. 12, no. 3 (2018), pp. 322–343.

ers bring their unique perspectives shaped by their attitudinal priors and individual histories to bear on the image interpretation process.⁹

2.1. Polysemy

The late social theorist Stuart Hall described polysemy as the capacity of a constituted sign, such as a framed image, to carry more than one meaning.¹⁰ In a widely referenced model of encoding/decoding, he argued that scholars should identify the patterns associated with message interpretation through different types of readings, or attempts at comprehension. For any given message (image), he maintained, three readings are possible: dominant, negotiated, and oppositional. Dominant readings occur when an audience decodes a message in line with the source's intended meaning, whereas a negotiated reading recognizes the dominant or intended code but adapts the meaning based on individual or localized interpretations. An oppositional reading occurs when an audience dismisses the dominant code completely and reconstructs meaning in a contradictory way.¹¹ Because environmental and other scientifically oriented issues (e.g., nanotechnology or climate science) often lack visibility and detailed public understanding, visual representations of these issues are vulnerable to diverse interpretations.

2.2. Visual Framing

The mechanism through which images presented in news accounts promote particularized interpretations is the visual frame. Frames are modes of presentation that journalists employ to highlight certain aspects of a perceived reality over others, thereby encouraging pre-

⁹ Stephanie Geise and Christian Baden, "Putting the Image Back into the Frame: Modeling the Linkage between Visual Communication and Frame-Processing Theory", *Communication Theory*, vol. 25, no. 1 (2015), pp. 46–69.

¹⁰ Stuart Hall, "Encoding/decoding", in Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (ed.), *Culture, Media, Language: Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972–1979*, London: Routledge, 1980, pp. 128–138.

¹¹ Hall, *op. cit.*

ferred understandings of issues or events.¹² Although citizen concerns about energy sources and immigration can vary broadly,¹³ and diverge considerably from stock media narratives, news about these issues is routinely presented in terms of well-trodden frames of reference to provide a common basis of understanding. With fracking, economic benefit versus environmental risk framing is predominant,¹⁴ whereas with immigration and refugees, depictions are often framed in terms of individual responsibility (i.e., culpability versus victimization) and, in the case of children and other vulnerable groups, the distress they are experiencing due to displacement.¹⁵

As individuals take stock of salient issues in the news, visual frames are often interpreted to correspond with viewer preconceptions and experiences.¹⁶ Individuals in such instances process visual frames in accordance with their prior attitudes.¹⁷ When attitudes are not well defined, as in the case of fracking, media framing becomes a salient consideration, particularly among those who are undecided about the practice. We would therefore expect media framing to drive image interpretation. When attitudes about issues are fairly fixed and

¹² Maria Elizabeth Grabe and Erik P. Bucy, "Image Bite Analysis of Political Visuals: Understanding the Visual Framing Process in Election News", in Erik P. Bucy & R. Lance Holbert (eds.), *Sourcebook for Political Communication Research: Methods, Measures, and Analytical Techniques*, New York: Routledge, 2011, pp. 209–237.

¹³ Laurence Williams, Phil Macnaghten, Richard Davies, and Sarah Curtis, "Framing 'Fracking': Exploring Public Perceptions of Hydraulic Fracturing in the United Kingdom", *Public Understanding of Science*, vol. 26, no. 1 (2017), pp. 89–104.

¹⁴ Richard Buttny and Andrea M. Feldpausch-Parker, "Communicating Hydro-fracking", *Environmental Communication*, vol. 10, no. 3 (2016), pp. 289–291.

¹⁵ Delia Dumitrescu and Erik P. Bucy, "How Images of War Victims Affect Public Opinion and Political Participation", paper presented to the Midwest Political Science Association, Political Psychology Division, Chicago, IL, April 2017.

¹⁶ Doris A. Graber, "Say It with Pictures", *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 546, no. 1 (1996), pp. 85–96.

¹⁷ Laura M. Arpan, Kaysee Baker, Youngwon Lee, Taejin Jung, Lori Lorusso, and Jason Smith, "News Coverage of Social Protests and the Effects of Photographs and Prior Attitudes", *Mass Communication and Society*, vol. 9, no. 1 (2006), pp. 1–20.

cognitively accessible, however, as in the case of refugee displacement and relocation efforts, media framing likely has a more subdued influence and *intervening factors* like emotional response are bound to come to the fore. Two studies serve to illustrate these expectations.

3. Images of Fracking

In recent years, enhanced forms of energy production have received outsized attention and media coverage, drawing the scrutiny of activists and policy makers around the globe. The news media's increased reliance on visual communication to illustrate complex processes and promote learning stresses the importance of investigating how visual content impacts the understanding of scientific issues.¹⁸ In this study, we investigate how members of the public interpret and make sense of differentially framed images of fracking. Understanding how individuals attribute individualized meanings to images of oil and gas extraction takes on social significance due to uncertain public support for the issue, concern about potential impacts, lack of widespread knowledge surrounding the science, and the sometimes ambiguous or polysemic quality of the images used to depict the issue in public debate.

3.1. Methodology

Consistent with media framing of the issue, we asked viewers to evaluate images of fracking depicting environmental risk, economic benefit, and issue protest. Protest images (both pro and con) were initially grouped with our primary frames of economic benefit and environmental risk; however, participant responses to depictions of protest differed substantially in the emergence of comments about

¹⁸ Allison Lazard and Lucy Atkinson, "Putting Environmental Infographics Center Stage", *Science Communication*, vol. 37, no. 1 (2014), pp. 6–33; Thomas E. Powell, Hajo G. Boomgaarden, Knut De Swert, and Claes H. de Vreese, "A Clearer Picture: The Contribution of Visuals and Text to Framing Effects", *Journal of Communication*, vol. 65, no. 6 (2015), pp. 997–1017.

idealized democracy, which was absent from responses to the other images. Thus, they merited their own categorization.

For the analysis, we asked 250 participants drawn from a national sample in the U.S. to evaluate 40 photographs of fracking operations and consequences.¹⁹ Each participant evaluated seven, randomly assigned images. The analysis here focuses on responses to an open-ended prompt that asked: “Please write a few lines or a brief paragraph describing your thoughts and feelings about this image.” After cleaning, the final sample consisted of 1,704 responses, which provided a rich dataset of volunteered impressions to explore image interpretations. Participants were also asked about their support for fracking and were divided into three groups: supporters (22%), undecideds (31%), and opposed (47%).

Next, the discursive themes and emotional tone expressed in participant comments, identified from a close reading of the responses, are highlighted. For clarity, the analysis proceeds from an understanding of visual frames as an image’s overarching message emphasis, while themes represent the image’s contextual interpretation by viewers.²⁰ Altogether, eight themes were identified in the responses: environmental destruction, economic competitiveness, human health, uncertainty, image ambiguity, idealized democracy, quality of life, and visual propaganda. Table 1 lists each theme derived from the coding process and includes an example taken from the open-ended responses.

3.2. Theme Analysis

The most prevalent themes across all attitude groups and visual frames were environmental destruction, economic competitiveness,

¹⁹ For details, see Krause and Bucy, “Visual Framing of Fracking” (cf. note 8 above).

²⁰ Mojtaba Vaismoradi, Jacqueline Jones, Hannele Turunen, and Sherrill Snelgrove, “Theme Development in Qualitative Content Analysis and Thematic Analysis”, *Journal of Nursing Education and Practice*, vol. 6, no. 5 (2016), pp. 100–110.

The Vulnerability of Images to Diverse Interpretation

and human health. Less prevalent, although still common, were themes of image ambiguity, uncertainty, and idealized democracy.

*Table 1: Themes emerging from coding of the open-ended responses.*²¹

Theme	Description and illustrative comment
Image ambiguity	Indicates a lack of understanding of an image or an unclear, ambiguous meaning. (E.g., “I don’t really understand what’s going on with the jar. What is it a jar of? [Cloudy, polluted water.] Is it supposed to be bad or good? I don’t really know how to interpret it.”)
Uncertainty	Describes how an image makes the individual feel uncertain about the fracking process. (E.g., “I think this image best illustrates the uncertainty about fracking....”)
Visual propaganda	Describes a level of orchestration and a biased illustration of what the image is representing. (E.g., “This image is propaganda. The image implies that tapping into the natural gas underground will bring in new revenue for the nation. Not true. It will just go into the energy company’s coffers.”)
Idealized democracy	Indication of citizens voicing their opinion. (E.g., “This is yet another image showing what will happen to a community that has a fracking operation going on in their neck of the woods. Citizens need to rise up and get other operations shut down.”)

²¹ Reprinted from Krause and Bucy, “Visual Framing of Fracking”, with permission of Taylor & Francis.

Economic competitiveness	Broadly indicates that hydraulic fracturing enhances the U.S. economy. (e.g., “More industry. More teamwork. More advancement.”)
Environmental destruction	Broadly discusses the environmental damage caused by hydraulic fracturing operations. (E.g., “The image brings negative connotations about the process of hydraulic fracturing because it depicts it as a dirty, environmentally harmful job.”)
Human health	Broadly explains the concern for human welfare as it relates to hydraulic fracturing, including unease or distress about polluted drinking water, worker safety, even disease from toxins associated with the process. (E.g., “This probably hits on my biggest fear with fracking. People could get very, very sick.”)
Quality of life	Describes the conditions that fracking operations will have on participants’ general happiness or discontentment with their life situation. (E.g., “The image shows a very large drilling machine and platform. I would not want to live near such a machine as I am sure it is very loud and could possibly pollute the air quality.”)

Economic competitiveness was the most frequently occurring theme articulated among participants in response to economic benefit framing, particularly among supporters (33.98%) and undecideds (24.27%). Opponents’ comments were more likely to identify the consequences of fracking, namely, environmental destruction (27.65%) and concerns about human health (24.20%), despite the economic benefit framing.

The Vulnerability of Images to Diverse Interpretation

Undecideds and supporters referenced environmental destruction considerably less, 14.40% and 9.15% respectively.

Images depicting environmental risk produced a much different pattern of response. Environmental destruction and human health were the most common themes appearing in participant comments. Those opposed to fracking referenced environmental concerns the most frequently, with a majority of comments (52.65%) evoking an environmental destruction theme, followed by concerns about human health (39.41%). Environmental destruction appeared in 29.33% of undecideds' comments and 25.18% of supporters' comments. For both undecideds and supporters, human health was the main concern expressed in response to images of environmental risk. Economic competitiveness was referenced considerably less in response to the environmental risk frame among all support groups.

Although not considered a stand alone frame initially, images containing depictions of individuals engaged in protest activities produced a unique and prevalent theme, that of idealized democracy. A total of five images were defined as protest images post hoc. Three were initially included in our selection of environmental risk images (anti-fracking in emphasis), while two were at first included in the economic benefit set (pro-fracking). Idealized democracy emerged as a theme most prevalent within comments made by fracking opponents (40.19%). References to citizen activism were made less frequently by undecideds (21.42%) and supporters (25%) in response to the protest frame.

3.3. Emotional Tone

Participant responses were also coded for their affective valence. Positive statements were operationalized as responses with an upbeat, favorable, or accepting tone, whereas negative statements were defined as having a menacing, unfavorable, or hostile tone. Neutral statements were classified as simply describing the scene depicted in the image without any discernible sentiment or emotional slant.

Statistical tests showed that fracking opponents offered significantly more negative statements across all three frames presented

than undecideds or supporters. When tone was examined by visual frame presented, opponents expressed significantly more negative sentiment in response to environmental risk framing than in response to economic benefit framing. Supporters, on the other hand, expressed significantly more positive sentiment in response to the economic benefit frame. Overall, environmental risk framing generated significantly more negative statements than economic benefit framing.

3.4. Discussion

Results of the analyses reveal several interesting insights about the message interpretation process. First, the meanings that viewers assign to images of a controversial energy production and environmental issue – and the themes that arise in open-ended responses about differently framed depictions of fracking – vary in accordance with standing attitudes. Individuals who disagree with hydraulic fracturing are more likely to indicate concern for the environment regardless of frame shown, whereas undecideds and supporters cite the impact on human health more frequently.

Prior attitude, operationalized as issue agreement, also influenced the number of thoughts generated in response to the images and the emotional sentiment expressed. Affective responses were heightened when individuals processed an image that aligned with their existing level of issue agreement. Supporters were more positive towards economic benefit frames and opponents expressed significantly more negativity in response to environmental risk framing. Interestingly, opponents volunteered significantly *more thoughts* than any other group, regardless of frame type.²² Opposition to fracking seems to drive environmental ideation. Undecideds, by contrast, appear to be most affected by the type of visual frame presented, as their mean scores move in concert with the primary frame emphasis; undecideds, for instance, were more closely aligned with opponents when evaluating environmental risk and more closely aligned with supporters when evaluating economic benefit.

²² Krause and Bucy “Visual Framing of Fracking”.

The Vulnerability of Images to Diverse Interpretation

Considering these findings through the lens of Hall's encoding/decoding framework further illuminates the pattern of response between issue attitude and frame emphasis. Table 2 summarizes the different message readings – dominant, negotiated, or oppositional – that our visual frames primarily evoke, sorted by issue attitude. Note that only two cells out of six are filled by dominant readings, where viewers internalize and accept the intended message meaning. These are for opponents' readings of environmental risk frames and supporters' readings of economic benefit frames. The other cells either show negotiated or oppositional readings. This variation in interpretation demonstrates the disjuncture between the intended meaning of a visual frame and an individual's constructed meaning.

*Table 2: Message readings by standing attitude and frame emphasis.*²³

Standing attitude	<u>Frame emphasis</u>	
	Environmental risk	Economic benefit
Support	Negotiated	Dominant
Undecided	Negotiated	Negotiated
Opposed	Dominant	Oppositional

²³ Reprinted from *ibid.*, with permission of Taylor & Francis.

4. Depictions of People in Need

As conflicts flare around the world, images of refugees are becoming ubiquitous in Western media. This second case study, based on three survey experiments involving over 6,000 respondents in Sweden, the U.S., and UK, explores how visuals of war refugees affect citizens' moral evaluations of the refugees' plight and support for humanitarian aid.²⁴ In total, we use 31 unique news images drawn from international news coverage of the Syrian refugee crisis to investigate the impact of visual depictions of refugees, both children and adults, in visible distress or not.

4.1. Moral Foundations Theory

Since the Syrian war and refugee crisis have sparked debates about helping those affected, we rely on Moral Foundations Theory²⁵ to explain how exposure to refugee depictions might influence public opinion. While it is recognized that visuals of war victims engage a host of moral issues, and that visuals can affect viewer attitudes and decisions, there is, at the same time, a dearth of large-scale, empirically-focused studies of how different visual portrayals of such victims impact public opinion.

What motivates people to help others in need is a timeless question, but emotional activation plays a key role. Empathy (understood primarily as empathic concern, or sympathy²⁶) is a feeling triggered by witnessing others in distress.²⁷ Research has shown that em-

²⁴ Dumitrescu and Bucy, *op. cit.*

²⁵ Jonathan Haidt, Jesse Graham, and Craig Joseph, "Above and Below Left-Right: Ideological Narratives and Moral Foundations", *Psychological Inquiry*, vol. 20, nos. 2-3, (2009), pp. 110-119.

²⁶ Nancy Eisenberg, Natalie D. Eggum, and Laura Di Giunta, "Empathy-Related Responding: Associations With Prosocial Behavior, Aggression, and Intergroup Relations", *Social Issues and Policy Review*, vol. 4, no. 1 (2010), pp. 143-180.

²⁷ Mark H. Davis, "Empathy and Prosocial Behavior", in David A. Schroeder and William G. Graziano (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Prosocial Behavior*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 282-306.

pathic concern enhances altruistic motivations in helping those in need,²⁸ particularly for “weak” or “helpless” victims.²⁹

The link between empathy and helping behaviour is strongest when the social distance between the respondent and victim is minimal.³⁰ This is primarily achieved when the person in need is a member of the same social group as the respondent, whether a relative or someone who is ethnically familiar, or from a group perceived to be similar to one’s own.³¹ Studies suggest that empathy plays a key role in support for disadvantaged out-groups when the plight of the out-group is perceived to be the result of an unfair set of circumstances, and the respondent’s group is not generally held to be responsible for these circumstances.³²

According to work by Haidt,³³ an important category of moral emotions is generated in response to others, sentiments that encompass both “other-suffering” emotions (empathy and compassion) and “other-condemning” feelings (anger, disgust, and contempt). Individuals’ ideological orientation (left–right, or liberal–conservative) is intrinsically linked to their sensitivity to violations of moral norms.³⁴

²⁸ C. Daniel Batson, “Empathy and Altruism”, in Kirk Warren Brown and Mark R. Leary (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Hypo-egoic Phenomena*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 161–174.

²⁹ Davis, *op. cit.*

³⁰ Stefan Stürmer and Mark Snyder, “Helping ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’”, in Stefan Stürmer and Mark Snyder (eds.), *The Psychology of Prosocial Behavior: Group Processes, Intergroup Relations, and Helping*, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 33–58.

³¹ Cigdem V. Sirin, Nicholas A. Valentino, and José D. Villalobos (2016), “Group Empathy in Response to Nonverbal Racial/Ethnic Cues: A National Experiment on Immigration Policy Attitudes”, *American Behavioral Scientist*, vol. 60, no. 14, pp. 1676–1697.

³² Aarti Iyer and Colin Wayne Leach, “Helping Disadvantaged Out-Groups Challenge Unjust Inequality”, in Stürmer and Snyder (eds.), *The Psychology of Prosocial Behavior*, pp. 337–354.

³³ Jonathan Haidt, “The Moral Emotions”, in Richard J. Davidson, Klaus R. Sherer, and H. Hill Goldsmith (eds.), *Handbook of Affective Sciences*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 852–870.

³⁴ Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt, and Brian A. Nosek, “Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of Moral Foundations”, *Journal of Personality and*

Liberals and left-leaning individuals are more responsive to violations of norms related to fairness and harm (or care), while conservatives and right-leaning individuals are more alert to violations of authority or purity.

4.2. Methodology

To study the relationship between viewer ideology, image potency, and moral evaluations, we fielded three online surveys between September 2016 and May 2017 in Sweden ($N = 2,102$), the U.S. ($N = 1,185$) and UK ($N = 2,966$). Upon commencing each study, participants were reminded that, due to conflicts around the world, many individuals have become refugees in different countries. We did not attribute blame or provide any further context. They were then asked to evaluate a refugee image depicting children or adults, and refugees who were either in visible distress or not (signaled by visible sadness or crying but not through bodily harm). Respondents self-reported how much empathy, compassion, contempt, and disgust they felt in response to the image shown, then answered questions about their support for humanitarian aid to assist the refugees. For parsimony, the key findings for all countries combined are summarized below.

4.3. Discussion

Consistent with Moral Foundations Theory, we find that ideology moderates the impact of refugee depictions on moral evaluations (emotional response), with conservatives more likely to report both compassion *and* condemnation of refugees when exposed to images of people in need, while liberals report primarily feeling compassion. Conservatives are more responsive to the age of the refugees depicted and react with more emotional warmth toward children – a key

Social Psychology, vol. 96, no. 5 (2009), pp. 1029–1046; Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt, Sena Koleva, Matt Motyl, Ravi Iyer, Sean P. Wojcik, and Peter H. Ditto, “Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism”, *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 47 (2013), pp. 55–130.

The Vulnerability of Images to Diverse Interpretation

factor in support for humanitarian aid – whereas liberals are largely unmoved by variations in refugee visuals but have much more favorable attitudes towards refugees overall.

From our results we can also make these observations:

- Conservatives and liberals report different moral responses to images of refugees, irrespective of the type of image shown. Whereas liberals feel primarily empathy and compassion, conservatives react with a balance of other-suffering and other-condemning emotions, consistent with heightened attention to the gamut of perceived moral principle violations.
- In general, conservatives are responsive to varying depictions of refugees, whereas liberals – consistent in their empathy – are largely unresponsive to image type. This is explained by the high levels of compassion that left-leaning respondents report across the board. Conservatives however, are more responsive to depictions of children refugees when compared to adults, as well as to displays of distress.
- Our cross-national approach reveals that cultural context does affect emotional response. Overall, Swedish respondents expressed more compassion towards the plight of refugees than respondents in the U.S. or UK. This does not ultimately affect the pattern of responsiveness to images of children among right-leaning citizens, but it does alter the strength of net emotional warmth they report toward refugees.
- Across all three of our sampled countries, net emotional warmth has a significant positive impact on aid attitudes irrespective of the visual treatment; if respondents feel compassionate towards refugees, their willingness to help increases. For conservatives, especially, the largest differences are found in models testing exposure to children in distress compared to adults in no distress, with distressed children prompting emotional warmth, which then has an indirect positive effect on attitudes concerning humanitarian aid.

5. Conclusion

As more public communication relies on visual imagery to capture the attention (and support) of citizens while encapsulating complex issues, understanding the dynamic nature of message interpretation becomes an increasing priority. As these studies have shown, visual portrayals alone do not dictate how individuals construct meaning from images but rather interact with standing attitudes and, depending on the issue, the ideological orientation of the viewer. For visual frames to be considered effective, they should have the capacity to guide interpretations based on selective highlighting of an issue's consequences – and be deployed in anticipation of how individuals will selectively process the information they convey based on prior attitudes and political orientation.

For individuals who are decided on a controversial environmental issue (i.e., supporters or opponents), visual frames are interpreted based on a view that aligns with their standing attitudes. However, when undecided on an issue, viewers negotiate meaning by weighing the outcomes against each other – and expressing these tradeoffs. This implication is consistent with the observation that uncertainty, and the anxiety associated with it, drives deeper processing about political developments.³⁵ Thus, the polysemic quality of visuals about issues is an important factor that warrants our consideration and further investigation.

Finally, ideology and the underlying world-views associated with these elaborated political schemas can act as powerful perceptual lenses, neutralizing the effects of images in some cases while making them more pronounced in others. Taken together, these nuances should not discourage further research into visual influence but rather guide new inquiries that appreciate the fact that images do not always independently assert influence over the viewer who perceives them.

³⁵ George E. Marcus, W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen, *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000.

Daniel Conway

Visualizing the Alien Other: Science Fiction and Genocide Studies

1. Introduction

Teachers and scholars working in the field of genocide studies face the daunting challenge of communicating to their respective audiences the scope of genocide and the motivation(s) of its perpetrators. This is a challenge, simply put, because those who do not already acknowledge genocide as a viable political or military option find its appeal to be virtually incomprehensible. Most civilized audiences, including those that are inclined to accept the possibility of just warfare, dismiss the practice of genocide as primitive, barbaric, inhumane, *and*, as a result, unthinkable. In many cases, in fact, the revulsion is sufficiently strong that the architects and perpetrators of genocide are described in terms – e.g., “inhuman”, “savage”, “monstrous”, etc. – that suggest the forfeiture of their very standing within the civilized human community. For such audiences, the prospect of expanding their spheres of sympathetic identification to include the aims and motives of genocidal tyrants is at best dim. Genocide may (and must) be studied, probed, and analyzed, but it is not likely to be understood by civilized audiences as the fruition of recognizably human aspirations.

At the same time, however, genocide remains a persistent feature of the contemporary geopolitical landscape. Moreover, recent history and current events confirm that recourse to genocide is not the exclusive province of barbaric, anti-modern nations and peoples. Proudly civilized nations also have been known to pursue (or abet or tolerate) genocidal campaigns, despite their avowed embrace of principles, ideals, and laws that expressly condemn the practice of genocide. If we continue to regard the administration of genocide as the

product of exclusively barbaric impulses, in fact, it will almost certainly remain to some extent mysterious to us.

So although it may be tempting to continue our habit of apportioning responsibility for genocide to those savage others (i.e., “them”) with whom civilized nations (i.e., “us”) are obliged to share the world, it may be more productive to acknowledge the impetus toward genocide as native to the human condition itself. As we shall see, a signal advantage of doing so is that we then may position ourselves to isolate more accurately the conditions and threats that lead human beings, whether civilized or barbaric, to endorse or abet the practice of genocide.

The challenge faced by teachers and scholars in the field of genocide studies may be addressed, I offer, if we focus our attention on the build-up to genocide. While civilized audiences may honestly consider their opposition to genocide to be non-negotiable, they may be persuaded to consider the question of their support for (or tolerance of) those measures and decisions that are known to pave the way for genocidal violence. Genocides do not occur in a vacuum; nor do they arise spontaneously and without warning. For this reason, the study of genocide must include an investigation of the conditions under which a citizenry or populace comes to accept (and, in some cases, abet or support) the practice of genocide.

The important task of preventing the rise and spread of genocide thus presupposes an understanding of how the unthinkable eventually becomes tolerable. To address this challenge, I have focused my research on what I call the *normalization* of genocide, by which I mean the complex of social, political, and legal processes through which a nation, populace, or citizenry is groomed to accept incremental measures (e.g., restrictions, laws, quotas, bans, internments, etc.) that pave the way to genocide. In my efforts to account for the normalization of genocide, I have been particularly concerned to explain how a populace or citizenry that sincerely abhors genocide may be nudged toward an understanding of genocide either as a *fait accompli* (e.g., as an inevitable consequence of escalating political tensions) or as an acceptable course of action under conditions that are deemed to be unprecedented and/or exceptional.

2. Science Fiction and Genocide Studies

My current research project investigates the normalization of genocide by marshaling the visual and philosophical resources available within the underexplored cinematic genre of science fiction. Drawing on representative films in the genre, I demonstrate how unfamiliar *others* – e.g., aliens, avatars, and androids – are subjected to escalating degrees of suspicion, fear, disgust, intolerance, emotional/psychological trauma, abjection, and hatred. As such, these unfamiliar others may be understood to represent the vulnerable minority populations and communities that currently face the gathering threats posed by statelessness, xenophobia, out-group shaming, misogyny, religious persecution, homo- and transphobia, ethnic cleansing, and genocide itself. As we shall see, a narrative staple of films in the genre of science fiction is the presentation of genocide as an acceptable (if regrettable) course of pre-emptive engagement with an alien presence that has been identified as a hostile and intractable nemesis.

There are a number of reasons why popular films in the genre of science fiction are valuable resources for teachers and scholars working in the field of genocide studies. First of all, the genre of science fiction allows storytellers (including authors, directors, artists, and performers) to isolate a moral or social or political problem that may not be readily accessible via other genres and media. A typical conceit in science fiction films is the stipulated fruition of a technology (e.g., space travel, gene splicing, geo-engineering, artificial intelligence, and so on) that is not yet fully developed in the lives of the target audience. The storyteller in question is thus afforded the opportunity to magnify and explore a moral dilemma that the audience is not optimally situated to consider under ordinary circumstances.

Second, the genre of science fiction is especially effective in allowing its practitioners to envision, and its audiences to contemplate, the potentially dystopian outcomes of current trends and practices that may be considered benign, unobjectionable, natural, or normal. Having previewed these dystopian outcomes, audiences often

find themselves in a better, more informed position to question the seemingly innocent (or harmless) decisions they have made, as well as the newly normalized courses of action that have been inaugurated, often on their behalf, by others. If audiences do not particularly care for the dystopian futures presented to them, they may feel empowered and emboldened to ensure that other, brighter futures remain possible.

Third, films in the genre of science fiction allow audiences to inhabit futures in which what they take for granted – e.g., as “real”, “natural”, “hard-wired”, “fated”, “divinely ordained”, etc. – has been called into question. A common emancipatory effect of this particular device is the disruption or suspension of seemingly foundational certainties. Audiences are both invited and encouraged to receive what they have taken for granted as provisional, artefactual, conditional, contingent, *and*, perhaps, as subject to review and revision. This emancipatory effect is especially important for teachers and scholars in the field of genocide studies. The history of genocidal violence indicates that a nation, populace, or citizenry may be persuaded to quell their agitations, or look the other way, if the build-up to genocidal violence is presented to them as the only (or the most reasonable) course of action available to them.

For my purposes, however, the single greatest appeal of popular films in the genre of science fiction is their capacity, both individually and collectively, to identify the conditions under which viewers would assent to the incremental measures I have identified as promoting the normalization of genocide. Despite the prevalence of the theme of genocide in these films, audiences are often surprised to discover that a scene or plot point they have cheered is in fact conducive to (or constitutive of) genocidal violence. In the case of a threat posed by supposedly malign alien beings, for example, recourse to genocidal violence may appear to be entirely reasonable, especially if undertaken in self-defense, and perhaps even enjoyable. If these alien beings are depicted in the film as uninvited, physically unattractive, unreasonable, or seemingly incapable of (or resistant to) immediate compromise, as is the case in the *Alien* film franchise, audiences may judge the ensuing attempts at genocide as eminently

justifiable.¹ (When apprised of the theme of genocide in the *Alien* franchise, my students are often chagrined to acknowledge their support for measures designed to attempt or accomplish genocidal outcomes.)

What is important here is that popular films in the genre of science fiction allow audiences to understand, if they are willing, that genocide is not unthinkable after all. While they would never countenance any of the geopolitical disasters of the past two centuries, viewers may have no problem assenting to the mass destruction of an alien race or species. This realization in turn positions audiences to consider seriously the morality of those incremental preliminary measures that I have associated with the normalization of genocide. If nothing else, viewers who find themselves supportive of plans designed to prosecute an alien genocide may begin to gain insight into the psychological and emotional appeal of those human genocides they rightly denounce. And, I offer, it is precisely this insight that will enable civilized audiences to prevent the normalization of genocide.

3. Some Examples from the Case Studies

In my examination of these films, I focus on three contributing factors to the normalization of genocide: 1) the use of abusive and demeaning language to enforce the political disenfranchisement of unwanted “others”; 2) the role of the new media in escalating (or fabricating) social and political tensions; and 3) the growing reliance on “experts” (and other presumed authority figures) who assure ordinary citizens that incremental measures leading to genocide are both reasonable and just. That these authority figures are also involved in actively misleading the ordinary citizens whom they offer to assure will surprise no one.

¹ I am indebted here to Stephen Mulhall, *On Film*, 3rd edition, London: Routledge, 2016, pp. 42–44; see also Daniel Conway, “*Alien*, Alienation, and Alien Nation,” in Jeffrey Ewing and Kevin S. Decker (eds.), *Alien and Philosophy*, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2017, pp. 110–112.

My current research project is structured as a series of case studies in which I investigate the normalization of genocide as it is presented and/or treated in the following films: *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968); *Solaris* (1972); *Alien* (1979); *Blade Runner* (1982); *Aliens* (1986); *Gattaca* (1997); *The Matrix* (1999); *Minority Report* (2002); *Prometheus* (2012); and *Ex Machina* (2014). The goal of each case study is to illuminate the susceptibility of civilized peoples and nations to the establishment of social, political, and legal measures that are known to promote the normalization of genocide. The goal of the research project as a whole is to articulate principles and strategies for exposing and preventing the normalization of genocide.

My current research project also makes productive use of first-person survivor testimonies drawn from the Visual History Archive (VHA), which is housed and maintained at the Center for Advanced Genocide Research on the Los Angeles campus of the University of Southern California. The VHA is described as “an online portal that allows users to search through and view more than 55,000 video testimonies of survivors and witnesses of genocide” (<https://sfi.usc.edu/vha>). I have been particularly concerned to document those first-person survivor accounts that attest to abuses and mistreatments like those endured by the alien “others” in the films I study. By making these connections, I intend to establish that the genocidal campaigns depicted in these films disclose an essential truth, pertaining to the persistence and tenacity of xenophobia, which, unfortunately, is not confined to the domain of fiction.

At this point, some specific examples may be instructive:

In Ridley Scott’s *Blade Runner*, the replicants (i.e., synthetic persons) are denigrated as “skinjobs” and, despite the stirrings within them of memories, affections, and sparks of consciousness, treated as mere objects. Uppity, recognition-seeking replicants are not simply unwelcome; they are summarily “retired” from service by the blade runners who are assigned to hunt them down. First-person survivor testimonies not only confirm the suspect basis on which the desultory humans declare their superiority to the replicants, but also reveal the prevalence of this practice in contemporary political discourse.

In James Cameron's *Aliens*, the Colonial Marines dismiss the xenomorphs whom they are tasked to engage as uncivilized "parasites" and "bugs", despite the coordinated defenses and well-defined matriarchal social structure the alien species displays. The Marines' subsequent decision to "nuke" the planet thus amounts to a gratuitous exercise in species-level genocide. The first-person survivor narratives archived in the VHA attest to similar tactics of denigration and dehumanization. Indeed, many of the survivors and witnesses confirm the practice of likening the victims of genocidal violence to "insects" and "vermin" that must be eradicated.

In Andrew Niccol's *Gattaca*, the obsession with genetic perfection (and the designer babies it produces) leads to the creation of a social underclass comprising those "in-valid" (i.e., "naturally" conceived) human beings who are known to possess genetic flaws or defects. As the technologically advanced society warms to the reductive dogma of biology as destiny, it cruelly excludes even those individuals who, like Vincent/Jerome, possess spiritual and volitional resources that scientists cannot recognize, much less measure. First-person survivor narratives housed in the VHA attest not only to the role of biological (or racial) "purity" in the normalization of genocide, but also to the relative ease with which science (and scientists) may be mobilized to defend and preserve the biological (or racial) "purity" in question.

In Steven Spielberg's *Minority Report*, the success of the pre-crime program is predicated on the state-sponsored conscription of the "pre-cogs" (i.e., clairvoyant, mutant human beings), whose instrumental value is alleged (and widely believed) to outweigh their intrinsic value as rights-bearing persons. The first-person survivor and witness accounts of life in forced labour camps shed clarifying light on the consequentialist logic that justifies the mistreatment of "pre-cogs" and "pre-criminals" alike.

In James Cameron's *Avatar*, the commencement of colonial mining operations on Pandora threatens the survival of the indigenous Na'vi clans. The desire on the part of the human invaders to secure extra-terrestrial sources of energy leads them to settle on an aggressive military option – namely, the obliteration of the Na'vi

Hometree – which, they were warned, might have precipitated the species-level genocide of the Na’vi and the collapse of the fully integrated Pandoran ecosystem.

In Neill Blomkamp’s *District 9*, the race of stranded aliens, identified only (and derogatorily) as the “Prawns”, is demoted in status from that of refugees in need of humanitarian relief to that of unclean, ghetto-bound miscreants. The midlevel bureaucrat tasked with the relocation of the aliens is clearly an Eichmann figure, who is manipulated in his abiding “thoughtlessness” (to borrow Hannah Arendt’s diagnosis of Adolf Eichmann) by his cruel supervisors.² The parallels in the film to the Holocaust and to the South African Apartheid are confirmed by the first-person survivor testimonies archived in the VHA.³

² Here I follow Allan Woolfolk, “Escape from the Dialectic of Enlightenment and Disaster? Authenticity, Agency, and Alien Space”, in S. Redmond and M. Leon (eds.), *Endangering Science Fiction Film*, New York: Routledge, 2016, pp. 183–185. See also Daniel Conway, “Framing a New Reality: Documenting Genocide in *District 9*”, *International Journal of Philosophy and Theology* 78/4–5, 2017, pp. 451–453.

³ I am pleased to acknowledge support for this project from various offices at Texas A&M University: the Glasscock Center for Humanities Research; the TAMU Division of Research; the Office of the Provost; the College of Liberal Arts; the Department of Philosophy; and the Film Studies Program. I am also grateful for the ongoing support of the USC Shoah Foundation Center for Advanced Genocide Research.

PHILOSOPHY IN THE NEW CENTURY

Zsuzsanna Kondor

Perceiving and Organizing the World

1. Introduction

In the present paper I will attempt to illuminate the intertwined relation between culture and consciousness as being based on some hard-wired aspects of human phylogeny. I will suggest, despite the fact that the human intellect is traditionally described in terms of visual metaphors, that our conceptual skills are based on a kind of crosstalk between different sense modalities and motor-control, i.e., visual perception and processing alone can not provide sufficient grounds for abstraction, and hence, concept-formation. In my argumentation I will start with Merleau-Ponty's distinction between the physical, vital, and human orders, establishing a kind of bridge between the hard-wired and physical on the one hand, and the cultural along with the mental on the other hand. I will briefly delineate some recent approaches to consciousness, since precisely it plays an important role in enabling culture and mental life to enter the scene. Finally, I will outline the *synesthetic bootstrapping* theory which, in harmony with conceptual metaphor theory, suggests a possible evolutionary path towards a proto-language, i.e., it establishes the possibility of abstraction and metaphoric mapping anatomically.

2. Orders of Functioning

Merleau-Ponty, an outstanding representative of the phenomenological tradition, proposed a new approach to overcoming the chasm between *materialism/empiricism* and *mentalism/intellectualism*.¹ He

¹ Although Merleau-Ponty suggested a way for it to be possible to bridge the gap between essentially different approaches, the question of how it is possible to relate mental and physical in a causal manner is still a controversial one. Similarly,

proposed that “the notion of form would permit a truly new solution” of how to relate nature to consciousness or “the synthesis of matter and idea”.² *Forms* (here the term refers to Gestalt psychology) or *structures* describe the patterns according to which the *three orders* work. “The physical form is an equilibrium obtained with respect to certain given external conditions.” This contrasts with the case of vital structures, where “equilibrium is obtained, not with respect to real and present conditions, but with respect to conditions which are only virtual and which the system itself brings into existence”. In the human order, there emerges a *third dialectic*. “For, between man and the physico-chemical stimuli, it [human work] projects ‘useobjects’ (*Gebrauchobjekts*) – clothing, tables, gardens – and ‘cultural objects’ – books, musical instruments, language – which constitute the proper milieu of man and bring about the emergence of new cycles of behavior.”³ This dialectic attempts to overcome the chasm between the mental and physical, and to describe how deeply intertwined the relation between the organism and its milieu is, and importantly, how the orders relate to each other. The organism is capable of forming its environment, and at the same time its environment solicits the organism’s capacities (affords and challenges), hence shaping it. In the case of the orders, the dialectic describes the peculiar relation of not transcending the lower order but being internally related to it, and thus being capable of reshaping it. That is, the human order does not transcend the lower ones but is internally related to them, and this internal relation provides the ground for direct access to the environment, thus making it possible to create new behavioural patterns.

scientific theories of consciousness nicely describe conscious experience in terms of neural functioning, but cannot give an account of how these neural states result in the peculiar phenomenal character of first-person experience.

² *The Structure of Behavior*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1967 [1942], pp. 131 and 137.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 145 and 162.

3. Consciousness as a Necessary Condition

Consciousness plays a crucial role in this process because it is “the theater of all being”, and “the subject for every possible object”.⁴ Being able to differentiate between beneficial vs. harmful conditions is not sufficient to reach beyond local conditions. Consciousness is necessary for intentional activity and the capability of forming the world beyond the limits of reciprocal adjustments between the organism and its environment. Merleau-Ponty distinguished between perceptual and intellectual consciousness,⁵ and believed perception plays a primordial role in human behaviour. He believes perception is “a kind of practical synthesis: I can touch the lamp, and not only the side turned toward me but also the other side”. Importantly, “[p]erception does not give me truths like geometry but presences”, and “there is no deciphering, no mediate inference from the sign to what is signified, because the alleged signs are not given to me separately from what they signify.”⁶

Like perception, the body also gains special importance. It provides perspective, ties the perceiving self to “a system of things”⁷, accommodates multimodal synthesis, yields perceptual fields and field of practice, and “as an active body capable of gestures, of expression, and finally of language, it turns back on the world to signify it”.⁸ Because “the perceived object is by definition present and liv-

⁴ M. Merleau-Ponty, “Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man” [1961], in J. M. Edie (ed.) *The Primacy of Perception*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964, pp. 55 and 57.

⁵ Merleau-Ponty supposed there were many different kinds of consciousness when he wrote “there are *several ways for the body to be a body, several ways for consciousness to be consciousness*”. (M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, Taylor & Francis e-Library, [1945] 2005, p. 109.)

⁶ M. Merleau-Ponty, “The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences” [1947], in J. M. Edie (ed.) *The Primacy of Perception*, pp. 14, 15 and 14.

⁷ M. Merleau-Ponty, “The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences”, p. 21.

⁸ M. Merleau-Ponty, “An Unpublished Text by Maurice Merleau-Ponty: A Prospectus of His Work” [1962], in J. M. Edie (ed.): *The Primacy of Perception*, p. 7.

ing”, perception is “a privileged realm of experience”. Accordingly, “the experience of perception is our presence at the moment when things, truths, values are constituted for us”.⁹

Thanks to consciousness and its intertwined relation to the body, according to Merleau-Ponty it is possible to form, reconstruct and model the world in the human order. In recent philosophy and cognitive psychology, there have been various efforts to overcome the chasm between the mental and physical, sometimes with decisively different presuppositions – not aimed at bridging the gap between the two realms but rather at establishing the mental life in the physical, and thus focusing on the latter. In the attempts to naturalize consciousness, evolution and functionalism play an important role.

Nicholas Humphrey, a neuropsychologist known for his research of blindsight and work on the evolution of human consciousness, made an attempt to illuminate how the brain and the mind can be the “aspects of a simple state – a single state, in fact, of the material world”.¹⁰ In his attempt, he accepts Thomas Reid’s distinction between *sensation* and *perception*. Accordingly, sensation’s “very essence consists in being felt; and when it is not felt it is not... Perception [by contrast] has always an external object; and the object of my perception, in this case, is the quality in the rose that I discern by the sense of smell.”¹¹ In functional terms, *sensation* is “providing an affect-laden modality-specific body-centred representation of what the stimulation is doing to me and how I feel about it”, while *perception* is “providing a more neutral, abstract, body-independent representation of the outside world”.¹² Though *perception* is built upon *sensation*, after their diremption, their evolution went on their own way.

⁹ M. Merleau-Ponty, “The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences”, p. 25.

¹⁰ N. Humphrey, “How to Solve the Mind-Body Problem”, *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, vol. 7, no. 4 (2000), p. 5.

¹¹ N. Humphrey, *Seeing Red*, London: Harvard University Press: London, 2005, p. 40.

¹² Humphrey, “How to Solve the Mind-Body Problem”, p. 17.

Humphrey suggests reconciling mind and brain by showing that we can see activity on both sides. As he noted, in case of *sensation* “the distinction between the act and the object is not real, but grammatical”; in short, “sensing is not a passive state at all, but rather a form of active engagement with the stimulus occurring at the body surface... I am reflexly reaching out *to* the body surface with an evaluative response... it is this *efferent activity* that I am aware of. So that what I actually experience as the feeling... is my reading of my own response to it.”¹³ That is, *sensation* as an activity can be observed in a similar way as brain states. Along the path of evolution, some organisms went from mere stimulus-bodily response, through the emergence of specialized sensory areas (being still “mere wriggles of acceptance or rejection”), to being capable of formulating mental representation of the stimulus and developing a separate channel for the processing of sensory information to gain “a more neutral, abstract, body-independent representation of the outside world”.¹⁴

Humphrey also considers consciousness as a decisive element of being able to model our environment. His experiments with a rhesus monkey whose visual striate cortex was removed, and with some human blindsighted patients, proved that without conscious access to percepts, visual experience cannot provide the same availability to visual information as conscious experience does. Beyond the “tiresome duty” the gained visual information is not worthy of interest because it is not related to the perceiving subject, it is hardly imaginable for the patient that s/he can see, if it turns out that s/he can see to some extent, they have no idea how it is possible, and furthermore, attributing seeing to someone else on the basis of their own visual experience is also not manageable.¹⁵

According to Humphrey, in order to be able to mentally reconstruct our environment we need conscious access to sensory experiences. Without conscious access to the scenery (as in the case of

¹³ *Ibid.*, p 13.

¹⁴ Humphrey, *Seeing Red*, pp. 87 and 92.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 70 and 69.

blindsight) the gained information is hardly accessible for further processing, thus patients are more likely to rely on other modalities. Sensation, as activity, provides ground for being able to reconcile brain mechanisms and the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences. That is, consciousness and the active character of perceptual experience anchor mental life in the physical body.

Michael S. A. Graziano, psychologist and neuroscientist, proposed a theory of consciousness as based on social perception, i.e., presupposes socially embedded individuals.¹⁶ The so-called *attention schema theory* suggests “consciousness is not an emergent property, or a metaphysical emanation, but is itself information computed by an expert system”, and significantly, a consequence or product of social perception. The capability of modelling one’s own attention can evolve on the basis of selective signal enhancement and the control of attention: “Awareness is a perceptual model of attention.”¹⁷ The close relation between attention and awareness is in line with the fact that although they are not identical, most of the time they covary. This schema suggests that while attention selects among signals (as

¹⁶ There is extensive literature on the social brain; all of which relates cognitive capacity to social interchange. We can have in mind Dunbar’s social brain hypothesis which is based on a correlation between group size and the relative volume of the neocortex, i.e., it suggests that ever changing social relations entail an increasing computational burden proportional to the group size. Similarly, Donald’s cognitive evolutionary model can be understood in the wider context of changing environmental needs. Not excluding social embeddedness, but rather emphasizing the importance of bodily engagement, the psychologist Ralph Adolphs suggests that our brain would be overloaded if we could not recline upon our environment, and suggests considering the body as emulator when we need to model other people’s behaviour. “The body might be thought of as a ‘somatic scratchpad’ that we can probe with efferent signals in order to reconstruct knowledge about the details of an emotional state.” (R. Adolphs, “Consciousness: Situated and Social”, in *The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness*, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 875.) Similarly, cognitive archaeology on the basis of the above-mentioned theories considers human cognitive evolution to be intertwined with material engagement.

¹⁷ M. S. A. Graziano and S. Kastner, “Human Consciousness and Its Relationship to Social Neuroscience: A Novel Hypothesis”, *Cognitive Neuroscience*, vol. 2, no. 2 (2011), pp. 99 and 100.

the brain is applying its “data-handling method”), the brain decides whether the selected signal will or will not entail awareness. This modelling capability makes it possible to predict behaviour, not just one’s own but also that of our companions. Monitoring one’s own attention and social perception both provide ground for monitoring others’ attention, hence, when awareness is attached to them, the schematic model of their attention enables the prediction of their behaviour. That is, Graziano provides us with a conception of consciousness based on a kind of sociability, and that supports prediction as being evolutionarily advantageous.

4. The Anatomical and Evolutionary Basis of Conceptual Skills

As we can see, consciousness is thought to be a necessary condition of higher order cognitive capacities (such as concept formation, modelling the external world, reflective and deliberate behaviour – to name a few), based on evolutionary and cognitive psychological considerations. *Synesthetic bootstrapping* theory attempts to reconstruct the evolution of a proto language based on brain anatomy, evolutionary usefulness, and supported by numerous reports and experiments. In 2001, V. S. Ramachandran and E. M. Hubbard published an article¹⁸ in which they provided evidence that synaesthesia is a genuine sensory phenomenon, revealed its supporting brain mechanisms, and made a suggestion regarding its broader implications. We know there are at least 60 different forms of synaesthesia that have been documented,¹⁹ that it runs in families and is more characteristic to females than males, and that it is more common in artists and

¹⁸ “Synaesthesia – A Window Into Perception, Thought and Language”, *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, vol. 8, no. 12 (2001), pp. 3–34.

¹⁹ Grapheme-colour synaesthesia is the most common type of synaesthesia (there are even colour-blind synesthetic patients) and it considerably enhances the recognition of certain visual patterns. But there are many different forms, e.g., when texture or smell entails vivid emotions. (V. S. Ramachandran, *The Tell-tale Brain: A Brief Tour of Human Consciousness*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011, p. 75.)

poets. It often entails remarkable memory abilities and enhances sensory processing and the integration of different senses; it sometimes illuminates hidden connections, rules; and importantly, “synesthesia seems to occupy that mysterious boundary zone between elementary sensations on the one hand and higher level abstractions ... on the other hand”²⁰. Beyond the above-mentioned characteristics, Ramachandran suggests a link between synaesthesia and creativity including metaphors. Although synaesthesia creates links that are at first glance random among different modalities and qualities, the conceptual basis of metaphors does not seem to be arbitrary. However, “the basis of metaphor – exists in all of us but is larger and stronger in synesthesia as a result of the cross-activation gene; in this formulation synesthesia is not synonymous with metaphor, but only that the gene which produces synesthesia confers a propensity towards metaphor.”²¹ How can this happen?

In a famous (and oft-repeated) experiment with round and zig-zag-shaped figures, subjects were asked to pair the figures with the sounds of *kiki* and *bouba*. The results consistently showed the high majority of the subjects paired the round shape to *bouba* and the zig-zag one to *kiki*. Ramachandran explains this with cross-activation of different brain areas. If we compare the *temporo-parieto-occipital* [TPO] *junction* of lower mammals with monkeys, apes, and humans, we can notice a radical increase in size. Even the apparently simple act of jumping from branch to branch requires the adjustment of motor movements, a proprioceptive map and visual information. That is, cross-activation between different areas can provide some evolu-

²⁰ D. Brang and V. S. Ramachandran, “Survival of the Synesthesia Gene: Why Do People Hear Colors and Taste Words?”, *PLoS Biology*, vol. 9, no. 11 (2011), p. 5.

²¹ Brang and Ramachandran, “Survival of the Synesthesia Gene”, p. 3. – Neural hyper-connectivity normally decreases during infancy and childhood thanks to a specific gene. Cross-activation between adjacent functional areas is probably the consequence of gene mutation. For details see V. S. Ramachandran and D. Brang, “From Molecules to Metaphor: Outlooks on Synesthesia Research”, in J. Simner and E. Hubbard (eds.), *Handbook of Synesthesia*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 1005.

tionary advances.²² Similarly, in the case of language, cross-activations in the TPO junction can emerge between various areas: visual, auditory, motor control, and Broca. That is, correspondence can pop up between visual shape and sound, lip movements and sound contours, and also between lip movements and hand gestures. Hence, the cross-activation between the motor, auditory, and visual areas connects different sense-modalities, and as regards language, connects senses to different areas of motor-control. These cross activations create ground for abstraction: round shapes and gentle sounds together establish *softness* on the one hand, and render lip-movements and gestures “physically mimicking the visual appearance of what you are saying”²³, on the other hand.

5. Conclusion

The theories briefly outlined above suggest consciousness provides ground for higher cognitive functions. Some of them emphasize the importance of bodily engagement, perception or the active character of it, and/or social embeddedness. In the case of scientific theories, we can ask the question of how mere neural activities can be related to mental states; how can brain mechanisms accommodate abstract reasoning and create the phenomenal character of our experiences? In the present paper I attempted to delineate a framework within which these questions can be answered. Ramachandran’s *synesthetic bootstrapping* theory anchors abstract concept-formation in biology; Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between the three orders connects the physical and mental through the creative potential of human consciousness. As humans are living organisms and have a direct relation with

²² For details see V. S. Ramachandran, *A Brief Tour of Human Consciousness*, New York: PI Press, 2004, pp. 60–82.

²³ For a detailed list of cross-activation see *ibid.*, pp. 77–80.

the physical world, they are socially embedded as well, capable of reorganizing their milieu. This creative power relies heavily on the capacity for abstraction, and later on abstract reasoning,²⁴ and is rooted in a wide range of sensual experiences and motor skills.²⁵

²⁴ For details about the relation between tool-making and syntactical higher-order embedding see *ibid.*, pp. 80 f.

²⁵ The intracranial focus of cognitive science and psychology can be called into question when sociability and communication are assumed being necessary. Considering the scope and limits of investigation when consciousness and cognitive capacity are in question, see Zs. Kondor, "Representation and Extension in Consciousness Studies", *Avant: The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard*, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 209–227.

Tibor Bárány

Pictorial (Conversational) Implicatures

1. SS, SSSM, and Pictorial Implicatures

Considering the widespread use of pictures in ordinary communicative acts nowadays, it might be natural to think that our well-proven pragmatic theories developed for explaining how we communicate with linguistic expressions can be easily applied to pictorial communication. What might support this idea is the firm conviction that by and large, pictorial and linguistic communication proceed along basically the same lines.

On the other hand, there seems to be a deep asymmetry between the communicative use of words and of pictures. While it is reasonable to talk about *syntactic rules* operating on linguistic items (by which the syntactic structure of the sentence will be generated) and posit *compositional semantic content* or *conventional meaning* of sentences derived from conventionally encoded lexical word- (or morpheme-) meaning and conventional semantic rules for composition (which correspond compositionally to conventional syntactic rules), pictures appear to lack any kind of syntactic structure or encoded meaning-constituents. According to the Standard Model for Meaning Comprehension of Linguistic Utterances (for short: Standard Model, SM), the “total significance” of a speech act emerges as the outcome of four different types of processes:

- I. Working out the CONTEXT-INDEPENDENT CONVENTIONAL MEANING of the sentence uttered. The cognitive process of linguistic interpretation consists in *decoding* lexical meanings and the *computation* of semantic content as a function of the contents of the constituents and the way they are syntactically combined.

II. Working out the CONTEXT-DEPENDENT CONVENTIONAL MEANING of the sentence uttered. This process involves the mandatory contextual assignment of semantic values to various types of expressions – pronouns and indexicals, relative adjectives (like *tall*), and incomplete predicates (like *ready*), etc. – without which the utterance would remain semantically incomplete, lacking any determinate propositional content. Since the elaboration of this type of context-dependent meaning is governed by linguistic constraints, the cognitive process of interpretation is partly based on *linguistic competence*, because it involves knowing how to use conventionally certain expression-types (independently of whether the tokens of these types are overtly occurring in the sentence uttered or merely appearing in its logical structure while unpronounced), and partly on *pragmatic reasoning*.

III. Working out the PRAGMATICALLY ENRICHED MEANING of the sentence uttered, which is the result of optional pragmatic processes (free enrichment, broadening/loosening, predicate transfer etc.). These processes do the work of *truth-conditionally relevant* contextual modification of the proposition expressed; they can serve to “fine-tune” the proposition in order to ensure correct fit between the meaning-intentions of the speaker, the meaning-expectations of the audience, and the information conveyed by the utterance.

IV. Working out the CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES (and other types of implicit meaning) of the sentence uttered. One can describe this process as the *derivation of additional propositions* (supposedly meant by the speaker) from the proposition expressed by the utterance, which is triggered by particular features of the conversational context and the speaker’s communicative behaviour (or on hypotheses thereof formed by the audience).¹ It should be noted that whilst it seems appropriate to

¹ Conversational implicatures are not inferences, as Kent Bach emphasizes (“The Top 10 misconceptions about Implicature”, in B. Birner & G. Ward [eds.], *Drawing the Boundaries of Meaning: Neo-Gricean Studies in Pragmatics and Sem-*

Pictorial (Conversational) Implicatures

say that these elements of meaning are conveyed by the utterance, they are not part of what the utterance literally means, so the elaboration of them does not affect the truth-conditions of the proposition generated as the outcome of the processes subsumed under I–III.

I dubbed this model “standard” because almost everyone agrees in the literature (with few exceptions) that by and large these kinds of processes – decoding, pragmatic reasoning: obligatory/optional enrichment, derivation of implicatures – take place when a language user understands a verbal utterance. However, there’s profound disagreement among philosophers of language over how to match particular types of meaning-elements with particular types of processes (e.g. are “scalar implicatures” pragmatically enriched meanings or generalized conversational implicatures?, etc.); how to define key concepts (e.g. in the case of conversational implicatures should what is meant be “completely separate” from what is said? [Kent Bach], as I characterized in the previous paragraph, in the spirit of the original Gricean program, or can conversational implicatures have truth-conditional consequences? [Stephen C. Levinson]; etc.); how to explain the relationship among various conceptual distinctions that underlie our pragmatic theories, such as “semantic”–“pragmatic”, “literal”–“non-literal”, “explicit”–“implicit”, and so on (we see massive proliferation of terminology in the literature, e.g. “explicature” [Relevance Theorists], “implicature” [Bach], etc.); and where to locate the theoretical boundary of *what is said* (between context-dependent conventional meaning and pragmatically enriched meaning, or somewhere else?). In short: if we fill in the gaps, SM will no longer remain quite as standard as it might have initially seemed.

antics in Honor of Laurence R. Horn, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2006, pp. 21–30), because they are defined as elements of speaker’s meaning, not hearer’s interpretation. However, how conversational implicatures are grasped by the audience, should be understood as some kind of inferential process.

However, for our present purposes, a much more schematic (let's say, grossly oversimplified and highly contestable) model works well:

The Super Simplified Standard Model for Meaning Comprehension of Linguistic Utterances (SSSM): whenever an audience *A* understands a linguistic utterance *U* performed by a speaker *S*, *A* must grasp

- (i) *what is said* by *U*, which contains *decoding* lexical items, *compositional derivation* of sentence-meaning, *contextual completion* of sentence-meaning (viz. mandatory enrichment of semantically underspecified items in order to get complete proposition), and *contextual expansion* of sentence-meaning (viz. optional enrichment of the proposition expressed);² and
- (ii) *what is implicated* by *U*, which is triggered by *S*'s verbal behaviour (by the supposed tension between *S*'s being co-operative and her apparent violation of conversational norms or *U*'s lack of relevance at first sight).

Now, why should we think that SSSM can be applied to pictorial utterances, first and foremost, to cases of *genuine pictorial communication* (communicative exchanges performed solely by pictures, without any explicit “verbal accompaniment”)? Should we think it at all? I think the answer is “yes”. The fact that pictures do not have syntax and in interpreting pictures the audience normally does not decode visual items does not make the concept of *what is shown* (as analogous to what is said) theoretically useless or unintelligible. We can reasonably speak of “meaning (implicating) one thing by showing (a picture of) something else” – so there are no theoretical obstacles to maintain the distinction which underlies SSSM and the whole pragmatic machinery. How should we imagine such a theory? I sketch one version.

² By and large this is what Jennifer Mather Saul calls “constrained conception” of what is said. (*Lying, Misleading, and What Is Said*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 31–33.)

First step: let's endorse some version of the resemblance theory of depiction, and assume that in normal cases visual features of the picture determine what it depicts. Resemblance theorists contend that the fact that pictures have a certain content (i.e. they represent, or are used by some people to represent objects, persons, events, actions, etc. from a particular perspective) should be explained by appeal to the visual resemblance relation between the picture and its object (rather than by appeal to the fact that pictures belong to some *conventional* representational system, as Nelson Goodman or more recently John Kulvicki suggested).

Second step: let's endorse (some version of) the theory of pictorial speech acts, which was developed as early as the 1970s by David Novitz and Søren Kjørup.³ (Interestingly, this work has not been pursued further. We had to wait until the 2010s for in-depth discussion of pragmatic phenomena connected to pictorial communication – mainly in relevance-theoretic terms; see for example the analyses of various types of “multimodal communication” by Charles Forceville.) According to this theory, the main difference between speech acts and pictorial acts lies in the role that conversational context plays in determining the “total significance” of the acts. In most cases performing a pictorial act can be described as expressing a proposition pictorially with some illocutionary force; in other words: someone who uses a picture for conversational purposes by showing or sharing the picture performs a particular pictorial propositional act and a particular illocutionary act (where the latter corresponds appropriately to the former).⁴ What makes a propositional act *pictorial* is the nature of predication: the utterer attributes to the referent some property that is visually represented in the picture. However, when performing a pictorial propositional act, the utterer cannot use convenient pictorial equivalents of linguistic devices such

³ See David Novitz, *Pictures and their Use in Communication*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977 (especially chapter IV and V: “Pictorial Illocutionary Acts”, “Pictorial Propositions”, pp. 67–107); Søren Kjørup, “Pictorial Speech Acts”, *Erkenntnis* 12 (1978), pp. 55–71.

⁴ See Novitz, p. 89; Kjørup, pp. 62–64 (propositional act), pp. 64–68 (illocutionary act).

as proper names, pronouns; negation, disjunction (and other Boolean operators); quantifiers; tense indicators – moreover, explicit illocutionary force indicators are also missing from the visual communicative apparatus. The explanation for this lack lies in the nature of depiction: elements of pictures are not endowed with syntactic structure, and they can contribute to the content expressed only via some sort of visual resemblance.⁵ But of course utterers *do* express quantified, tensed, negated propositions with a certain illocutionary force by showing/sharing pictures. In the cases of *multimodal communication* the missing pictorial elements are often substituted by linguistic elements (or other types of conventionally encoded devices); see e.g. internet memes (captioned pictures or videos), traffic signs (the red border as a shape signaling danger), etc. In the cases of *genuine pictorial communication* the “missing parts” of meaning become parts of the expressed proposition by contextual inferences drawn by the audience. These inferences are based on assumptions about the speaker’s communicative intentions and on her knowledge of the situation.⁶

⁵ As Alex Grzankowski puts it, “the semantic facts about depiction are determined at least in part by visual resemblance relations and since nothing *looks* to be disjunctive and nothing *looks* to not be the case, it’s unsurprising that pictures do not depictively express disjoined or negated propositions.” (“Pictures Have Propositional Content”, *Review of Philosophy and Psychology*, vol. 6, no. 1 (2015), pp. 151–163, the quoted passage on p. 159.)

⁶ Philosophers who deny that pictures have propositional content argue that pictures cannot be true or false, just more or less accurate (similar to perceptual experience), and we cannot assert or negate anything (or express disjoined propositions) by using only pictures; if we want to do all of this, we need to employ some kind of non-pictorial symbol, or to stipulate some *ad hoc* convention which relates aspects of a picture to negative facts, etc. See Tim Crane, “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?”, *The Philosophical Quarterly* 59 (2009), pp. 452–469, esp. pp. 457–461; Richard M. Sainsbury, *Reference Without Referents*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005, p. 242. Alex Grzankowski, *op. cit.*, points out that from pictures’ expressive limitations it does not follow “that all contents pictures *do* express fail to be propositions” (p. 158). Grzankowski is right: from pictures’ expressive limitations *concerning negation* (and disjunction etc.) the general inability to express certain propositions pictorially simply does not follow. But the problem, I think, lies deeper. If we consider *all types* of expressive limitations

As Kjørup puts it picturesquely: “a picture may be construed as a heap of adjectives and other characterizing or predicating verbal phrases: ... is a man, ... is middle-aged, ... wears a tie, etc.”⁷ From these adjectives and other predicative VPs the audience should work out the propositional content of the pictorial act. Moreover, visual properties of pictures are also *filtered* by the context: the audience should pick out those properties that are relevant with respect to predication.⁸ For example by using this picture (Figure 1) the utterer might predicate different properties about different referents (a) in a Madrid travel guide, (b) in a book analyzing the European Union’s refugee policy, or (c) in a fashion blog. The three different tokens of the same picture-type share very few properties with respect to the proposition expressed – if they share any properties at all.

pictures *do* have, taking pictures in themselves – not only their inability to express negation, but the lack of pictorial quantifiers, pronouns, tense indicators, illocutionary force indicators, etc. – we arrive at this view: pictures *do not express propositional functions* (functions from contexts of utterance to propositions) *in a context-independent way*. To express complete propositions (with some illocutionary force) by conventional means requires not only conventional signs for representing objects in the world (and for indicating the illocutionary force of the utterance), but elements which perform functions such as quantification, forming tenses, building up syntactic structures – and that’s what is missing from pictures. To express complete propositions by conventional means, in a context-independent way, requires *more*, and pictures lack the adequate resources to perform the functions in question. On the other hand, Crane and Sainsbury are, it seems, adopting an untenable stance if they want to deny the possibility of genuine pictorial communication. Showing a photo or sharing it in the social media without any linguistic “accompaniment” sometimes does constitute a pictorial act. Non-propositionalist philosophers systematically underestimate the role of context in understanding pictorial communicative acts.

⁷ Kjørup, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

⁸ “... even though it is true that a picture must look like whatever it is a picture of, it does not follow from this that a picture attributes these looks to anything unless it is used to do so” (Novitz, *op. cit.*, p. 103).



Figure 1: City council of Madrid © Juanjo Martin, *El Mundo*.

It seems natural to think that this process is strictly analogous to the disambiguation of sentences, which is also based on pragmatic reasoning; both takes logical priority over interpreting context-independent compositional meaning.⁹

⁹ Catharine Abell in a recent paper draws a similar distinction between a picture's *visible* content (viz. the content we would attribute to the picture on the basis of its perceptual properties) and its *depictive* content (the content we actually communicate by the picture), see "Pictorial Implicature", *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, vol. 63, no. 1 (2005), pp. 55–66. She proposes that the difference between visible content and depictive content be explained based on the difference between *what is said* vs. *what is implicated* when uttering a sentence. I am not sure her stance is tenable. What triggers an implicature (even a pictorial one) is something that has certain semantic properties on the basis of which (and with the help of other contextual clues) the implicature can be worked out by the audience. However, the visible content of pictures *by definition* lacks any determinate semantic property. Contrary to what the content-talk suggests, visible content is nothing more than the sum of the picture's perceptual properties *perceived* by a potential spectator – without any representational nature. According to Abell, even "nondepictions" may have visible content (p. 56). Perhaps she *mislocates* the point from which pictorial implicature is derived: the audience of pictorial acts *do* employ pragmatic reasoning in picking out the relevant properties or in construing the depictive content of the picture – but this is not the same as deriving a completely new proposition from what is expressed by the utterer (because otherwise

Pictorial (Conversational) Implicatures

In sum: according to the theory of pictorial acts, in interpreting a pictorial act, the context (and our assumptions thereof) plays a much more significant role than in the case of verbal communication; “the context in which a pictorial illocutionary act is performed is to some extent a determinant of, or is responsible for, the propositional content of the act.”¹⁰

Third step: let’s apply SSSM to genuine pictorial utterances!

Super Simplified Standard Model for Meaning Comprehension of Pictorial Utterances (SSSM): whenever an audience *A* understands a genuinely pictorial utterance *U* performed by a speaker *S*, *A* must grasp

- (i) *what is said* by *U*, which contains *visual recognition* of properties on the basis of pictorial resemblance, *deducing* from the context (and from *A*’s prior knowledge, her assumptions concerning *S*’s meaning-intentions, etc.) the missing parts of the proposition – namely reference, tense, quantification, etc., and *contextual expansion* of the proposition expressed; and
- (ii) *what is implicated* by *U*, which is triggered by *S*’s communicative behavior (by the supposed tension between *S*’s being cooperative and her apparent violation of conversational norms or *U*’s lack of relevance at first sight).

Perhaps this solution to the problem of the application of our pragmatic explanation to pictorial communication strikes readers as a bit too easy; and they are right. The crucial point is whether we can hold on to the distinction, on the one hand, *between literal propositional content* expressed by showing or sharing a picture and, on the other hand, *conversational implicature* as a cancellable, non-detachable and calculable proposition (or set of propositions) triggered by the utterer’s apparent violation of conversational norms or the utterance’s apparent lack of relevance – despite the fact that pictures lack

the audience cannot secure the conviction about the utterer’s cooperative behaviour), which is characteristic of conversational implicatures.

¹⁰ Novitz, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

syntactic structure, therefore we cannot make sense of context-independent compositional picture meaning(-type).

The problem lies in the fact that “pragmatically enriched meaning” and “conversational implicature” are conceptually linked to “conventionally encoded compositional meaning”: one would think this is what can be pragmatically enriched and this is what can trigger a conversational implicature in appropriate circumstances – and this is what is unavailable in the case of genuine pictorial communication. In the next section I will phrase accurately the philosophical problem of pictorial conversational implicatures.

2. The Problem of Pictorial Conversational Implicatures

We have three propositions that are independently plausible and jointly inconsistent; I will call this “the problem of pictorial conversational implicatures”.

(Non-P) Anti-propositionalism: pictures do not have context-independent, conventionally encoded propositional content (propositional function).

(C) Only those representations can be used to convey conversational implicatures which have associated with them a context-independent, conventionally encoded propositional content (function).

(I) Pictures can be used to convey conversational implicatures.

There are three ways of responding to the problem: affirm (Non-P) and (C) while denying (I); affirm (C) and (I) while denying (Non-P); or affirm (Non-P) and (I) while denying (C).

Strategy I: *denying (I)*. This solution disallows the possibility of pictorial conversational implicatures. Communicating by pictures involves certain kinds of inferential processes, but strictly speaking these derived meanings are not conversational implicatures.

But I can see no clear reason for disavowing pictorial conversational implicatures. When I interpreted A’s photo in the chat win-

dow in a particular way, I did the same as somebody would who is working out a conversational implicature on the basis of a particular verbal utterance and of some contextual clues. Without further arguments the proposed Strategy I is nothing more than denying the obvious.

Strategy II: *denying (Non-P)*. Employing Strategy II is the most popular way of solving the problem of pictorial conversational implicatures in the literature. Philosophers and linguists analyzing “multimodal discourse” often relativize the concept of “conventionally encoded content” to the conventions of the *visual genre* to which the picture belongs (for example: cartoon, commercial image, selfie, etc.). As Charles Forceville and Billy Clark puts it: “Understanding pictures requires knowledge of conventions of depiction as well as of genres that, even though pictures do not have a grammar or a vocabulary, suggest that we should broaden the concept of ‘encoding/decoding’.”¹¹

But I think there is a considerable difference between linguistic conventions to which we automatically and directly conform and conventions of pictorial genres the adherence to which is usually preceded by a conscious decision. Genre-conventions do not serve as adequate substitutions or analogies for linguistic conventions – at least they are not adequate for our theoretical purposes.

What I propose is the adoption of Strategy III: I think *we should deny (C)*. Nothing supports the idea that the propositional content which triggers a conversational implicature in a particular situation *must be* (partly) encoded conventionally by the representational device. All that we need is the propositional content that the audience might use as a clue (among other contextual clues) for working out

¹¹ Charles Forceville and Billy Clark, “Can Pictures Have Explicatures?”, *Linguagem em (Dis)curso* 14 (2014), pp. 451–472, the quoted passage on 469. See also Charles Forceville, “Relevance Theory as Model for Analyzing Visual and Multimodal Communication”, in David Machin (ed.), *Visual Communication*, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2014, pp. 51–70.

the conversational implicature in question – independently of the “origin” of that content.¹²

Consider the case of “serial implicatures”! We can put some conversational implicatures in sequences: that the hearer is expected to infer x from what is said, while the hearer can also reasonably infer a further conversational implicature y from x . This means a conversational implicature can serve as a vehicle to another conversational implicature. But there is no expectation that the vehicle implicature x be compositionally obtained! (For example: the speaker says that *It’s almost 7*. She conversationally implicates: “we’d better leave to catch our 8 o’ clock film at the movie theater”. This in turn implicates: “if you don’t make a decision fast as to what you’ll wear, we’ll be late for the movie”. This in turn implicates: “stop staring at your closet’s contents and put something on already”. Or: “we’d better call a cab soon so it’s here in time to get us to the movie theater”.)

In sum: conventionally encoded meaning need not serve as a departure point for conversational implicatures – and this holds for language and pictures alike.¹³

¹² Marcello Frixione and Antonio Lombardi also embrace this strategy, see “Street Signs and Ikea Instruction Sheets: Pragmatics and Pictorial Communication”, *Review of Philosophy and Psychology*, vol. 6, no. 1 (2015), pp. 133–149.

¹³ I am deeply grateful to Zsófia Zvolenszky for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of the present paper. This research has been supported by Grant No. K-116191 “Meaning, Communication; Literal, Figurative: Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Language” received from the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund – National Research, Development and Innovation Office (OTKA–NKFIH).

Epilogue

A decisive insight in today's philosophy of images is the recognition that objects of vision are as a rule moving ones, rather than static. Vision and movement are bound up with each other. It has of course been known for a long time that the seeing eye is never at rest,¹ but that is not the main point here. The main point is that when we open our eyes to the world, the picture offering itself is, normally, a moving one. Likewise, our visual mental images tend to fluctuate, rather than stand still. Still images are man-made artefacts, compromises forced upon their creators by there not being technical means to put together moving ones. Drawing *image sequences*, the precursors of the animated image, of course has had a long tradition; and by the twentieth century there emerged film, animation, video. However, it was not until quite recently that handling and even creating moving images became possible on one's own computer. This latter development forms the immediate technological background of the pictorial turn, set on its way to victory. We now perceive still images as limiting cases of moving ones, we realize that it is the moving image that embodies what an image really is. Moving images are not in need of interpretation, or captions, or verbal context, as opposed to the way still images are. The notorious problem of the ambiguity of the static

¹ A brilliant summary of this issue is provided by Ernst H. Gombrich, in his essay "Standards of Truth: The Arrested Image and the Moving Eye", in W. J. T. Mitchell (ed.), *The Language of Images*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980. I have discussed Gombrich's position in my paper "Gombrich on Image and Time", in *Journal of Art Historiography* (https://arthistoriography.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/media_139131_en.pdf), no. 1 (December 2009), published in hardcopy in Klaus Sachs-Hombach and Rainer Totzke (eds.), *Bilder – Sehen – Denken: Zum Verhältnis von begrifflich-philosophischen und empirisch-psychologischen Ansätzen in der bildwissenschaftlichen Forschung*, Köln: Herbert von Halem Verlag, 2011, pp. 9–32, reprinted in my volume *Meaning and Motoricity: Essays on Image and Time*, Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang, 2014, pp. 53–71.

image herewith disappears.² Let me add that new light is here shed on another notorious problem, that of the existing or not existing grammar/syntax of pictures, discussed in volume 3 of the series *Perspectives on Visual Learning* both by Forceville and by Bárány. Just think of the primal situation of one looking around in one's visual surroundings: looking at this *and* then at that, *or* at that, or *not* looking at something.

Moving images happen in time. Images and time hang together.³ There is an intrinsic connection between how images mean and how time flows. We cannot gain a proper understanding of the function of images unless we have an at least approximate notion of what time is. On the other hand, the concept of time cannot be grasped through verbal definitions, as the history of philosophy has so depressingly shown. There is a famous passage by St. Augustine: "What then is time? If no one asks me, I know: if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not."⁴ Augustine's embarrassment was understandable, since clearly he possessed certain perceptual images related to time, did not however have at his disposal, as neither have we today, a verbally articulated explanation. What we possess are verbal *images*, in the sense of verbal *metaphors*. Time cannot be conceptualized except by metaphors, and so ultimately by images, of movement in space. A fundamental metaphor is that of the *flow of*

² The problem was classically formulated by Ludwig Wittgenstein, in a typescript posthumously published as *Philosophical Investigations*, Part I. This is way the passage inserted under § 22 runs: "Imagine a picture representing a boxer in a particular stance. Now, this picture can be used to tell someone how he should stand, should hold himself; or how he should not hold himself; or how a particular man did stand in such-and-such a place; and so on."

³ The connection between image and time is the central topic of the chapter by James J. Kimble in the present volume. I myself have extensively discussed the topic in my film & metaphor essay (see note 5 below) and my Gombrich paper (see note 1 above), as well as in the chapters "Time As a Figure of Thought and As Reality" and "Image and Time in the Theory of Gestures", both in my volume *Meaning and Motoricity: Essays on Image and Time*.

⁴ I have analyzed the Augustine passage in detail in my chapter "Die konservative Zeitauffassung", in my volume *Zeit und Bild*, Bielefeld: transcript, 2012, pp. 141–194, for this analysis see pp. 144 f.

Epilogue

time. It is a complex figure of thought, synthesizing the experience of the passage of time as a physical force on the one hand, and the experience of the present as gradually receding into the past on the other. I have extensively discussed the flow of time metaphor in my 2008 essay “Film, Metaphor, and the Reality of Time”⁵. The essay contains a section with the heading “The Pressure of Time”, providing essential references to William James and Hugo Münsterberg; preceded by the section “The River of Time”, in which I begin by quoting the seminal twentieth-century philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein writing about the flow of time, him even attempting to draw a picture of that flow (Figure 1). The attempt is significant, since Wittgenstein here clearly thought himself able to at least *indicate* in a drawing something he implied one cannot *say*. The text runs: “The immediate finds itself in a constant flux [Fluß]. (It has in fact the form of a stream.)” As time went by, Wittgenstein became unhappy with the flow of time metaphor,⁶ as indeed, to the detriment of his later philosophy I believe, with the role of metaphor in language generally,⁷ the point I here wish to make however is that from a manu-




Figure 1: Wittgenstein's drawing, Nachlaß, MS 107, p. 159 (10 November 1929).

⁵ *New Review of Film and Television Studies*, vol. 7, no. 2 (June 2009), pp. 109–118, accessible at <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17400300902816796>, for the unabridged version see https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333371028_Kristof_Nyiri_Film_Metaphor_and_the_Reality_of_Time.

⁶ As one can see from his 1934 *Brown Book* dictation, cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958, pp. 107 f.

⁷ See the chapter “Image and Metaphor in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein”, in my volume *Meaning and Motoricity*.

script entry written at about the same time as the *Brown Book* dictation it becomes clear that Wittgenstein imagined the flow of time – and so this is the way we should interpret his earlier drawing – to run from left to right,⁸ as Western thought, possibly influenced by the direction we write, commonly imagines.⁹ It is important to recall, however – this is how I go on in my film & metaphor essay – what the eminent philosopher J. J. C. Smart, probably not uninfluenced by the *Brown Book*, in his 1949 classic paper wrote:

There are certain metaphors which we commonly feel constrained to use when talking about time. We say that we are advancing through time, from the past into the future, much as a ship advances through the sea into unknown waters. Sometimes, again, we think of ourselves as stationary, watching time go by, just as we may stand on a bridge and watch leaves and sticks float down the stream underneath us. ... Thus instead of speaking of our advance through time we often speak of the flow of time.¹⁰

⁸ MS 115, p. 172: “beim Nachdenken über die Zeit [hält uns] das Bild des Vorüberfließens gefangen hält... Wie etwa, wenn wir an einem Fluß stehen auf dem Holz gefloßt wird: die Stämme ziehen an uns vorüber; die, welche vorüber sind, sind alle rechts von uns, die noch kommen, sind links. ... Wir sprechen vom Lauf der Ereignisse, aber auch vom Laufe der Zeit...”

⁹ See, too, the Kimble chapter referred to above. I have discussed this subject quite extensively in my paper “Time and Communication”, in F. Stadler and M. Stöltzner (eds.), *Time and History / Zeit und Geschichte*, ontos verlag, Frankfurt/M., 2006, pp. 301–316. I here stress that time in the medium of preliterate orality is experienced as cyclic, rather than as linear. And it is indeed “a cyclic view of time that the daily movement of the sun, the changes of the moon, the seasons of the year, and the succession of generations in the animate world suggest” (*ibid.*, p. 306). The idea of linear time is a culturally subordinate one, an idea that did not become dominant prior to the age of the printing press. In my paper I refer to Jan Assmann as providing a masterly summary (*Ägypten: Eine Sinngeschichte*, Frankfurt/M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999, pp. 27–38) of the simultaneous, but unequal, presence of the cyclic and the linear views in medieval Christianity (with the Church partaking in the sacred linear history leading to salvation, while events here in this world followed a cyclic pattern).

¹⁰ “The River of Time”, *Mind*, vol. 58, no. 232 (Oct. 1949), p. 483.

Epilogue

This varying pattern of time experience observed by Smart was rediscovered by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson some decades later in their paradigm-creating work *Metaphors We Live By*. They distinguish between the TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT metaphor on the one hand, and the TIME IS STATIONARY AND WE MOVE THROUGH IT metaphor on the other, stressing, however, that these are just two subcases of the TIME PASSES US metaphor.¹¹ Lakoff and Johnson return to this topic, and analyze it in quite some depth, in their *Philosophy in the Flesh*, where they contrast THE MOVING TIME METAPHOR with THE MOVING OBSERVER METAPHOR.¹² In conceptual metaphor theory, these metaphors have come to be referred to in brief as the “ego-moving” and the “time-moving” metaphors, with Lera Boroditsky even drawing a picture representing them (Figure 2).¹³




Figure 2: From Lera Boroditsky, “Metaphoric Structuring: Understanding Time through Spatial Metaphors”, *Cognition* 75 (2000).

I will below soon come back to the topic of metaphors, but let me first embark on a different train of thought by noting that the concept of the flow of time can be very well expressed in some specific *visual* languages: the languages of deaf communities, the language of gestures. There is every reason to believe, and this is the second deci-

¹¹ Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980, pp. 42 ff.

¹² New York: Basic Books, 1999, see esp. pp. 139–149.

¹³ In my film & metaphor paper (cf. note 5 above) I have provided an extended discussion of the Lakoff–Johnson analysis as put forward in their *Philosophy in the Flesh* book, and also displayed the Boroditsky picture.

sive insight in today's philosophy of images, that the language of gestures is the primordial language of humankind. My Postscript to volume 1 of the series *Perspectives on Visual Learning* provides detailed arguments, here let me just refer to the central point: verbal language could not have possibly emerged before the coming into being of visual language – the language of gestures and facial expressions. Verbal language rests on conventions, the language of gestures rests on immediate visual resemblances. In order to form conventions you cannot but use a language, and in the course of the development of verbal language – we are speaking of an evolution that probably happened as late as perhaps 30,000 or so years ago – the only language humankind had been in a position to use was visual language. Now once the fact of the historical priority of visual language is accepted, the primacy of visual thinking, too, must clearly be recognized. Our early ancestors were, obviously, thinking beings, however since they did not yet possess a verbal language, their thinking must have been sensual, and indeed, fundamentally, visual.¹⁴

The emergence of verbal language – spoken language – based on the language of gestures and facial expressions, must have been an immensely complex process, with so-called mouth-gestures – sound-producing mouth movements, most importantly lip movements – probably playing an essential mediating role. Now visibility is primarily bound up with the right brain hemisphere, while symbolic – verbal,

¹⁴ Perhaps it is fitting to refer here to Carl Gustav Jung's entirely hazy, but inescapably haunting, notions of archetypal images and the collective unconscious they make up. This is how F. C. Bartlett, in his classic *Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), sums up the issue, remarking that if his summary "appears to be obscure", he can plead only "the difficulty of the original statements as affording at least some excuse". The collective unconscious is "a storehouse of pictures, of ideas, of themes. It preserves psychological material". There can be no doubt, and here Bartlett directly quotes Jung, that, "'for example, those archaic symbolisms which constantly crop up in dreams and fantasies are collective'". However, the question we must ask, concludes Bartlett, is "whether there is any way of showing in actual fact that there does exist this common stock of images, ideas and formulae which continue independently of individual acquisition" (*Remembering*, 1995 edition, pp. 284–287).

Epilogue

arithmetical – processing with the left one. The rise of verbal language must have placed enormous psychological pressures on the generations subjected to the process. Imagine the accomplished orator of gesture language having to cope with the upcoming of spoken language. Stammering, he must have been looking for words. It is in this light we must see the role of early, and even contemporary, rhetorics. Rhetorics is not about the pictorial embellishment of ordinary spoken language. It is about recovering the original sensual-pictorial content having become buried under mere words. The Budapest Visual Learning Lab has had the good fortune of being able to count Petra Aczél, world-renowned theoretician of rhetorics, among its contributing members from the very beginning.

Developing through the phases of pictographs and syllabic writing, alphabetic writing emerged roughly around the 8th century B.C., in Greece. It was a real blow to visual thinking. It used no word spacing, as neither did early Latin texts, thereby making the optical recognition of single words difficult, with reading out loud the only option: you understood what you heard, not what you saw. This changed in the following centuries, but there still remained dramatic tensions between visuality and textuality, tensions wonderfully brought out by Anna Somfai's chapter "Visual Thinking in Medieval Manuscripts", in volume 2 of our series *Perspectives on Visual Learning*. Medieval manuscripts could be replete with elaborate illuminations and, even, small paintings, but let us add that, as William Ivins classically pointed out,¹⁵ they were not accompanied by scientific drawings, since in the copying process they would have been inevitably distorted anyway. The technology of printing woodcuts, etchings and engravings was unknown in Europe until as late as 1400 A.D; then came book printing with the invention of the movable type by Gutenberg, but even after Gutenberg pictures were relatively rare in humanities publications, since both for the author and the printer to deal with images was much more cumbersome than to deal with texts. With the arrival of the age of photography this began to change, but the change was

¹⁵ William M. Ivins, Jr., *Prints and Visual Communication*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953.

not radical: humanities authors as a rule did still not add photos to their typescripts, they were happy to type away on their typewriters, pouring out words that dealt with words, even while cinema and television completely altered the culture surrounding them. The radical change, as we have claimed by way of introduction, came with the computer, first enabling authors to work with still images, and then, finally, with moving ones.

The full vocabulary of verbal language must have consisted, in its earliest phases already, mainly of metaphors – we are returning to the topic of metaphor. The meagre core vocabulary could not but refer to the human body itself – its parts, postures, and movements; any extension must have relied on a transposed mode of speech. But let me point out that even gesture language already made use of metaphors. It is indicated here to refer to Wilhelm Wundt's *The Language of Gestures*, the original German editions published around 1900. Wundt claims that gesture language has “an originality and naturalness such as speech neither possesses today nor has ever had in any forms hitherto uncovered by linguistics”, and agrees with the view according to which “gestural communication is the original means of communication”. He first analyzes what he describes as “concrete” gestures, but then introduces also the notion of “symbolic” gestures, of which he writes: “The over-all character of the symbolic gesture ... consists of transmitting the concept to be communicated from one field of perception to another, e.g. implying a temporal conception with spatial means or depicting an abstract idea physically.”¹⁶ Wundt appears to be not only an early forerunner of conceptual metaphor theory, a fact not known to Lakoff and Johnson, but also of the conceptual metaphor approach as applied to the visual – a fact not known to leading figures recently pursuing research on the subject. And let me here add another idea to the theme metaphor

¹⁶ See Wilhelm Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie: Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythos und Sitte*, vol. I: *Die Sprache*, 2., rev. ed., Leipzig: Engelmann, 1904, ch. 2 (pp. 136–247). This is the chapter that has been published in the English translation Wilhelm Wundt, *The Language of Gestures*, The Hague: Mouton, 1973, see here pp. 56 and 74.

Epilogue

and visuality, an idea that was indirectly alluded to in the present Epilogue some pages earlier: even verbal metaphors express what they express only by virtue of sensual, mostly visual, images. My Postscript to the first volume of our series *Perspectives on Visual Learning* provides some references backing this idea; just now it should suffice to recall a brilliant passage by the Jesuit Stephen J. Brown, dating back to 1927: metaphor amounts to an “imported image coming vividly before our mental vision, while the notion which is the real subject of the discourse momentarily fades into the background, and is seen only through the image”.¹⁷

One of the very few who were still aware of Stephen Brown in the post-WWII era was art historian and psychologist Rudolf Arnheim. He extensively quoted Brown in a 1948 essay.¹⁸ At the time,

¹⁷ Stephen J. Brown, S.J., *The World of Imagery: Metaphor and Kindred Imagery*, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1927, p. 42.

¹⁸ See Rudolf Arnheim, “Abstract Language and the Metaphor” (1948), in Arnheim, *Toward a Psychology of Art: Collected Essays*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966, pp. 266–282. Arnheim here also quotes some parallel, essential, passages from John Middleton Murry, “Metaphor” (1927), in Murry, *Countries of the Mind: Essays in Literary Criticism*, second series, London: Humphrey Milford / Oxford University Press, 1931, pp. 1–16. The train of thought which brings Arnheim to these references is the idea of synesthesia. As he puts it: “we speak without hesitation of a ‘soft tune’, thus applying a quality of touch to sounds, or of a ‘cold color’, thus relating temperature to an optical phenomenon. ... words like ‘cold’, ‘sharp’, ‘high’, ‘dark’ have partially lost their specific perceptual connotation for us... this linguistic phenomenon itself bears witness to the fact that it is natural for man to rely on qualities that different senses have in common. These similarities ... provide the bases of metaphoric speech in poetry” (Arnheim, “Abstract Language and the Metaphor”, p. 275). I discuss Arnheim’s argument at some length in my online book *Pictorial Truth: Essays on Wittgenstein, Realism, and Conservatism*, Dunabogdány: 2007, pp. 115–118, accessible at https://www.academia.edu/34190040/Pictorial_Truth_Essays_on_Wittgenstein_Realism_and_Conservatism. Here I also emphasize the impact the turn-of-the-century leading American psychologist Titchener had on Arnheim. Words build on imagery, but imagery, Titchener emphasized, builds on the *motor dimension*, on kinaesthesia. In my Postscript to the first volume of the present *Perspectives on Visual Learning* this how I summed up Titchener’s message: “When an organism encounters a problem, it reacts with a motor answer. If that answer is not equal to

Arnheim still had a long way to go before writing his 1969 magisterial book *Visual Thinking*. That book was the first indication that after decades under the yoke of the linguistic turn, a pictorial turn might follow. For a long time it did not happen. In the past few years however the trend has changed. We believe that the Budapest Visual Learning Lab, during the first ten years of its existence, has visibly contributed to that change.

the problem, and if the organism is one gifted with sight, it then *forms itself a picture of the problem* – that is, it creates a specific mental image.”

Notes on Contributors

BÁRÁNY, Tibor, is Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology and Communication, Budapest University of Technology and Economics. He earned his MA in Philosophy (2004) and his PhD (2012) at Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest. A former assistant research fellow in the MTA-ELTE Philosophy of Language Research Group (2008–2011), a postdoctoral researcher at Central European University (“What it is to be human” project, 2012–2014). His current research interests include theories of linguistic intensionality; speech acts; metaphor, irony; semantic and pragmatic theories of visual communication; ontology of artworks; aesthetic value. E-mail: barany.tibor@gmail.com.

BENCZES, Réka, is Associate Professor at the Institute of Behavioural Sciences and Communication Theory, Corvinus University of Budapest, and an Affiliate at the School of Languages, Literatures, Cultures and Linguistics, Monash University (Melbourne). Her main research interests include word-formation and lexical creativity; the language of ageing; the social context of metaphorical motivation; and framing in political communication. Her most recent monograph, *Rhyme over Reason: Phonological Motivation in English*, appeared in 2019 with Cambridge University Press. E-mail: reka.benczes@uni-corvinus.hu.

BENEDEK, András, born 1950, is Professor of Education at the Department of Technical Education, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, and DSc of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. From 1976 to 1979 he studied systems analysis and acquired a PhD at the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences on a scholarship in Moscow. His research activities recently focus on Visual Learning and Open Content Development (OCD), introducing new conceptual elements within the framework of a pedagogical-methodological project at Hungarian Academy of Sciences. In the spirit of the Vocation

and Educational Training system improvement, there is a special approach to open content development, which moves from a rigid system of central content formation towards a more dynamic content innovation, where both teachers and students can participate through cooperative techniques, this approach having a strong visual character. In the up-to-date info-communication technological (ICT) environment a new pedagogical opportunity appears: the Open Access principle and its adoption in a wider context of practice have stirred up pedagogical thinking, amounting to a trend of radically opening up education. András Benedek was the co-founder of the Visual Learning Lab (www.vll.bme.hu) at Budapest University of Technology and Economics in 2009. To date he has published approximately 150 papers on human resource development, including the essays “New Vistas of Learning in the Mobile Age” (in Kristóf Nyíri, ed., *Mobile Understanding: The Epistemology of Ubiquitous Communication*, Vienna: Passagen Verlag, 2006), “Mobile Learning: New Horizons and Unstable Summits” (in Kristóf Nyíri, ed., *Engagement and Exposure: Mobile Communication and the Ethics of Social Networking*, Vienna: Passagen Verlag, 2009), and “Visual Education: Old and New Dilemmas” (in Benedek–Nyíri, eds. *The Power of the Image*, series Visual Learning, vol. 4, Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang Edition, 2014). E-mail: benedek.a@eik.bme.hu.

BOTALOVA, Anna, is a graduate student in the Faculty of Liberal Arts and Science of Saint-Petersburg State University, Russia and Bard College, U.S. Her academic interests are focusing around Film Theory, Philosophy of Film and Philosophy of Aesthetics. Her studies concentrate on an interdisciplinary approach to visual arts through cognitive studies, philosophy and history of arts. E-mail: annabotalova3334@gmail.com.

BUCY, Erik P. (PhD, University of Maryland), is the Marshall and Sharleen Formby Regents Professor of Strategic Communication in the College of Media and Communication at Texas Tech University. He is the author of *Image Bite Politics: News and the Visual Framing of Elections* (with Maria Elizabeth Grabe, Oxford, 2009) and editor

of the *Sourcebook for Political Communication Research: Methods, Measures, and Analytical Techniques* (with R. Lance Holbert, Routledge, 2013). His research interests include visual and nonverbal analysis of political news, user engagement with digital technologies, and public opinion about the press. From 2009 to 2016 Bucy was the editor of *Politics and the Life Sciences*, an interdisciplinary journal published by Cambridge University Press. He has held visiting and research appointments at Dartmouth College, UCLA, Oxford University, and the University of Michigan, and has consulted for industry as vice president of research for SmithGeiger LLC. In 2017 he was a visiting fellow at the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at Oxford and in 2018 a visiting senior fellow in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics. E-mail: erik.bucy@ttu.edu.

CAVAZZANA, Alessandro, holds an MA in History of Art and a PhD in Philosophy at Ca' Foscari University of Venice. His doctoral research focuses on visual metaphors and their connections with mental imagery and theories of perception. For the Academic Year 2017-2018 he has been teaching assistant for the MA course of Aesthetics at Ca' Foscari University of Venice. In 2018, he carried out his PhD research under the supervision of Dr. Marianna Bolognesi at the University of Oxford. He took part as a speaker in national and international conferences with talks on metaphor, visual metaphor and artwork interpretation. His most recent publications are "The Cognitive Role of Metaphor in Arthur C. Danto's Approach" (2017), and "Pictures and/or Words: Visual Metaphor between Innocent Eye and Imagery(2017). E-mail: alessandro.cavazzana@unive.it.

CONTINI, Annamaria, PhD, is associate professor of Aesthetics and Director of the Research Centre Metaphor and Narrative in Science at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia. Her research interests include the cognitive power of metaphor and its applications in education, the development of children's creativity through digital storytelling, the transformations of art and aesthetic experience in multicultural societies. She has participated in national and interna-

Notes on Contributors

tional conferences, publishing studies both in Italy and abroad, for example: A. Contini, *Esthétique et science du vivant*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2015; A. Contini, C. Bertolini, *Digital Storytelling for Education: Theories and Good Practices in Preschool*, Roma: Aracne, 2018. She is project manager of the European project "Stories". E-mail: annamaria.contini@unimore.it.

CONWAY, Daniel, is Professor of Philosophy and Humanities and Affiliate Professor of Film Studies and Religious Studies at Texas A&M University (USA). He lectures and publishes on topics pertaining to philosophy, religion, film, literature, and genocide. His most recent book is *Nietzsche and The Antichrist: Religion, Politics, and Culture in Late Modernity* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2019). E-mail: conway@exchange.tamu.edu.

FORCEVILLE, Charles, is associate professor in the media studies department at University of Amsterdam. He has extensively written on visual and multimodal discourse, specifically metaphor, in genres including advertising, documentary, animation, and comics & cartoons. Author of *Pictorial Metaphor in Advertising* (Routledge 1996), he co-edited *Multimodal Metaphor* (2009) and *Creativity and the Agile Mind* (2013) for Mouton de Gruyter, and *Multimodal Argumentation and Rhetoric in Media Genres* (2017) for Benjamins. *Analyzing Visual and Multimodal Mass-Communication: A Pragmatic Model* (in prep., Oxford University Press) is the fruit of his long-standing interest in relevance theory. E-mail: C.J.Forceville@uva.nl.

GOODNOW, Trischa, is a professor of Speech Communication at Oregon State University. Her publications include analyses of visual rhetoric appearing, for example, in *Visual Communication Quarterly*, *The Handbook of Visual Communication*, and *American Behavioral Scientist*. Her most recent co-edited book with James J. Kimble is *The Ten Cent War: Comic Books, Propaganda, and World War II* published in January 2017. E-mail: tgoodnow@oregonstate.edu.

Notes on Contributors

GREXA, Izabella, born 1980, is assistant at the Section of Philosophy and Historical Sciences (Section II) of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. She has a MA degree in history (2006) and a cultural organizer BA (2004). Her research concentrates on the opportunities and limits of the life of women during the Kádár regime in Hungary, especially the marginal (worker)women's social status and the representation of women poverty. E-mail: grexaiza@gmail.com.

KIMBLE, James J. (PhD, University of Maryland) is Professor of Communication & the Arts at Seton Hall University. He researches domestic propaganda, war rhetoric, and visual imagery. He is known for his investigation into the identity of the "We Can Do It!" model (now commonly known as Rosie the Riveter). This research has been noted by National Public Radio, *People* magazine, and the television show *Mysteries at the Museum* – and has reached audiences in nearly twenty countries. Professor Kimble has served as a Fulbright Scholar in Croatia, and has been a Senior Fellow at the Rockwell Center for American Visual Studies. He has been recognized by the National Communication Association with the Gerald R. Miller award and the Karl R. Wallace award for outstanding scholarship in rhetoric and public discourse. In 2010, Seton Hall honoured him with the President's Award for Service to Students. Kimble is the author of *Mobilizing the Home Front: War Bonds and Domestic Propaganda* (2006) and *Prairie Forge: The Extraordinary Story of the Nebraska Scrap Metal Drive of World War II* (2014), as well as the writer and co-producer of the feature documentary *Scrappers: How the Heartland Won World War II*. His most recent book, co-edited with Trischa Goodnow, is called *The 10¢ War: Comic Books, Propaganda, and World War II* (2016). He is presently Book Review Editor for the academic journal *Presidential Studies Quarterly*. E-mail: James.Kimble@shu.edu.

KONDOR, Zsuzsanna, is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Philosophy, Research Centre for the Humanities of the HAS. Main fields of research: philosophy of communication and images, philosophy of mind, and theories of consciousness. Her publications in-

clude “Perception and Delusionary Concepts in Science” in C. Limbeck-Lilineau – F. Stadler (eds.) *The Philosophy of Perception and Observation*, 2017; “Do We Have a Visual Mind?”, in A. Benedek – K. Nyíri (eds.), *Beyond Words*, 2015; *Enacting Images: Representation Revisited* (ed.), 2013; “Representations and Cognitive Evolution: Towards an Anthropology of Pictorial Representation”, *Journal of Interdisciplinary Image Science*, 2013; *Embedded Thinking: Multimedia and the New Rationality*, 2008. E-mail: kondorzs@gmail.com.

KÖVECSES, Zoltán, is Professor Emeritus in the School of English and American Studies, Eötvös Loránd University. His research interests include metaphor, metonymy, emotion language, American English and culture, and the relationship between metaphoric conceptualization and context. Major publications: *Metaphor and Emotion* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), *American English: An Introduction* (Broadview Press, 2000), *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction* (Oxford University Press, 2002/2010), *Metaphor in Culture* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), *Language, Mind, and Culture* (Oxford University Press, 2006), and *Where Metaphors Come From* (Oxford University Press, 2015). E-mail: kovecses.zoltan@btk.elte.hu.

LIU, Jin, doctor and professor in linguistics, dean of School of Foreign Languages, Guizhou Normal University, Guiyang, China; major research interest includes cognitive linguistics and discourse analysis. E-mail: wyxylj@163.com.

MANERA, Lorenzo, holds a master degree in pedagogy and is currently attending the Doctoral School in Human Sciences at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, tutored by Professor Annamaria Contini. He is part of the Italian research unit for the European project “Stories” (<http://www.digitalstorytelling.eu/en>) and, as pedagogical adviser, collaborates with the Reggio Children – Loris Malaguzzi Centre Foundation. E-mail: manera.lorenzo1@gmail.com.

PUTZ, Orsolya, is an assistant lecturer in the Department of American Studies of Eötvös Loránd University. She holds a PhD in cognitive lin-

Notes on Contributors

guistics. Her main research interests are: cognitive and cultural linguistics, cognitive metaphor theory, automatic metaphor identification, theories of the mind, the concept of the nation in English and in Hungarian. E-mail: putz.orsi@gmail.com.

SUAREZ, Gerard Martin C., is a graduate of Tohoku University. He is a linguistics major that specializes in the field of cognitive linguistics. His research interests are in the areas of metaphor studies, cognitive grammar, mental space theory, the philosophy of language and polysemy. E-mail: si_gerard_lng@yahoo.com.

SZELID, Veronika, is Assistant Professor in the School of English and American Studies, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest. Her research interests lie in the relationship between language, culture and cognition. Her publications and research topics are on the regional and social varieties of language, the language of “love” and “morality”, and the linguistic and multimodal metaphors of folklore. She has edited *Cognition and Culture: The Role of Metaphor and Metonymy* (Eötvös University Press, 2012) with Sonja Kleinke, Zoltán Kövecses and Andreas Musolff. E-mail: jszveronika@gmail.com.

WEN, Xu, doctor and professor in linguistics, dean of College of International Studies, Southwest University, Chongqing, China; editor of *Cognitive Linguistic Studies* (John Benjamins), major research interest includes cognitive linguistics, pragmatics, and discourse analysis. E-mail: xuwen@swu.edu.cn.